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abstract 
This thesis presents a conceptual examination of the modernist director read through 
Gillian Rose’s speculative lenses of the ‘broken middle’.  Highlighting the significance 
of speculative philosophy, I explore the meaning of the director as a mediating 
subjectivity. I demonstrate how a speculative reading of the director can act as a 
corrective to the received totalitarian, despotic image of the director. I urge for the 
rehabilitation of the director as a history and as a practice and I propose  the emergence 
of this figure as being the outcome of a complex theatrical articulation entangled with 
the discipline of philosophy. Combining close readings of philosophical texts by Rose, 
Plato, Castoriadis, Badiou, Rancière, Laclau and Mouffe, among several other 
intellectual references in this study, I explore the director as a mode or trope of embodied 
philosophy. My argument also proposes the director as an Event, in Badiou’s definition, 
and I trace this configuration as already taking place with the ‘tragic’ paradigm of the 
Athenian theatre. This Event of the director, I then argue, gets fully inaugurated in 
modernism as the Event of thought in theatre. I explore how the director acting as a 
mediator transforms theatre to what Puchner calls ‘a theatre of ideas’ while 
simultaneously philosophy becomes itself transformed to a theatre of thought.  
Chapter 1 outlines the key strands of Rose’s thought and sets out the theoretical 
parameters of my examination. The chapter argues for a speculative reading of the 
director cross-examined with current positions within theatre historiography. The chapter 
paves a new understanding of the director, not historically, but conceptually, as a mode 
of embodied thought. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between the primacy and 
centrality of the aesthetic paradigm of theatre in philosophy and the role and practice of 
the poet – or ‘chorodidaskalos’ – who I consider as an early philosophical figuration of 
the modern director. I highlight speculative ‘aporia’ which in Rose indicates a path ‘with-
out a path’ as the primary modality of thinking philosophically, already at work in 
tragedy, that renders the modernist director as a theatrical thinker. Chapter 3 puts 
forward the case of the director’s mediating subjectivity by arguing for the Event of the 
director. I analyse Badiou’s philosophy of the Event, making connections to speculative 
philosophy and illuminating the Evental dimension of this figure. Chapter 4 moves the 
examination to the Event of the director that I locate in Richard Wagner. My reading 
explores the philosophical dimension of Wagner as an artist and a thinker by which I 
rehabilitate his overtly negative image. I do this by reading Left Hegelianism, and 
anarchist philosophy more broadly, in Wagner’s operatic works, writings, and political 
activism. Chapter 5 examines the ‘speculative director’ in the aesthetic project of 
Naturalism and Realism. The chapter includes a published section by which I explore the 
political mode of the director indirectly, by examining the articulatory discourse in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s definition and the practice of affirmation. Chapter 6 looks at the 
avant-garde manifesto as a form of meta-language that seeks to actively re-shape theatre 
and the world as embodied, declaimed philosophy. The chapter repositions the avant-
garde’s aesthetic preoccupation with failure as a profoundly transformative project rather 
than as being incomplete. The included published article examines more closely the 
affinity between the Spartacus Manifesto by Rose Luxemburg (philosophy) and the more 
politicized forms of the Dada Berlin manifesto art (theatre). Chapter 7 is the concluding 
chapter by which I argue the case of the director finally having entered the theatre as a 
philosopher; that is, through Bertolt Brecht. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION    Theatre’s Broken Middle  
In response to Walter Benjamin’s evocation of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus, 
wherein he famously depicted the angel of history turning his head back, but with 
his wings facing forward while watching, frozen in horror, as the ruins of history 
piled up, Gillian Rose proposes another of Paul Klee’s angels, namely Angelus 
Dubiosus: 
 
…[a] hybrid of hubris and humility – who makes mistakes, for whom things 
go wrong, who constantly discovers its own faults and failings, yet who still 
persists in the pain of staking itself, with the courage to initiate action and 
the commitment to go on and on, learning from those mistakes and risking 
new ventures. (Judaism and Modernity 10) 
 
This is an angel who has gone through pain, suffering and destruction. However, 
it is not speechless, paralysed by the trauma that characterises Benjamin’s 
immobilised spirit, which appears struck by shock. Rose’s angle is a different, 
difficult angel. A ‘hybrid’ spirit, that has learnt to recover from loss and turn 
suffering into a struggle that needs to be overcome. As the name suggests, this 
spirited creature is not so easily swayed. This is a dubious angel. On the one hand, 
his/her implicit ‘double’ level of experiencing denotes the kind of difficulty one 
is faced with when positing an idea or possibility, having it fail in comparison 
with what takes place in actuality, and positing it again. On the other hand, it is 
this ‘doubtful’ bearing that, oddly, might be said to also hold this angel suspect 
of ‘duplicity’ – as someone who employs ‘difficulty’ in order to transform it into 
an occasion for action and upon action, evoking equivocal, speculative thinking 
as an aesthetic strategy. Was Rose thinking of the modernist theatre director when 
she drew upon Klee’s angel as a speculative symbol? Whatever the conclusion, 
one thing is for sure. That Rose’s Angelus Dubiosus’ endless trying, failing, 
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learning, and trying again, and the director’s formalistic experimentation with 
form and content in theatre, could be easily read as twin tales of speculative 
interpretation of how the world is and how it could be. In other words, what places 
the director, as I hope to show in this thesis, as a speculative thinker in theatre. 
From the highly aestheticised experiments of the Symbolists and Formalists 
of the late-nineteenth century, to Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the 
speculative form of the director channels the angst and urgency of what 
compounds the complexity and, to a high degree, brokenness of an anti-humanist, 
decadent modern world. The director, as a speculative mode of mediation, which 
is how I propose to read this figure, reflects and carries out Angelus Dubiosus’ 
ceaseless resourcing to experimentation, relentlessly restructuring the form of 
theatre, de-theatricalising it, re-theatricalising it, anti-theatricalising it, and yet 
without doing away with. My main premise here is that the director renders 
speculative thinking into a creative expression of theatre, by which the director, I 
argue, mediates experiences, knowledge and meanings. This speculative function 
is what allows this figure to claim to interpret the world as a form of not only 
explaining it, but transforming it. The director, as mediation, enacts in my reading 
experiences, knowledge and meanings, not as mere forms of recreating or 
presenting these experiences, knowledge and meanings anew, but as ways of 
acquiring a new understanding of them. It is what ultimately transforms, I argue 
in the following chapters of this thesis, the theatres of modernism into 
philosophical theatres. 
Mediation is fundamentally Hegelian. It seeks to reconcile irreconcilable 
binary opposites by resisting dualistic thinking, replacing them with a ‘triune 
structure of recognition’ (Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology 47), whereby the factor 
of attention itself to the relation between two terms is the ‘third’ term of 
mediation. For Hegel, mediation is both transformative and relational. It describes 
the negotiation of two terms which enables knowledge to arrive, not through the 
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resolution of oppositions dialectically – which would be a move towards a new 
synthesis (most prevalent in post-structuralist discourse) – but reciprocally – by 
relating one term to another, moving between opposites into a changed relation. 
Rose, too, follows this same speculative approach. However, the significance of 
Rose’s revisionist reworking of Hegel, to which I keep turning in my reading of 
the director, is that she insists on a sophisticated reading of mediation repeatedly 
asserted as a ‘broken middle’. (The Broken Middle xii) Seeing in mediation a 
method by which irreconcilables reconfigure, yet through hard and persistent 
work, Rose argues that the middle that one encounters is always a mediating 
middle characterised by brokenness. 
Brokenness, for Rose, essentially speaks of diremption – another key 
Rosean concept that informs in my reading the mediating subjectivity of the 
modern director. The significance of diremption is that, as Rose argues, it draws 
attention to ‘the trauma of separation of that which was, as in marriage, not 
originally united’ (The Broken Middle 236). Diremption points to ‘the scar of 
being broken and separated from’ (ibid.), Rose insists, allowing us to come to 
terms with the ‘anxiety’ that the ‘middle’ produces (ibid.). If it is fundamental to 
the thought of modernity, it is because it invites speculative thinking, 
interrogating the structures of the kind of misrecognition that, Rose believes, 
facilitate and sustain injustice, exclusion and trauma in modernity and its 
representations. It is also why, in this thesis, the director as a ‘middle’ that informs 
the aesthetic structure of the modernist theatre is simultaneously an intensely 
‘political’ term. 
The sway of the current study is, I hope, both ‘speculative’ and ‘political’. 
Informed by Rose’s logic of the broken middle, I seek to rehabilitate the director, 
from a tyrannical, totalitarian figure, to how I conceptualise this figure as a 
mediating subjectivity, situated between theatre and philosophy: a meson. I thus 
read the conceptual structure of the director on Rose’s speculative poetics of 
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breakdown, which designates in my account the means by which theatre shapes 
change and movement in aesthetic modernity. I start off from the double premise 
that, 1) mediation defines a process of relating that as a constant process of 
negotiation, positions the director in the middle, both a cause and an effect of new 
relationalities and possibilities – ultimately presenting the director as a site of 
contestation, anxiety and aporia in modernism. And, 2) the director’s mediating 
subjectivity is immersed in matters of thought to the extent that it turns 
philosophy into experience, produced and received on the increasingly complex 
understanding of philosophy as a mode of theatre. On this analytical basis, my 
main theoretical itinerary emerges, not from a historical reading of the director, 
but from a conceptual one. By investigating the breaks in between a duality, I pay 
attention to what might be the speculative dimension of the director which, 
broadly speaking, I conceive between a ‘thinking’ (philosophy) and a ‘doing’ 
(theatre). An in-betweenness, which I read as an embodied mode of thought, what 
I consider to be mobilising conceptual energy as an aesthetic strategy in the 
modernist theatre.  
For Jacque Rancière, one of my many intellectual references in this study, 
the significance of theatre’s middle as a performed mode of ‘in-betweenness’, is 
that it calls for a ‘political being-together’ (Disagreements 137-8) – another focus 
of this thesis. As he explains, theatre’s ‘being-between’ is to be ‘between 
identities, between world… between several names, several identities’ (ibid.). 
The middle, therefore, simultaneously designates a political radical middle that 
interrupts, fractures, disturbs and divides what Rancière calls the ‘police’ 
community (meaning authority, the political order, etc.) and the forces of 
subjectification. It is a line of argument that actively evokes Plato’s famous 
theatrical mistrust while, at the same time, subverting Plato’s critical position of 
anti-theatricality. For Plato, meanwhile, theatre is condemned and banned from 
his ideal city of the Republic due to theatre’s ability to confuse ‘phantoms’ with 
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reality and to ‘call the same thing now one, now the other’ (Republic 10.605b-c). 
Theatre’s alluring appearances, being far removed from reality itself, cause one 
to forget one’s own proper place for Plato. It is also, what posits theatre as another 
double, between the demos and the Polis, that is profoundly fractured in the 
middle.  
It is with this in mind that I turn to Rose’s speculative philosophy, which I 
read through the prisms of the theatrical. In her challenging The Broken Middle: 
Out of Our Ancient Society, the full breadth of her argument unfolds through an 
eclectic reading of Kierkegaard, whose philosophy Rose puts in dialogue with a 
number of modern thinkers and writers, from Jacques Lacan and Franz Kafka to 
Hannah Arendt, John Milbank and Rose Luxemburg. What is so striking here is 
the way in which she replaces the terms of negotiation with the failure of the two 
opposites to transform one another, resulting in a broken ‘third’ – the broken 
middle. For Rose, a ‘third’ – which is always a mediating term – is a way by 
which something or someone can ‘come to a changed relation’ so that 
‘recognition’ is attained – or, as she puts it, ‘something [is] understood’ (The 
Broken Middle xi) – even if never instantaneously or miraculously, but through 
one’s continuous engagement with and negotiation of the points of contradiction 
in pursue of what she describes as ‘a good enough justice’ (Love’s Work 116). As 
a point of the Hegelian triune structure, the ‘broken middle’ is the most significant 
‘third’, yet always, for Rose, being offered as a condition of loss and a register 
‘not of one’s struggle but of the nature of struggle itself’ (The Broken Middle 
100). In this ‘agon’ of the middle, Isobel Armstrong observes, in her nuanced 
reading in The Radical Aesthetic of Rose’s speculative thought, ‘the individual 
confronts itself as particular and universal, but discovers these contradictions’ 
(64). To be, therefore, in the middle and be confronted by it, is not to accept or 
escape it, but to bear the anxiety it produces and is produced by – i.e. ‘the anxiety 
of the middle’(Rose, The Broken Middle 101). Such a point of engagement 
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involving the continuous negotiation of a ‘beginning’ and an ‘end’ – a Hegelian 
dualism of thesis and anti-thesis – takes the shape in my account of the relation 
between form and content, character and identity, autonomous and engaged art, 
aesthetics and politics, the collective and the institutional – all of which are 
dualistic relations in a true Hegelian sense, fuelling with opposition the ‘middle’ 
as a point of breakdown that I want to suggest the director inhabits and is 
inhabited by. 
However, Rose is relevant to the director in another way, too. Rose is a 
difficult thinker. Like the figure of the director, Rose not only evades 
classification, but her important work seems to have been strangely neglected 
because of this difficulty, both embedded in and employed by her thought. This 
is the same difficulty, perhaps, that has haunted a conceptual understanding of 
the director in theatre scholarship, especially within offered accounts of theatre 
historiography. This is something that I explore in the next session of this chapter, 
arguing for the significance of a philosophical understanding of this figure and, 
in effect, of the modernist theatre. 
In her introduction to Rose’s thought, Kate Schick bemoans what has too 
often led to an important neglecting. In Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice, 
Schick describes Rose as ‘a creative thinker, who falls outside established and 
easily defined schools of thought’ (1). Another such ‘timely intervention’ is 
revoked by Vincent Lloyd’s article, ‘On the use of Gillian Rose’. Lloyd positions 
Rose as ‘one of those authors, whose work many have looked at, few have read, 
and still fewer have read carefully’ (697). ‘Rose’s call,’ he stresses, ‘to be content 
with the difficult and never-ending struggle to grapple with the world we have, 
not the world we want’ (ibid.) is not an easily accepted invitation, let alone an 
initiation in how one needs to think and act in this world. A final point of contact, 
perhaps, between Rose and the figure of the director, is Rose’s intellectual 
character that, for Arnold Jacob Wolf, is as ‘a polemicist’ (482). Similarly, 
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Andrew Shanks places Rose in the cannon of a ‘philosophy without inhibitions: 
a quite uninhibited love of Truth, at its rawest’ (6). Shanks even speaks about her 
battling with mild dyslexia as a youngster, in which nothing would come easy to 
her: ‘In her judgment of ideas she is above all, allergic to what comes easy’ (ibid.). 
However, ‘difficulty’ and the idea of ‘struggle’ are not only central to the 
experience of reading Rose. They are the very fabric of her thought. The fabric, 
too, one should add, that runs through the creative identity of the director as an 
artist and thinker of representation that is met with difficulty in the struggle of 
interpreting and creating meaning on stage. 
Such an agon for what Rose calls ‘re-cognition’ returns in her writings in 
different formulations to the interchangability of negotiation, risk and struggle, 
understood as speculative modes of knowing. For Rose, re-cognition is the 
staging of reason in such a way that understanding can be seen. When cognition 
is re-cognised, it mobilises negotiation, change and growth. It is what renders the 
path of re-cognition a simultaneously theatrical path that dwells in aporia (The 
Broken Middle 201) – the path with-out a path that necessitates inquisition, 
difficulty, diremption. Its learning process is to re-cognise – which, itself, stages 
understanding in the actuality of experience so that it can be seen again, but 
differently, and be re-understood and re-configured as a result. To understand the 
oppositional logic that Rose proposes as a mode of knowing, we only need to 
think of the various fraught relationships between the schools of modernist theatre 
and the legacies of anti-theatricality. It is what, for Martin Puchner, signals the 
appearance of the ‘closet drama’ (Stage Fright 10), in which anti-theatricality is 
not simply reconsidered or reconfigured, but actively employed in an antithetical 
manner. If modernist anti-theatricality is fundamentally theatrical, it is not a 
matter of shifting definition. It is a matter of confronting all modernist theatre 
with its radical opposition, from an instrumental Aristotelian theatrical poiesis to 
embodying a Platonic critique of theatre, both as a form of theatre and a theatrical 
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critique of philosophy. It is what turns, for example, Wagnerian theatre to notions 
of totality as forms of re-establishing the communal agency of the democratic 
tragedy of the Athenian stage. This is, though, the very political efficacy that is 
so averse to Plato. Conceiving all mimetic theatre as a democratic paradigm, he 
condemns theatre as a form of ruling – what he calls theatrocracy.  
The same opposition is immediately felt in the pure theatricality of the 
avant-garde theatre. Its foundational form, especially seen in the avant-garde 
activity of performing manifestos, is surely punctuated by a deep affiliation with 
radical politics. Manifestoing, indeed, directly interacts with real politics and 
actively seeks to make radical visions of the world possible. Towards this aim, 
avant-garde theatres and their manifestos can be seen to act as a kind of  
philosophy. At the same time, philosophy turns to theatre and produces a stunning 
display of philosophical thought. Ernst Bloch, Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, 
Georg Lukács are emblematic figures in the political discussion of the twentieth 
century that set out their thoughts in response to the aesthetic activity of the avant-
garde project within modernism. Even in the trajectory of Naturalism and 
Realism that channels the creative contradiction of the mimetic form as empathy 
and identification, consensus and discontent, body and psych, what emerges is 
‘dramatic presentation’, to borrow from Robert Leach, that ‘does not represent 
reality, but rather reworks and recreates it’ (41-2). This is the kind of theatre, 
therefore, that also rehabilitates the various versions of anti-theatricality while 
revealing, as I will argue in what follows, a deeply theatrocratic view of theatre 
which is a philosophical view of theatre on the basis of politics, and most 
specifically, democracy.  
For this reason, the significance of Rose’s thought for the modernist project 
is, I believe, twofold. Firstly, she attempts to rethink the political on the 
conjunction power and ethical consideration, understood as a fundamentally 
agonistic practice which is at the core of the modernist theatre practice . Secondly, 
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she introduces an aporetic perspective, which is not only the opting out for a path-
without-a-path, the critical path of one’s engagement with the details of a daily 
struggle, but also a speculative perspective of mediation, understood again as an 
agonistic form of knowledge that is also a creative form. The agonistic nature of 
Rose’s broken middle allows speculative thought to form at those moments of 
diremption. And yet, while it negotiates the actuality of social and political 
conditions, it is without falling victim to utopian fantasy or self-pity and 
resignation.  
The major significance of aporia is that it emphasises relationality. As 
Schick observes, ‘an aporetic journey towards recognition takes place in the 
middle, where both self and Other are perceived as agents, and the brokenness 
that attends misrecognition is acknowledged and worked through’ (91). Aporetic 
action is simultaneously theatrical action: it foregrounds the centrality of 
mediation as a space that, for Armstrong, is about a ‘coming to know and knowing 
about that coming to know’ (62), a place ‘inevitably of fracture’ (63) rather than 
connection – an agonistic space. It stands for a mode of thought, which the 
director employs in my reading to perform an inversion of theatre into 
philosophy, causing philosophy to yield to theatrical enquiries. Or, to frame this 
as a question: how can we read philosophy in the aesthetic structure of the 
modernist theatre, and particularly in the new theatrical form of the director? 
What kind of philosophy would then be the director? And how does a 
philosophical understanding of the theatres of modernism potentially allow us to 
read the director as a philosopher, as an embodied modality of thought? If the 
director can be thought of as a mediating subjectivity, what exactly does the 
director mediate? In what follows, I am also interested in the ways by which the 
director forces philosophy to advance a series of arguments in response to the 
modernist theatre aesthetic activity, while positioning aesthetic material as 
philosophical thought in theatre. In my reading, therefore, aporia stands for the 
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kind of theatrical space that reveals a conceptual, speculative meaning of the 
director, both as a poetics and a philosophical aesthetics of re-cognition in the 
struggle-filled, hard-won and reversible expressions of modernism. This 
speculative negotiation of the diremptive middle is the nexus within which my 
readings of the director as a mediating subjectivity take shape in this thesis. It 
provides a corrective to the current theatre scholarship, which predominantly 
insists on thinking and cataloguing the intellectual and artistic achievements of 
the director as an essentially historical expression of stylistic and theatrical 
conventions, rather than a speculative articulation or expression of aporetic 
negotiation, communal collectivity and democratisation that I explore in this 
thesis.  
The director’s mediating ‘third,’ as it is argued in the chapters that follow, 
reconfigures the opposition between looking and acting into a transformative act 
of shaping. In realising, as Rancière claims, that ‘looking also is an action which 
confirms or modifies the distribution of the visible, and that “interpreting the 
world” is already a means of transforming it, of reconfiguring it’ (The 
Emancipated Spectator 227), the director turns theatre’s mode of vision into an 
interpretative act that is both metamorphic and political. It is why tragedy 
emerges as a primary forum of metamorphosis in the history of theatre. Again for 
Rose, it is because the activity of mourning, being the founding gesture of tragic 
representation, is the activity of working through. It is also what makes Rose’s 
tragic conception of the political particularly theatrical. By locating the political 
in the difficult work of mourning, she conveys a tragic conception of politics in 
tragedy’s ability for self-reflection and agency. If tragedy is an experience of 
thoughtful conflict, then speculative thinking is, first and foremost, tragic 
thinking, denoting a specific intra-philosophical and intra-aesthetic mode of 
subjectivity. As already mentioned, the modality Rose names aporia evokes an 
in-between space with-out a way, and yet a space of knowing nonetheless which 
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sums in my account the director’s intellectual activity as practice – an a-poretic 
mode of embodied inquiry that could yield true social and political insight, and 
perhaps even real change.  
Part 1 of this study, ‘Philosophical figurations of the Director’ (Chapters 1–
3) reads the director’s subjectivity in Evental terms. Tracing structural and 
aesthetic sequences in the function of the director in the Athenian paradigm of 
tragedy, I identify the potential of the director’s in-betweenness. I then discuss 
mediation in Evental terms, tracing the figure of the director in what becomes the 
Event of philosophy in theatre – an embodied philosophy in the mode of the 
director. Part 2, entitled ‘The Philosophical Figure of the Director’ (Chapters 4–
6), subsequently shifts attention to the modernist modes of speculative thinking 
as the new form of the theatre director. I show how the modern director is not 
only entangled with philosophical thought, but how the cultural and political 
landscapes of modernist theatre can be revised by thinking the director as a 
speculative subjectivity.  
 
Historiography and the (Philosophical) Director  
How does one define the director? Being an artist who works through the 
mediums, skills and characteristics of other artists of theatre, such as of the actor, 
the playwright, the scene and light designer, even the producer, certainly eludes 
any clear categorisation. This is especially the case when one tries to define what 
exactly the director does, or what the actual art of directing is. This is a difficulty 
that is further exacerbated by the critical theory when this figure is assessed from 
the politics that have shaped the historical moment of aesthetic modernity. So 
how can we read the artistic identity of this figure? What does this figure mean 
for the practice of theatre, but also for society and culture as a whole? Most 
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importantly perhaps, why was there a need for this figure to appear when the 
director finally emerged at the end of the nineteenth century?  
Such questions are prevalent in the critical writings of Adorno. His famous 
essays around the rise of the culture industry pursue an exploration on what – or 
better, who – caused the culture industry to come into being. Adorno’s typically 
condescending voice turns to Wagner that, for him, denotes the process of setting 
off cultural commodification: ‘like a spider,’ Adorno claims, Wagner sits in ‘the 
gigantic web of 19th-century exchange relations’ (in Huyssen 36). Adorno’s 
reading is socioeconomically motivated and fuelled to some degree by the already 
circulating rhetoric of the charismatic ‘creator’, the self-proclaimed ‘genius’ that 
he attaches to Wanger and which informs the artistic tradition of romantic 
idealism to which Wagner belongs.  
Another major philosopher concerned with theatre is Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Certainly, Nietzsche plays a significant part in shaping the image of the director 
as a creative artist of the theatre. Starting by reworking Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
idea of the artistic genius that is capable of transcending limitations in thought by 
following an intuitive process, Nietzsche arrives at the conceptual outlines of his 
Übermensch as the modern creative artist – and specifically, as that gifted 
individual endowed with special qualities that not only allows intuitive insight 
into the world but partakes in its creation. Yet what is most interesting is that his 
Übermensch is a man (and it is always a man, for Nietzsche) of theatre: ‘the 
“Dionysian” man,’ he writes, ‘is a synonym for Übermensch, the man in whom 
will to power has been sublimated into mastery and self-creativity’ (Dithyrambs 
of Dionysus 17).   
This powerful creative identity is given an emblematic space in Olga 
Taxidou’s Modernism and Performance, Jarry to Brecht. For her, the director 
signals a ‘creative force’ that, in her words, is ‘to an extent codified, experimented 
with and given some form of definition within the aesthetic concerns of 
	  
	   23	  
Modernism and within the broader socio-political framework of modernity’ (43). 
In light of this, too, which places an emphasis on the synthetic creativity of this 
figure, an early definition of the director can be seen in the aesthetic writings of 
Edward Gordon Craig, who envisions this figure mainly for himself. Claiming 
special skill and mastery in every practice peculiar to the stage, the director is 
conceived in his writings as a kind of supreme master that sets off the Theatre of 
the Future – which is Craig’s theatre. This new theatre, like the new figure of the 
director, creates through gesture, movement, sound, lighting, costume, design and 
speech. Ironically, Craig had a problematic relationship with the actual practice 
of theatre and had very little to show in his role as a director. On the contrary, 
there were numerous lengthy theoretical writings about the role of the director 
and the new theatre he had envisioned for this figure. Yet this is something that 
cannot be discounted as a diversion from what directors actually do. Prolific 
(practical) theatre directors, from Konstantin Stanislavski, to André Antoine, to 
Vsevolod Meyerhold, to Antonin Artaud and Bertolt Brecht, produced an 
impressive volume of writings about theatre through which they introduced their 
own different stylistic preferences and openly sought to transform theatre right 
from its core by experimenting with and reforming its medium and agents.   
Therefore, what is at stake in the practice of the director is the director’s 
own creativity that is often corelated to writing in a way that reflects the equally 
contested relationship between aesthetic modernity and philosophy. We only 
need to look, in this sense, at the way Craig endorses Nietzschean philosophy by 
reciting ideas and whole passages taken directly from Nietzsche in an attempt to 
compose his own aesthetic writings, particularly as developed in Craig’s 
periodical, The Mask. Not only does he impersonate the voice of the philosopher 
but embodies the figure of some kind of philosophical theatrical master. 
Following the model of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which Nietzsche borrows from 
Plato’s dramatic dialogues in the Republic, as observes Taxidou, Craig ‘appears 
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as the all-knowing master (in part a Pateresque Socrates-figure but also a 
Zarathustra one)’, initiating ‘the student into the mysteries of his art’ (The Mask 
30).   
The philosophical concept of the all-powerful ‘artistic-genius’ offers Craig 
an intellectual premise upon which he can then enact the image of the ‘aesthetic 
man’ as deeply creative and transformative. It is how, Craig also comes to 
conceptualise his own theatrical Übermensch, namely the Übermarionette. As a 
prototype of the modern actor, the Übermarionette can be read as an attempt to 
renovate the artistic tradition of the actor-manager. By making a case about why 
the actor needs to be ‘puppetised’, Craig turns the actor into creative artifice for 
his Theatre of the Future. What is often not registered in the scholarship of the 
director is that it is through thinking about a new creative type of an actor that the 
director emerges as a by-product of creative intellectual work. In Craig, for 
example, this thinking takes the shape of promoting an Über-figure for the actor 
that, ultimately, is what the director wants to embody, recreate, and use as some 
kind of ‘other half’ in the theatrical expression of the director; that is also what 
shapes the director’s art. Furthermore, theorising about theatre in a direct relation 
to philosophy brings the director to also claim the new role of this artist as a type 
of thinker of theatre.  
In this respect, the director can, as Taxidou argues, ‘act as a channel for the 
“new” art of the theatre’, creating ‘a space’ and ‘a language’ that functions in 
itself as ‘a distinct epistemological category, differentiating it from the art of the 
playwright’ (Modernism and Performance 44). This is the same relation that we 
find with the discipline of philosophy which, already since Plato, turns to theatre 
to theatricalise intellectual activity. In this particular sense, philosophical thought 
is seen to enacted by and through the art of the director in modernist theatre and 
offered by philosophy as a kind of dramatisation of a certain ideological attitude 
which, in turn, shows the director as a kind of ‘construct’. One such example is 
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Adorno’s appropriation of Wagner. As mentioned earlier, by approaching 
Wagner as an ideological case, Adorno creates a hypothesis that essentially 
functions as an intellectual dramatisation of it. It is in this light that Maria 
Delgado and Dan Rebellato also observe in their edited collection Contemporary 
European Theatre Directors that the director cannot be seen to denote ‘a 
homogenous individual but rather as a construct that itself articulates wider 
debates around the intersections between theatre, nation, state and the broader 
structures through which geographical, political and cultural spaces intersect or 
collide’ (21).  
Now if philosophical discourse has often problematised the role of the 
director, the centrality of the dramatic text in relation to the director has dictated 
a further reductive understanding of the function of the director that sees the 
director as that other ‘prosthetic’ leg by which theatre carries the weight of the 
playwright’s word. In his Contemporary Mise en Scène: Staging Theatre Today, 
for instance, Patrice Pavis describes the director as the primary function of 
‘choosing a direction, an orientation, an interpretation’ (4). Yet, it is offered 
always as a practice to be understood in relation to staging a text – a practice, 
which Pavis conceives to be ‘unalterable, to the letter’ (ibid.). Thus his reading 
strictly situates the director in the act of ‘laying out’ and ‘of putting on stage a 
dramatic text’ (ibid.). A similar approach is seen in Simon Shepherd’s Direction: 
Readings in Theatre Practice. Here, the English context of the director is 
considered, this time from a broader artistic and aesthetic perspective in relation 
to the director’s practice. Yet, it is offered as fundamentally rooted in the 
‘practical theorisation’ of directing and he even shifts terms in the UK context, 
from ‘directing’ to ‘direction’ (16). Therefore,  Shepherd’s study which 
innovatively attempts to interpret the practice of theatre direction nonetheless 
falls prey to a theatrical discourse that reads an ‘auteur’ dimension (as 
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authoritarian) into the meaning of the director that is hardly emancipatory or 
radical.  
It should also be mentioned at this point that the term of the ‘auteur’ was 
first introduced in the theatrical discourse by David Bradby and David Williams. 
In their influential book Directors’ Theatre, published in 1988, they analyse the 
director as an auteur but without intending to propose the director as authoritarian. 
Rather, the ‘auteur’ is meant to reflect the radical ramifications of the French 
cinematic ‘auteur’ brought in the context of theatre. The ‘auteur’ conceived as an 
exemplary agent of the experimental European film occupies the kind of critical 
space by which to critique and oppose the capitalist machinery of mass 
entertainment represented by Hollywood. Similalry, in Directors’ Theatre, the 
aim was to provide this kind of similar critical ground by which one could 
conceptualise the director as a radical sociocultural figure. This is further 
evidenced from the selection of the directors’ work they discuss who were all 
notable experimental figures of the 1960s and 1970s. And yet, their account is 
still not immune to ideological binary readings of power structures that conflate 
the art and practice of the director with a type of evolved managerial function 
originating from the actor-manager theatre – most notably, the first chapter of 
their book is entitled ‘The Rise of the Director’.  
The historical evolutionary reading of the director is nothing new in theatre 
history and can already be seen in John Osborne’s early article of 1975. Osborne 
explores the theatre of the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen which is widely considered 
among theatre historians as the first director.  Entitling his article ‘From Political 
to Cultural Despotism: the Nature of the Saxe-Meiningen Aesthetic,’ Osborne’s 
tone of his overarching argument is driven by power dynamics evoked by his use 
of words and phrases such as ‘duke’, ‘despot’, ‘consistently authoritarian,’ and 
the like. Another such attempt is made by John H. Terfloth. Terfloth’s article, 
also exploring Saxe-Meiningen but this time in relation to ‘The Pre-Meiningen 
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Rise of the Director in Germany and Austria’, explicitly proposes a reading of the 
director as an autocrat that set off to discipline every aspect of theatre through 
artistic control and the subordination of the artistic freedom of the actor.  
Now you might have thought that forty-one years later, theatre 
historiography may have moved to more complex interpretations of the history 
of the director that at least rehabilitate the authoritarian image of the director. 
However, the answer is principally ‘no’, mostly giving way to a wealth of factual 
readings of stylistic trends and movements upon which the director is reductively 
mapped. Even the achievement of Toby Cole and Helen Krich Chinoy’s 
comprehensive account of the director’s art in their Directors on Directing that 
has undoubtedly thrown light on the various stylistic preoccupations of each of 
the director described, their analysis is limited, nonerheless, to the historical 
genealogical moment that appropriates the director in theatrical convention and 
styles mainly understood on the basis of theatrical evolution. This approach can 
and has significantly aided an understanding of the conditions and processes that 
compelled this new figure to emerge, yet it has offered very little insight about 
the meaning of the function of the director and the kind of thinking this figure 
fosters, both in terms of the formation of the aesthetic trajectory of modernism as 
well as a new form of art in theatre. This is further evident in Puchner’s early 
book, Stage Fright, Modernism, Anti-theatricality and Drama (2002), in which, 
despite his later, more philosophical approaches to discussing theatre, he employs 
the same normative historiographical position that reads ‘the rise of the so-called 
directors’ in the late-nineteenth century as ‘an attempt to reduce collaboration in 
the theatre and to concentrate the act of creation in the hand of one supreme 
director’ (10, my emphasis).  
Consequently, what could be said to be the key problem with  the 
historiographical approach is the casting of a particular understanding of the 
director as a primarily individualistic, tyrannical figure that is read in accordance 
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with the stylistic manifestations and trends of each movement while it neglects to 
acknowledge any more radical perspectives for the image of this figure that may 
include notions such as collectivity, equality or democracy. A representative 
example of this case in point is Christopher Innes and Maria Shevtsova’s The 
Cambridge Introduction to Theatre Directing, in which the function of the 
director is described as the immediate extension of ‘the emergence of naturalism 
as the dramatic form of the age’ (30). The director viewed as ‘a cause and effect’ 
becomes nothing more but a requirement for ‘objectivity in presentation and 
individualised characterisation’ (ibid.) that is necessitated by the dramatic 
conventions and stylistic concerns of Realism. There is no doubt that the director 
is infinitely connected to the development of verisimilitude in theatre, yet it is 
also worth questioning what this formal ‘requirement’ in the aesthetic foundation 
of Realism (and not only) actually meant for the structure of theatre as a locus of 
a dynamic interchange between representation, community and emancipation, 
and between place, form and politics. This recurrent issue in the scope of analysis 
of historiographical scholarship appears in most available examinations of the 
director. Even when directing is considered beyond the straightforward confines 
of practice, rehearsals or the efficient blocking, as seen in  Delgado and 
Rebellato’s analysis, the emphasis continues to fall on the smooth organisation of 
the text’s proper enunciation and representation and of whether directing is a 
matter to be measured by its conformity to the pre-written script. Again here, for 
them, directing (and the function of the director) is primarily allocated the 
meaning of a craft event if it ‘is never simply a question of “interpreting” but 
rather about shaping, representing, positioning and creating’ (18). It could be 
argued that the pronouncement of ‘craft’ rather than ‘art’ does not necessarily act 
as a reductive derivative in their assessment of directing. Keeping the connection 
between ‘interpreting’ and the ‘act of giving form’, understood as arranging, 
representing and creating, is indeed an approach to thinking about the director in 
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ways that make the question of ‘interpretation’ all the more important. Yet, as I 
want to propose in this thesis, it is also time that we thought of directing in more 
complex ways that move theatrical enquiry beyond purely historical accounts or 
‘how to do’ manuals of directing practice to more conceptual terms. Indeed, as 
Boenisch puts it:  
 
For more than a decade now, theatre research has offered prolific, sustained 
and profound investigations into the art, techniques and problems of the 
actor, of acting and performing. We still lack a similarly in-depth 
interrogation, let alone understanding, of theatre direction. (4) 
 
In following pages of this thesis I attempt to identify and articulate a conceptual 
understanding of the figure of the director within the theatres of modernism. I 
seek to move beyond this curious ‘lack’ in theatre scholarship when it comes to 
discussing the director and directing as an art. The notable exceptions are 
Taxidou’s two volumes, Modernism and Performance and Tragedy, Modernity 
and Mourning, both of which explore (even if indirectly) the philosophical 
underpinnings of the function of the modern director within aesthetic modernity. 
Other exceptions are Puchner’s philosophically motivated study The Drama of 
Ideas and Boenisch’s recent study Directing Scene and Senses: The Thinking of 
Regie, which reads the director’s Regie speculatively, as a Hegelian mode of 
thinking: ‘I start by asserting,’ he writes, ‘that directing thinks and that it thinks 
in its own way.’ (5) 
In the opening chapter of Boenisch’s book, the only other major study on 
directing that can be seen to complement the conceptual breadth of my own 
examination, the entry of the director at the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
is viewed in terms of producing plays, initially coming from the canonical 
dramatic repertoire and staged by an ensemble of residence artists, ‘usually at the 
public state and city theatre of Continental Europe’. (1) This is not an uncommon 
position in theatre scholarship as I have already explained, and the director did 
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indeed emerge out of the organisational structures of the nineteenth century actor-
manager theatre. Yet what is, by contrast, new and particularly interesting in 
Boenisch’s reading of this history is the emphasis he places on distinguishing 
what he calls a ‘Continental theatre’ (2) from the Anglo-American theatrical 
enterprise. In this context, the director’s emergence is to be understood as a 
primarily European phenomenon that is hardly accidental but deeply entangled 
with the developments in modern philosophical thought. Developments, I should 
further add, that bring theatre to enact, with the appearance of the modern 
director, the ‘Event of thought in theatre,’ (Handbook 72) in Badiou’s terms – or 
what Taxidou calls ‘a philosophical theatre’ (Modernism and Performance 71) 
and the kind of theatre that Puchner conceptualises as a ‘theatre of ideas’ (The 
Drama of Ideas 7).  
The other important part of the history of the director that this thesis 
proposes is an understanding of the director as subjectivity which I conceptualise 
as an Event. For Alain Badiou, an Event defines ‘pure beginning’ (in Barclay 
174). In making such an opening, something epochal takes place that is deeply 
transformative and relational, but it can only be understood retrospectively. 
Badiou’s ‘Evental’ thinking is central to the conceptual reading of the director’s 
subjectivity I propose as a speculative mode or trope. Firstly, the logic of the 
Event reveals subjectivity as fundamentally speculative, which brings us back to 
the conceptual model of mediation. That is to say, it allows us to read the 
appearance of the director not chronologically, but as the result of the process 
(Event) of its own appearance that necessitates the director as a ‘third’ term. Thus, 
to speak of the Event of the director designates, not merely the history of this 
figure, but the very essence of the historical in such a figure. It also proposes the 
philosophical configuration of the director, which, in turn, rehabilitates the 
historical director as a tyrannical, autocratic figure. But what does it mean to read 
the ‘essence’ of the director? That, instead of interrogating historical change on a 
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logic of cause and effect, mediation (what Hegel refers to in this sense as 
historicity) proposes to explore the ontological region in the structure of change 
as such. Some of the questions that confront us have to do with the meaning of 
the appearance of the director in the historical moment of theatre. What did this 
appearance cause theatre to experience? What did this figure do to philosophy 
and the hegemonic time of philosophy? How were the ancient quarrels between 
Plato and theatre first played out, revisited and played out again once the director 
entered theatre in modernism? What was the political meaning of the director in 
these theatres? As we shall see,  the director as an Event also recreates the Event 
of tragedy, reinventing what makes democracy in the same manner as to what 
makes tragedy. The link between theatre, democracy and tragedy in this thesis is 
where the figure of the director derives its conceptual meaning and where the 
Event is formed. 
What I am proposing, therefore, is not to simply challenge the normative 
position within theatre scholarship that has often associated the director with 
someone who suddenly arrested artistic control from the actor, the playwright and 
the scenic designer in order to impose a new artistic vision that was primarily 
individualistic and subjective, but to delve deeper into the meaning of the director 
in its non-anthropomorphic dimension – as a subjectivity. This thesis therefore 
conceptualises the director as an Event, which is to think of the director in its 
mediating capacity as negotiator and, as we shall see, a type of speculative thinker 
and democrat. Reading the director through an Evental prism consigns historical 
material into an intraphilosophical and transhistorical mode or trope of analysis. 
It recognises the creation of a new possibility, not in a simple linear and 
progressive manner, but introspectively and relationally as already embedded in 
the act of occurring. An Evental conception of the director would then suggest 
that the perceived origin of the director cannot be understood historically, as a 
specific moment in time, or as a particular historical figure. Rather, it acts as an 
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indicator in historical time without a beginning, behaving as a kind of mobile, 
structural activity conceived as a relational movement already at work since the 
inception of the institution of theatre in classical Athens.  
Following this line of argument, my approach might be seen as purposefully 
refusing to fall back on received notions and histories of the director as a foil for 
a restatement of traditional understandings of the director as a particular type or 
style of theatre, or a particular historical genealogical exposure of theatrical 
tradition and evolution. Rather, what I propose is a philosophical reading of the 
director, by which I attempt to rehabilitate the historical moment of this figure 
while I question the ramifications of this development in the complex critical 
terrain of aesthetic modernity. The director, presented and understood in my 
reading as a conceptual paradigm of speculative thought, enacts as much as 
embodies the anxieties and aspirations of the modernist project, which are then 
tested and negotiated by this figure. Offered as a paradigm of (politico-aesthetic) 
practice, the director can also be seen to enable a necessary critical framework 
upon which certain central questions of politics, ethics, and aesthetics are posed, 
allowing us, in this way, to gain access to a range of wider philosophical issues 
that lay at the heart of theatrical modernity. Moreover, to re-conceptualise the 
director’s subjectivity in Hegelian terms, and particularly in Rose’s revisionist 
account of mediation as a ‘broken middle’, is to move beyond the debilitating 
binary position that sees tyrannical directors and subordinated actors, and beyond 
what is a misinformed perception, to again evoke Boenisch’s own words, ‘of the 
director as authoritarian auteur who allegedly (ab)uses the playwright’s work 
according to his individual will’ (46). Rather, the aim of my examination here is 
to emphasise the speculative dimension of the director as a figure between the 
philosopher and the theatre-maker, what Badiou describes as being between 
‘thought and representation’ (The Century 40). This in-betweenness, I suggest, is 
what allows the actualisation of ideas. Their dramatisation and potentialities, 
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once embodied, experienced, and shaped in concrete physical forms on stage, are 
read in my account as representations of mediation which simultaneously denote 
the (mediating) subjectivity of the director as modes of knowledge – a productive 
mode, too, of philosophical thought itself. 
 
Directing as a Philosophical Enterprise 
 
I want to briefly address here, too, my choice of reading the modernist director as 
a philosophical enterprise rather than as a theatrical practice that purely focuses 
on the anthropomorphic image of the director either as an auteur, an actors’ coach 
or even perhaps a theatre reformer. Although my reading does not exclude these 
important parts of the historical identity of the director, it is the speculative status 
of the director that I turn my critical attention to. By ‘speculative’ I mean the kind 
of mediating function that enables the director to enact thought in space and time 
and to offer the modernist theatre as a site of agonism and a form of ‘knowing.’ 
In theatre this ‘knowing’ is always a matter of embodied knowledge and is 
embedded in the speculative experience of theatre. It is what turns modernist 
theatre, as I hope to show in this thesis, to a philosophical theatre inextricably 
linked with the function of the director as a speculative thinker of representation. 
If my reading, therefore, appears to situate the director, not at the rehearsal rooms 
where directors interact with actors in the process of staging plays, it is because 
my focus is on the speculative values of theatre that I read as representations of 
mediation. This mediating function I attribute to the director whose art creates a 
new space between acting and writing, the body and the word, philosophy and 
the stage. The director as a philosopher in this thesis is to be understood, 
therefore, as this kind of speculative figure that, to borrow from Badiou, ‘carries 
out the very complex investigation into the relationship between text, acting, 
space and public.’ (The Century 40)  
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   Following, in this respect, Badiou’s understanding of the director as 
‘something like a thinker of representation’ (ibid.), I wish to rehabilitate this artist 
as a mode thought in theatre. Like Badiou, my interest in this thesis is to highlight 
the connection between the modernist theatre and philosophy, and more 
specifically, between the director and speculative thought. As a result, my 
analysis is less concerned with stylistic expressions, rehearsal methodologies or 
a ‘how to’ guides of directing plays. Rather, I consider the art and practice of the 
director from the ability of theatre to produce ideas and I examine the director, in 
line with Badiou, as ‘an event of thought’ (Handbook 72) in theatre. This Event 
in theatrical modernism, I argue, is carried out through the mediating subjectivity 
of the theatre director. For this reason, my examination tends to focus on those 
moments and practices that seem to me to visibly demonstrate the philosophical 
dimension of the director. I turn to theoretical writings produced by this figure as 
well as the interrelation between aesthetics, politics and philosophy and less to 
the material production process of directing concerned with directing actors and 
staging plays. The latter covers vital information about the practical composition 
of directing as a theatre craft, but it is the dimension of directing as philosophy 
located in the aesthetic material themselves that concerns my investigation in this 
thesis. These are materials, too, that I perceive to be embodied expressions of the 
mediating subjectivity of the director. 
 
Antiphilosophy 
My broader definition of philosophy also includes the somehow recent term of 
antiphilosophy. First, let’s take a closer look at what antiphilosophy is before I 
explain how the term ‘philosophy’ is used in my analysis. For Boris Groys, 
antiphilosophy stands for ‘a readymade philosophy that ascribes universal 
philosophical value to certain already-existing ordinary practices, in the same 
way in which practices of the artistic readymade ascribe artistic value to ordinary 
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objects.’ (xi) He then goes on to explain that the antiphilosopher was drawn to 
‘ordinary experiences and practices that can be interpreted as being universal – 
as transcending one’s own cultural identity’ (ibid). What is also of particular 
interest in his definition is how the intellectual work of antiphilosophy 
‘dissociates the production of evidence from the production of philosophical 
discourses.’ (idid.) In short, it seems that it is the experience, practices, objects or 
(philosophical) attitudes that produce the evidence for the antiphilosophers, rather 
than self-evident discourses that are taken to be ‘determined by specific cultural 
and social conditions’ (ibid.) Thus, whilst philosophy, according to Groys, 
generates ‘universally self-evident discourses that transcend the limits of any 
particular cultural identity,’ in antiphilosophy one is concerned with ‘the 
experience of self-evidence (of truth)’ which is understood in the same way that 
‘aesthetic experience’ is produced. (xii). What is further striking with his 
definition of antiphilosophy is the correlation between the ‘artistic’ and the 
‘philosophical’ which appears, in his account, to come into contrast with the task 
of the philosopher. Indeed, the philosopher is seen as a kind of mediator – as 
someone who uses personal self-evidence as experiences with which the 
philosopher ‘mediates through his or her discourse.’ (x) 
    Now I would like to clarify my approach which does not cancel either critical 
aspect of what Groys describes as philosophy and antiphilosophy respectively. 
However, it is the latter aspect – that of mediation – that is most significant for 
my analysis that Groys attaches to the term of philosophy. As such, if 
antiphilosophy is concerned with experiences of self-evidence that emerge ‘not 
at the origin of the object or the production of the text, but as an effect of their 
contextualisation’ (ibid.), then it is the function of mediation attributed to 
philosophy that is most relevant for my reading of the director as a type of a 
speculative philosopher. This does not necessary disallow the contextual practice 
of the antiphilosopher. Indeed, my analysis often turns to contextualising various 
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philosophical texts, discourses and practices in relation to the figure of the 
director that I employ non-anthropomorphically; that is, as I explained earlier, a 
type of speculative subjectivity. Yet I am aware that antiphilosophy has its own 
independent conceptual focus and I acknowledge the limitation that my use of the 
term ‘philosophy’ poses. However, I have chosen to embed antiphilosophy in the 
broader sense of ‘philosophy’ as a discipline. This is mainly because the focus of 
my examination is specifically on the mediating aspect of speculative thought as 
well as the relationship between speculative philosophy and directing that drives 
the conceptual backbone of this thesis. Furthermore, the thinkers that I turn to, 
such as Badiou, Rancière, Rose, have often refereed to themselves as 
philosophers and their intellectual activity as philosophy – notably Badiou wrote 
two manifestos on philosophy – Manifesto for Philosophy, Followed by Two 
Essays: the (Re)Turn of Philosophy itself and Definition of Philosophy (1999) 
and Second Manifesto for Philosophy (2010); Similarly, Rancière’s The 
Philosopher and His Poor (2004) openly situates the author as a 
philosopher/mediator who not only turns to philosophy to think about ‘the poor' 
but also asks how philosophy itself depends on this thinking about the poor, from 
Plato to Karl Marx to Jean-Paul Sartre to Pierre Bourdieu. The same can be said 
about Rose who has often claimed herself as a Hegelian philosopher, and so forth. 
It is, therefore, against this background that I draw on the term of ‘philosophy’ as 
a general, all-encompassing term by which I read the director without discounting 
the aspect of antiphilosophy which I consider as an internal current of 
philosophical thought, since anti-philosophy is essentially a critique of 
philosophy.  
 
The ‘Tragic’ Gesture of a Mediating Subjectivity 
In their edited collection Staging Philosophy, Intersections of Theatre, 
Performance and Philosophy, David Krasner and David Saltz question ‘what 
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exactly do we mean by a “philosophical” approach to theatre and live 
performance?’ (2). Distinguishing between critical theory and philosophical 
analysis, with the latter being the examination of ‘the assumptions made by 
critical studies’, they conclude that a philosophical approach to analysis is what 
‘advances new arguments about – and new approaches to – the nature of theatre 
and performance in general’ (ibid.). To address a likely objection to the kind of 
approach that I am proposing here, whose main trope is philosophical, I would 
like to briefly address my choice. Why treat the director as a philosophical 
phenomenon? And why approach the director in this way, from the specific 
philosophical locus of mediation? This privileges a theoretical approach that, 
while it appears to limit significant historical enquiry, it seems to promote a 
fundamental historicity – it describes, in other words, the historical placement of 
the meaning of the director as opposed to the director being historical, which 
again is a Hegelian dialectical mode of analysis. I will address each aspect in turn 
by highlighting the relevance of mediation to the primary form of theatre, namely 
tragedy, where I locate the origins of the director as a mode of thought. 
We should not forget that when Hegel proposed his speculative philosophy, 
it was not only in response to the perceived limitation of the Kantian dual 
thinking, but with a profound grasp of tragedy that rather shaped his 
understanding of mediation as a dialectical form of reconciliation and dissolution 
on the other. Since the focus of the tragic universe is not the tragic hero, who is 
only a by-product of this universe, but the city-state conceived, reflected and 
presented equivocally, it is always to be negotiated on moral and political 
grounds. It is what makes the notion of justice both vitally important and intensely 
ambivalent. There is not one justice – or at least, not one ‘right’ justice – but only 
justice as an agonistic topos or conflict. Its speculative thinking most visibly 
unravels in its tendency to repeatedly dissolve all the markers of certitude that 
need to be questioned and negotiated for any course of action, always leaving us 
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and its heroes wondering ‘what is to be done next?’ – or, rather, ‘what is the right 
thing to be done next?’ In other words, it could be said that tragedy, once it is 
viewed as part of the conceptual constitution of the director’s cultural meaning as 
I want to explore in what follows, signals not the beginning of the experience of 
rational argumentation, or its terminus, but the kind of a mediating dimension in 
which the civic and the collective can be re-thought, re-imagined and, finally, re-
cognised as something new, or something else in the aesthetic paradigm of 
tragedy. For if tragedy reveals a kind of politics – a tragic politics, founded by the 
difficulty and uncertainty of action, the partial intelligibility to human agency, 
‘where autonomy is necessarily limited by the acknowledgement of dependency’ 
(‘Tragedy’s Philosophy’ 32) as Simon Critchley argues, in an equivocal world in 
search of what Rose calls ‘a good enough justice’ – then I would like to argue 
that it is a tragic conception that provides us with insight into the political and 
philosophical dimension of the director as a theatrical phenomenon of the 
modernist theatre. Having said this, however,  I am not suggesting here that the 
director is a ‘tragic’ figure. Rather, that the aesthetic value of the ‘tragic’ is 
intimately related to this figure and it is a relation that is unambiguously 
speculative and political as a matter of aporia.  
When Aristotle described the genre of tragedy as the imitation of action – 
mimesis praxeos, he avoided elaborating the aspect of tragic action as the 
outcome of a conscious decision (something that Plato was mostly concerned 
with because it is the aspect the connected theatre with politics). Or to borrow 
from Simon Critchley, the question here is ‘how to act’? (‘Tragedy’s Philosophy’ 
33). As he argues, in tragedy ‘we find human beings somehow compelled to 
follow a path of suffering that allows them to raise questions which admit of no 
easy answer: what will happen to me? How can I choose the right path of action? 
The overwhelming experience of tragedy is a disorientation expressed in one 
bewildered and frequently repeated question: what shall I do?’ (ibid.) And yet, it 
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is a question that in theatre, like in democracy, cannot escape either the 
speculative act of ‘judging and choosing’. This is primarily an act of thought, of 
‘thinking in action, thinking upon action, for the sake of action’. (ibid.) It is the 
kind of thinking, indeed, that motivates and requests, not only radical questioning, 
but ‘the difficulty and uncertainty of action’, (ibid.) whose ethical ambiguity 
invites equivocation as an aesthetic strategy that incorporates in its experience a 
mode of embodied thinking – or, if you like, a thinking subjectivity, embedded in 
the work itself. This same kind of subjectivity, therefore, regulates affect and, in 
particular, the affect of grief in tragedy, and its relation to form –  what perhaps 
triggered Plato’s denunciation of tragedy in the first place. That is, the possibility 
of embodying, what Stuart Hampshire calls, ‘adversary reasoning’ or ‘adversarial 
reasoning’ (181) in the visceral, full-blooded form of theatre that is also offered 
as the most powerful political diagnoses or, even, political forms of power 
themselves. Even if the experience of tragedy revolves around moral ambiguity, 
its elevation of ‘justice’ to a conflictual topos to be seen and be experienced as 
such, signals the dissolution of all the markers of certitude in which the question 
of ‘what shall I do?’, for Critchley, poses both the beginning of rational 
argumentation and the ‘reason’s terminus’ (34), which is the dynamic opposition 
of thinking theatrically. It incorporates spectatorship in the thinking of the ethical, 
which transforms spectators by reconfiguring a new (ethical) subjectivity through 
the fictional world of tragedy. 
Now there is also the mode and method of thinking about the theatre that 
the recent ‘philosophical turn’ in theatre studies describes under the rubric of 
‘Performance Philosophy’. This is a methodological approach concerned with 
‘theatrical thinking’ in ways by which concepts, genres, and language are 
employed by philosophy to either literally enact philosophical ideas (such as we 
find in Plato’s dramatic, dialogic thought, for example), or by reconfiguring 
theatre for the appropriation of philosophy in models and paradigms that 
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constitute theatrical thinking. Philosophy, in this sense, not only in the sense of 
producing thought but as a different form of theatre, offers a method of thinking 
of the theatre while staging and embodying thought. Or, to frame it in Hegelian 
terms, theatre ‘becomes’ thought, while simultaneously its ‘being’ is its own 
‘becoming’ as a mode or trope of theatre.  
For Kenneth Burke, such a dialectic dimension is embedded in the dramatic 
form of philosophy already visible in Plato’s writing. As he argues, the dialectic 
form can be regarded as written ‘in the mode of ritual drama’ (107). Reflecting 
on Burke, in his article ‘Kenneth Burke, Theatre, Philosophy, and the Limits of 
Performance,’ Puchner points out that Burke’s source for developing his 
argument around the dramatic origin of the ‘dialectic’ is Hegel (48). Indeed, 
Hegel’s appropriation of theatre as a mode of thought, by which he proposes his 
speculative dialectics, is outlined in his Philosophy of History. History, he 
maintains, happens as if we have entered ‘the theatre’, comprising of different 
‘scenes’ and ‘characters’ which unfold on the ‘stages’ of the world history. (58) 
It is what also brings Simon Critchely to state that ‘tragedy is a dialectical mode 
of experience. …[and] an object lesson in dialectical thinking.’ (36) As he 
explains, ‘It is a staging of dialectics, which is why Hegel had such a profound 
grasp of tragedy, even if he sometimes confined it within the horizon of 
reconciliation, on the one hand, and dissolution, on the other’ (ibid.). In Peter 
Szondi’s An Essay on the Tragic, the concept of the ‘tragic’ explored from 
Schelling to Benjamin is, once again, identified as the source of dialectic thinking, 
epitomised by Hegel as its key representative. The gesture is one of reciprocity, 
yet one that also allows us to conceive in tragedy a point of rupture; thinking 
attempts to stage a theatre of thought and for thought, as both a mode of theatre 
(tragedy) and of philosophy (knowledge). The mediation between the two is the 
speculative space that originates in the ‘tragic’ gesture of embodied thought. But 
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how can mediation provide us with an understanding of the director as a mode of 
knowledge, a mode of embodied thought? 
Mediation is already a ‘thinking over’, which has thought for its content 
(Armstrong 69) – a kind of going beyond itself, which includes itself and object  
in the manner that the director attempts to understand theatre and its materiality; 
in other words, by endorsing an implied sense of ‘incorporation’ that is central to 
the director’s artistic subjectivity. For, if an activity of ‘thinking over’ contains 
the dynamism of thought that generates its own principles of activity from within, 
as Hegel argues, then it is also what changes the object, by re-working, which is 
the very process of positing it, giving it ‘a new status in consciousness and 
returning it to experience in a different form’ (ibid.). The director, in this sense, 
embodies and gives way to a kind of problematisation as a process of producing 
a new interpretation – and a new interpretation, as a process of creating meaning, 
is a transformation. Towards this end, I argue, the director is a truly Hegelian 
figure in the most ‘tragic’ sense; it is only through the mediation of alteration that 
the director proposes that the central aspects of an object come to consciousness, 
which in itself is an implicit act of shaping – or we might say ‘direction’ – that is 
also always an aesthetic act. For things, for Hegel, cannot be understood unless 
they are altered.  
What is argued in the next few chapters is that the mediating subjectivity of 
the director is what turns thought into experience. It is through the mediated 
nature of the director that thought can be shared, in an attempt to understand the 
point of aporia – that point where things ‘come into a changed relation’. 
(Armstrong 70) The director transforms the material s/he thinks with, which is 
why the double nature of mediation in the modernist theatre can be seen to involve 
the veering movement of form/unform, shape/unshaped, frame/unframe. It is also 
why the mediating middle of the director is intrinsic in the act of judging and 
choosing which, in Hegelian terms, presupposes negation. That tearing apart, a 
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moment of schism, that is integral to mediation, generating the anxiety which 
produces it. 
The reading I develop in the following pages sees the director as a 
mediating middle, a form of thought and, simultaneously, a request for 
knowledge, that renders the medium of his/her art away from the reductive 
associations of directing as a privileged kind of creativity, cut off from the 
experience everyone goes through. The tearing apart and splitting of diremption, 
the brokenness of the theatrical middle that I have discussed so far, I see as 
moments in the mediating process that come to inform the aesthetic subjectivity 
of the director – as a form of embodied thought, and simultaneously a creative 
aporia, to borrow from Rose, makes it possible ‘to know, to misknow, and yet to 




Chapter 1, which is my opening chapter to this thesis, examines the speculative 
premises of theatre as a ‘broken middle’. The chapter introduces the main strands 
of Rosean thought upon which I propose my reading of the director as a 
speculative thinker in theatre. Highlighting some of the problematics in the study 
of the director in contemporary theatre historiography, this chapter makes a case 
for a more conceptual, philosophical approach. The theoretical models of the 
Event and Tragedy are offered as alternative methods by which this thesis 
approaches and interrogates the meaning of the director as a mediating 
subjectivity.  
The aesthetic paradigm of tragedy is explored in more detail in Chapter 2, 
in which I identify the origins of a speculative space that later will give rise to the 
figure of the director – not genealogical, but as what Badiou calls an Event. The 
chapter looks closely at several philosophical texts by Plato, Castoriadis and Rose 
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and puts forward a new understanding of the function of the classical ‘poet’ as 
the first philosophical figuration of the modern director. This premise is more 
closely examined in the next chapter (Chapter 3) in which I compare Badiou’s 
philosophy of the Event with mediation, and how they both help us rehabilitate 
the director and various themes of the modernist theatre conceptually as a mode 
of thought.  
Chapter 4 rehabilitates Wagner from a proto-fascist to the first articulation 
of a philosophical director. I revisit his own writings that I analyse in relation to 
the philosophers that shaped his thought and his work, and I interrogate the way 
Wagner has been received through them and subsequently by philosophical 
discourse. By identifying an embodied mode of philosophical thought in 
Wagner’s aesthetic materials themselves, I explore Wagner as a Hegelian 
modality and argue for an alternative, positive reassessment of the meaning of 
Wagner as a socialist revolutionary and anarchist.  
Chapter 5 looks at the speculative subjectivity of the director in Naturalist 
and Realist theatre. Part of the aim of this chapter is to rethink the Naturalist and 
Realist project from its typical coercive application to what I perceive to be an 
affirmative antinomy. I explore this dimension in the published article included. 
The rest of the chapter takes a close look at what it is precisely that constitutes 
the Naturalist and Realist director as a speculative figure. This analysis is taken 
further in the context of the avant-garde project in Chapter 6. I particularly focus 
on exploring the art of the avant-garde manifesto as a philosophical configuration 
of the director. My intention is to draw links between the director as the mode of 
thought in theatre and its relation to politics in ways that keep revealing the 
director as a speculative modality, deeply agonistic and aporetic. This, I argue, is 
seen in the director’s meta-language that shapes the creative and intellectual form 
of the avant-garde manifesto. The chapter reads closely Marinetti’s futurist 
manifestoing activity and, later, the more political Dada Berlin manifesto as 
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expressions that insists on positively offering the themes of violence and failure 
as radically transformative, visionary and hopeful.  
In this light, Dada’s project of performative ‘negation’ is proposed to 
exemplify avant-garde’s experimentation with the political form of the manifesto; 
it conveys that glimpse of hope, of the promise that something may just happen, 
even if by staging the ‘negative’ which functions as a profoundly affirmative 
expression or, as it were, meta-manifestation. The premise of staging negativity, 
and failing because of it, is what ultimately enacts, I argue, a radical 
transformation in the theatres of the avant-garde; not by seeking to ‘mend’ the 
difference, or to seek perfection as a solution, but to exactly work through the 
brokenness in order to discover, as Rose would insist, a ‘good enough justice’. In 
this way, I propose the rehabilitation of these failed projects which I view as 
expressions of the director’s deeply speculative meta-language of thinking 
theatrically and acting politically. 
       The final chapter takes this premise further and reads the figure of Bertolt 
Brecht as the instance of the philosopher inside the theatre. With Brecht, the 
philosopher has entered the physical stage of theatre, rendering theatre into 
philosophy more directly. I examine this interface by juxtaposing Brecht’s ideas 
with platonic philosophy, and I argue for the status of the philosophical director 
as fundamentally theatrocratic. By this I do not mean Platonist but a kind of 
mediation, between theatre, philosophy and politics, as already implied by the 
term theatrocracy [theatre + state], that is understood here speculatively – as 







	   45	  
Chapter 2 
 
Between Theatre and the Polis 
 
The gaps indicate the irruption of thought: not the irruption of the city, 
alternately legitimate and illegitimate in its morphology of domination and 
authority… without generating the fantasy of mending the world – even less of 
mending the ‘two worlds’. 
–  Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law 33 
–   
Leaving the rubble in their masses 
Join in the column as it passes 
Squeaking ‘Freedom!’ as they flee 
‘Freedom and Democracy!’ 
– Percy Bysshe Shelley, Mask of Anarchy 42 
 
Each society creates its own forms. These forms in turn bring into being a world 
in which this society sees itself and gives itself a place. It is by means of them 
that society constitutes a system of norms, institutions in the broadest sense of 
the term, values, orientations, and goals of collective life as well as of individual 
life. At their core are to be found in each instance social imaginary 
significations, which also are created by each society and which are embodied 
in its institutions.  
– Cornelious Castoriadis, The Social Imaginary 56 
 
Participation 
Plutarch’s historical account of Thespis’ encounter with the magistrate Solon, one 
of the architects of Athenian democracy alongside Cleisthenes, is presented with 
a dispute. Having broken ranks with the chorus, Thespis performs an act that 
voices matters of political and civic life. Solon, enraged by the diversion, accuses 
Thespis of professionally deceiving the audience with lies that threaten to pervade 
society. However, the first man of theatre cunningly replies that it is not him but 
the character who speaks in the play, to which Solon, ‘vehemently struck[ing] 
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his staff against the ground,’ responds: ‘“Ay, if we honor and commend such play 
as this, we shall find it some day in our business”’ (Plutarch’s Lives 229).  
Theatre’s illusionistic dimension by the means of the spectator’s 
participation in the suspension of disbelief, and its partaking to the theatrical 
experience of imagining alternative perspectives embodied on stage, have often 
stood for a more ‘real’ existence than reality itself. Insofar theatre is taken to mean 
the direct image of the political agora, understood in its classical sense as the 
assemblage of people in a shared space, theatre can also be seen to represent the 
twin image of politics. What is at stake is not only the processes of framing and 
representation that appear common to both politics and theatre. While these are 
highly formative processes in which public perceptions are influenced, contested, 
and finally shaped, they are considered to determine the material expression of 
political life, despite theatre’s obvious fictional premise. This kind of political 
dialogue between theatre (thespis) and the Polis (Solon), foreshadows, to a certain 
extent, a relationality between theatre and politics which, as we shall see, shapes 
the identity of the director when this figure finally appears in modernist theatre. I 
will return to this configuration in my later discussion; for now, however, in order 
to understand just how the political ramifications of such a possibility 
problematise theatre in its conceptual core as a medium of vision and of visibility 
– a medium, as it were, of appearance more ‘true’ than reality itself – a brief 
etymological check of theatre is first in order.  
Theatre, coming from the same term as ‘theory’, derives from the Greek 
word thea meaning a place to be seen, or from which to see, to view, or observe 
something. As a field of vision, the problem with theatrical representation is said 
to be one of interfering, to recall Solon’s words, with the ‘business’ of governing, 
at the route of which is one’s participation in phantasmic possibilities that come 
to pass as ‘real’. In other words, it is the spectator’s participation as a form of 
regulation of the social and the political. At least, this is the perpetuated argument 
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over the fear of theatricality that has been voiced since the time of Solon. As a 
result, the civic act of participation receives its most critical attention as a 
theatrical practice of ‘vision’ of the ‘political’. Indeed, theatre’s double function 
as a space of ‘play’ and a space of public dialectical debate problematises 
theatrical visibility as a certain field of power-relations, which shape and threaten 
the society from within which it evolves. It is why the idea and practice of 
participation, considered as a distinctively theatrical trait, has always been 
intertwined with politics and, most particularly, with the formation of Athenian 
democracy. But it is why, too, the nature of theatre, understood as a fundamental 
democratic act in the body politic, is naturally invested, I argue, with political 
values that, on stage, are simultaneous ways of engaging with philosophical 
thought.  
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that the concept of participation has 
often dictated the ways in which the relationship (or opposition) between theatre 
and philosophy are assessed. Proposed as a cultural medium to strengthen 
democratic identity in classical Athens, theatrical participation was meant to 
facilitate cognitive skills during the act of participation with ‘fragments of reality’ 
of their society presented on stage. As S. Sara Monoson observes in her 
comprehensive Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, Athenian Politics and the 
Practice of Philosophy, when theatre was invented in classical Athens it was as a 
cultural practice through which citizens were provided with ‘an opportunity to 
hone intellectual skills that would be valuable when conducting policy 
deliberations and making decisions in the Assembly, courts, and Council’ (7). 
Monoson then discusses the role of theatre in the running of the democratic 
society, pointing out how theatre was integrated in the practice of democracy as 
an innate component of democratic politics rather than as something conducted 
outside of Athens’ democratic life. The civic content of the Athenian theatre 
receives an equally political significance in Simon Goldhill’s assessment, in 
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which he, too, argues that citizens’ participation at theatrical events was 
distinguished between private or leisure activities. Rather, attending the theatre, 
he points out, and ‘being a theatēs… [was] not just a thread in the city’s social 
fabric, it… [was] a fundamental political act’ (106). What such a dramatisation 
of the city’s perception of democratic citizenship in the practice of theatre also 
showed was the ability of theatre to not only engage and foster the vigorous civic 
practice of democratic identity and the excellence of the democratic polis. Rather, 
that the possibility of theatre as a philosophical space itself was capable of 
enacting the Athenian civic self-image as an intellectual demos capable of 
directly conversing with the Athenian politics of democracy. What was more, it 
was a relational configuration (between thought, politics and representation) 
articulated aesthetically in the work and practice of the poet/chorodidaskalos, that 
needs to be understood here dialectically – as a Hegelian negativity; that is, as 
Weber observes, in accordance with Plato, Aristotle and Heidegger, that 
participation encompasses its own negativity for its materialisation. It denotes a 
sense of ‘sharing’ and ‘partaking’, which  is always inherent to ‘dividing or 
divesting, a parting or, perhaps more precisely, a departing, a taking leave, a 
partitioning in order to impart’ (19). This seemingly ‘negative’ gesture that 
underpins participation is, however, not actual, in the sense of ‘the resolving of a 
relationship’ (ibid.), but is Hegelian dialectical in the sense that it expresses 
speculative negativity. Or, to phrase this configuration differently, participation 
as a ‘parting’ naturally negates the very notion of participation, but it does not 
dissolve participation in its ‘partitioning’ which is also the point that forms 
dialectic negation. What this essential condition of negativity highlights, 
therefore, is a relation that requires one to remain ‘with precisely by parting’ 
(ibid.). This performative inversion is, for Weber, equivalent to what Guy Debord 
reads as a relation of ‘union’ in theatre: ‘The spectacle,’ she argues, ‘thus unites 
what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness’ (36).  
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In the special issue of Performance Research journal on ‘Philosophy and 
Participation’, Laura Cull and Karoline Gritzner situate the notion of participation 
in similar dialectical terms, between performance and philosophy. What they 
interrogate is ‘how performance and our participation in it or with it might impact 
upon how we define “thought”’ (‘Editorial’ 5). Participation, they argue, ‘might 
be considered as a form (between part and whole, particularity and universality, 
the subject and the object), or it might be explored as a philosophical concept 
understood to signal a break with the dialectical approach to reality in favour of 
positing a primary relationality in which mind and matter, beings and Beings, or 
substance and expression, participate in one another’ (ibid.). The idea of 
philosophy as an insatiable consumer-participant of spectacle first appears in 
Plato’s Republic when Socrates, portrayed as eager for the thrills of spectacles, 
heads to Piraeus to attend a festival. In this scenario, the dramatic setting, which 
is comparable to the physical sight itself, is what conveys thought, rendering in 
this way the typical ‘lovers of sight’ (hoi philotheamones) in theatre, (475d-e) 
into lovers of the ‘sight’ (or vision) of truth in philosophy. The significance of 
what seems to be a reciprocal placement between thought and representation 
etymologically takes place in this ‘split’ that defines participation. On the one 
hand, it could thus be said that theatre frames or encloses a place or a series of 
places that it traverses while part(ak)ing (eg. Socrates in the role of theatrical 
spectating) in semblance as a mode of thought. The idea of speculative spectating 
is the following:  if ‘the divided character of such taking place,’ as Weber 
observes, ‘constitutes the quintessence of the theatrical scene,’ it gestures towards 
‘other scenes, which remain inconclusive, even and especially where the 
sequence ends or stops’ (22). Yet on the other hand, the very nature of the 
spectacle, which is capable of transforming a place into some other place 
somewhere else, is also what makes the visual and aura experience of spectating 
to be (dis)embodied in site/sights, both in terms of ‘being’ and ‘thinking’. In other 
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words: the portrayal of Socrates as a theatre-goer, that is reminiscent of Plato’s 
cave imaginary in which the philosopher escapes the spectators’ imprisonment, 
only to descend back in to share the light of ‘truth’, is also what renders spectating 
into a simultaneous mode of thinking-through-seeing as well as a site of 
(philosophical) ‘knowledge’.  
My interest, however, in the theatrical notion of participation is neither 
purely philosophical nor political. Rather, it is the aesthetic values of participation 
displayed by the role and function of the poet as chorodidaskalos that 
foreshadows, I argue, an aesthetic figuration of the modern director. With this in 
mind, what I want to question here is twofold: a) what is the kind of thinking that 
theatre as a site of vision and knowledge signifies? and b) what kind of 
participation is found in the aesthetic structure of the tragic theatre? I will look 
specifically at the tragic imaginary of this theatre as developed in democratic 
Athens, to which I trace a specific modality of thought, later to be 
transubstantiated (as in metousiosis), I claim, in what makes up the speculative 
subjectivity of the director, as we shall see.  
To start with, we need to first ask how can participating in the embodiment 
of the Greek tragic imaginary be read as a mode of thinking in itself? What kind 
of participation in (the thought of) performance is in the act ‘of being a theatēs’ 
that the figure of the poet engenders in the Athenian theatre? And what is the 
relationship of this practice to Athenian democracy? If the tragic theatre denotes 
a wholly democratic image of its spectatorship, what kind of democrat is the 
aesthetic presence of the poet/chorodidaskalos?  
The issue at hand is not merely to question the relationship that underpins 
philosophical activity and performative work in terms of how performance might 
illustrate philosophical discourse. It is how one might interrogate the ‘tragic’ of 
the democratic theatre in the embodiment of the poet/director’s thinking which I 
understand as a specific embodied mode of speculative thought already ingrained 
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in the tragic performance itself. Towards this aim, my analysis draws on 
Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of the ‘social imaginary signification’, a striking 
elaboration of which I locate in Rose’s speculative thought by her term of aporia. 
Rose’s call for the equivocation of the ethical that shapes her notion of the 
‘aporetic’ as a position of justice that is also a political position seems to bear a 
great resemblance to the aesthetic core that drives the Greek tragic imaginary, not 
only as a critique of classical democracy at the Athenian democractic society, but 
as a poetics of a particular type of democratic thinking embodied in what was 
called the ‘lesson’ of the poet/director. I read this practice as the kind of 
speculative knowing that arrives from aporia. I further look at Plato and his notion 
of theatrocracy, which I positively invert and explore in theatrocratic practice, not 
what Plato saw as the stompfeet ‘rule’ of the spectator, but spectating itself as a 
theatrical modality of thought. I examine this interface in the aesthetic structure 
of chorodidaskalia that I argue prefigures the art of directing. 
 
 
Didaskein Choron: the Poet/Director 
In Republic, Book 10, Plato excludes all mimetic poetry from his ideal city. 
Proposing the existence of single, unchanging ‘ideal Forms’ instantiated by 
objects in the physical world, he explores the value of ‘truth’ in relation to, and 
between, appearance and original. This, then, leads him to develop what has come 
to be known as his ‘Theory of Forms’, the key significance of which is the ascent 
of the soul to the realm of Forms as the ‘ascent of the mind’ (517b). These are, of 
course, not literal ascents from the physical world to the spiritual, but are integral 
to the ontological status of particulars as existing in-between being and non-being 
(478d) and, as such, of sensory things having a reality to the degree that they 
participate in reality. Put differently, Plato’s Forms make a metaphysical 
supposition that has a profoundly political significance: for how we understand 
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the world always inscribes a process from one way of apprehending it (such as 
through senses) to another (such as the intellect and philosophical labour), which 
then correlates, as Plato believed, to the ascent from appearance (illusion) to 
reality (forms).  
Plato’s metaphysical gesture of Forms, then, articulates a move towards 
affirming (as opposed to escaping) ‘the real world’ that he thinks needs to be 
distinguished from the one considered as ‘real’ when it is not (e.g. such as in 
sophistry or theatre). Yet in doing so, Plato lays the ground for a truly dialectical 
position between the truth of Forms and theatre’s deceptive appearance of truth. 
The problem with the latter has to do, for him, with mimesis, while it is the former 
– the coming-to-know reality itself – that he attributes to the discipline of 
philosophy. It goes without saying that holding theatre, on the one hand, as 
responsible for ‘faking’ reality and, on the other, philosophy as an eye-opener and 
the sole instrument for unearthing the true essence of things already implanted in 
the universal Forms themselves – yet Forms which require proper philosophical 
attention and understanding – Plato deliberately sets up an antagonistic and anti-
mimetic relationality between theatre and philosophy, yet with the intention of 
affirming the superiority of the discipline of philosophy in matters of ‘knowing’ 
against mimetic theatre. What is further fascinating in this regard is the way in 
which he not only distinguishes the mimetic poet from any other representational 
artists (such as the carpenter or painter), but that he does so by employing a 
theatrical model by which he advances his own dialogic philosophy – what 
Freddie Rokem (Aesthetics and its Discontents) and Tom Stern perceive as an 
attempt to replicate the effect of mimesis in his thought, putting us in effect ‘twice 
removed from the real thing’ (Philosophy and Theatre 27), just like the ‘reality’ 
that Plato believes theatre attempts to portray. Naturally, the question of whether 
Plato truly rejects theatrical mimesis registers in ways that open up much 
speculation. Indeed, as Puchner observes: ‘If Plato did not entertain the possibility 
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of such a good, philosophical mimesis, a mimesis of forms, his own dramatic 
form would be an obvious and blatant contradiction’ (The Drama of Ideas 32). 
But what was, then, the real purpose of Plato’s critique of mimesis in his  thought? 
It should be noted that mimetic poets, usually referred to as tragōidoi in 
David Wiles’ Theatre and Citizenship, were not only meant to compose the play 
but to also rehearse and stage it. This was a highly skilled, long process that 
involved the training of actors and the chorus in movement and choral singing. 
Choral training was an important part of an Athenian’s education. In Frogs, for 
instance, Aristophanes presents choral experience and education as a compulsory 
skill of any good politician and was seen as second in importance to physical 
training in the palestras. Even for Plato, the anti-theatrical philosopher, training 
in choral performances was viewed as an indispensable feature of a citizen’s 
education (Laws 654a). Its significance was not simply to educate oneself in 
singing, movement, tonality, or any of the literary aspects of the play. Rather, it 
was seen as embodying a particular dramatic understanding instructed by the 
poets/directors, which rendered the entire performance event of each play into the 
embodiment of the poet/director’s didaskalia. To ‘teach the chorus’, as Rehm 
attests in Greek Tragic Theatre, was the activity of didaskein choron which is 
‘the Greek phrase for directing a play. Even the list of victors in the dramatic 
competitions was called the didaskaliai, indicating that the prizes were given for 
directing and not for writing’ (26). For Rehm, it was the experience of the 
poet/director in rehearsals in which ‘a group of players’, working together under 
the instruction of the poet/director, would bring together ‘a highly literate and 
demanding text’ next to music and movement via oral reception, ‘since it cannot 
be assumed that the performers could read’ (ibid.). Indeed, to get a better sense 
of the degree of intellectual and physical dexterity that the poet’s rehearsing of a 
play required, it is worth quoting Rehm at length: 
The same twelve performers… played the chorus in all four plays – three 
tragedies and a satyr-play – composed by a given tragedian. To get a sense 
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of what this meant in practice, consider Aeschylus’s production of the 
Oresteia in 458 b.c. The same group of performers appeared as a chorus of 
Argive Elders in Agamemnon, a group of captured slave-women in 
Chorephori, the terrifying spirits of vengeance called the Furies in 
Eumenides, and a band of (presumably) randy satyrs in the last satyr-play, 
Proteus. Not only were the masks, costumes, and personae different, but 
the style of movement, the music, the level and quality of emotion, the 
countless other factors shifted from play to play. Since there was only one 
performance, the chorus were compelled to master a wide range of material 
without the benefit of preview audiences. (ibid.)   
 
‘Teaching’ the audience was often considered the poet’s primary challenge in 
staging a play. As Monoson observes, the start of the performance was usually 
heralded by the proclamation ‘“Bring on your chorus”… [which] meant 
something like “Show us (citizens) your (poets) skill at teaching”’ (Plato’s 
Democratic Entanglements 106). Unless the actual poet was dead, in which case 
a separate artist was needed to take charge of the staging process hearing to the 
name of the chorodidaskalos (meaning chorus-instructor/educator), the practical 
side of directing a play was normally embedded in the art and function of the 
poet. Poets, therefore, as trainers/directors, were regarded in the Greek theatre as 
didaskaloi (educators) of the demos, in its more general sense, while their ability 
to utilise mimesis as a technē had resulted in them becoming theatre artists of the 
highest calibre – a cultural placement easily comparable, I think, to the technical 
abilities of the modern directors, especially in their function as actor-trainers and 
interpreters of highly sophisticated texts. This is particularly the case considering 
the more direct links we find in Brecht’s reference to his practice as ‘didactic’, or 
the lessons in ‘humanity’ that Wagner called his colossal music-dramas, to the 
even later Dadaist subversion teachings by negation that we see in the 
hyperactivity of manifesto art. 
Another significant characteristic of the poets’ directorial temperament was 
their ability to anticipate the audience’s active participation and, in this way, steer 
intellectual stimulation in a predetermined and well-thought-through manner. As 
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Arnott argues, Athenian spectatorship was ‘an active partner, free to comment, to 
be commented upon, to assist, or to intervene’ (11) during the performance. 
However, it was an invited ‘intervention’, planted scrupulously by the 
poets/directors who also counted on deliberately arousing the critical faculties of 
their spectators, both emotionally and intellectually. This may well explain 
Plato’s fury with poets whom he accuses of inciting emotional fervour to be led 
by infatuated performers who then seduce the audience, which is also driven by 
hedonistic impulses. A vicious circle that, in Ion, even takes a co-dependent 
flavour; not only is Athenian performance culture depicted as one 
overwhelmingly underpinned by an image of ‘irrationality’, but it is the dreading 
outcome, as Marcus Floch observes, of a ‘perverse economy of pleasure between 
uniformly senseless poets and audiences’ (567). In the Republic, Plato had 
already voiced this fearful dynamic through Socrates: poets may ‘fashion 
phantoms’ in the audiences’ souls, but the audiences, he emphasised, are far from 
being silent victims. It is they that influence poets’ choices through their 
overpowering uproar, assuming the role of the active collaborator shaping the 
meaning of the performance. And yet, there is a further, deeply fundamental, 
reason for this objection. 
Besides poets being possessed by the Muses and then with their audiences 
being enraptured by pleasure (Laws 568), Plato essentially views the poet as a 
rival figure in the task of training the minds of the civic body of the Athenian 
demos, a role that he saw himself in as a philosopher, and he claimed only for the 
philosopher. The prospect, however, of the poet/director figure, who was capable 
of drawing on mimetic representation and producing convincing imitations of 
lived experiences that claim to convey the ‘truth’ of things, was, as to be expected, 
deeply troubling for Plato because this was, he thought, the domain of philosophy 
and not of theatre or any other discipline. Moreover, mimesis’s duplicity was 
already problematic in its relation between reality and representation, truth and 
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falsehood, appearance and the forms of Ideas. In theatre, he saw the problem of 
duplicity which was magnified due to being embodied; that is, the sui generis trait 
of theatricality that was simultaneously posing a metaphysical question about 
how the world is.  
As Monoson suggests, ‘to Plato, a poet in his capacity as author and director 
makes a compelling representation of an object in the world of becoming’ (209). 
What is most compelling indeed in this respect is that Plato’s understanding of 
the mimetic poet is not in singular literary terms, but it is a primary philosophical 
function – that is, the ability to represent reality as mimesis through the medium 
of the poet/director on the one hand, and, on the other, the appropriation of 
mimesis as technē, by which the poet/director engages in profound philosophical 
thought. What is more, for Plato, poets’ engagement in the thought of 
performance, not only shapes the thinking of the performative event, but transmits 
a particular modality of an embodied thought, lived and experienced in the 
presence of an audience’s moment and through their souls, that comes to shape 
and define political thought and its moment, too. This is reminiscent of Solon’s 
fear that we heard at the beginning of this chapter and a recurrent accusation that, 
as we shall see later on, fuels the debates of modernist discussion over the director 
and this figure’s experimentation with the aesthetic form. The extent of dispute 
may vary widely in the context of the various movements of theatrical 
modernism, but the root of the struggle is precisely a Platonic one: the more the 
spectators’ souls are aroused by vicarious experiences of extreme emotion in the 
name of emotionally convincing them, the more one’s good and sound reason, or 
judgement (krisis), is misguided. In this configuration, the poet/director is neither 
a side effect nor a mere participant, but is at the crux of a relationality that rivals 
philosophy and molds political identity.  
The experience of choral training and staging a play, like the experience of 
attending the theatre itself, was undoubtedly, as Simon Goldhill and many other 
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commentators of antiquity contend, a profound rehearsal of citizenship in 
Athenian democracy. It was also, I would add, a long way from what later 
theatrical traditions such as the actor-manger’s theatre would stand for, or even 
instrumentally aspire to in its practice dominated by repetition and mimicry. The 
significance of the poet/director’s theatrical practice was, ultimately, in ‘lessons’ 
of thought. And, by engaging in thought, the poet/director simultaneously forced 
thought to be performed on stage and ‘staged’ as philosophy in philosophical 
thought. In either case, the poet/director, as trainer of the chorus, the audience, 
and the actors, as well as authors and practitioners of the stage, are inaugurated 
also as philosophers; what could be called poets of philosophy. This dimension 
of theatre was to return in the form of the director with the advent of aesthetic 
modernity in theatre.  
In the subsequent parts of this present chapter, I will examine the 
democratic function of the poet/director, which I believe can throw valuable light 
on the political dimension that inscribes the aesthetic structure of the modern 
director. If the Athenian theatre had a primarily democratic function, and the role 
of the poet/director is a central part of it, then what does it tells us about the role 
and identity of the modern director? This is a question that underpins much of the 
following discussion, sometimes indirectly, by examining the democratic values 
of the aesthetic paradigm of the tragic theatre. This is a paradigm that lays, I 
believe, at the foundation of the poet/director’s thought and the thinking that 
renders the modern director as a kind of ‘democratic’ philosopher – indeed, what 
makes the director, as I will argue, a ‘theatrocratic democrat’, which is to propose 
a Platonist inversion of theatrocracy by which I read the philosophical status of 
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The Poet/Director as a Democrat 
Participating in the dramatic performance was as much a part of Athenian 
political life as it was ‘serving on a jury or fighting a battle’ (Monoson 107). 
Partly as an affirmation of Athenian democratic citizenship that needed to be 
enacted, embodied and glorified, and partly as a confirmation of the intellectual 
abilities of the Athenian civic body, theatre-going and theatre-making functioned 
as a peculiarly intermediate platform, situated between thought and action, that 
reflected demotic participation in the serious mental work of the Athenian 
Assembly. The links were further highlighted by the fact that Athenian law 
requested that a special Assembly meeting would take place within sight of the 
theatre following the end of the festival, which is described by Plato in the 
Republic as the ‘common meeting places of the multitude’ (492b). What is 
striking in Plato’s account is the naming of theatres next to Assemblies, courts, 
and army camps which  betrays a seamless continuity (Monoson 97). Further 
evidence can be found in records of the purchase of theatre tickets, which were 
supported by money from the public treasury – an act directly recalling the 
stipends paid from Assembly attendance and jury service. It is now easy to 
understand why political participation, praised in Pericles’ funeral oration as a 
model of reciprocal benefaction that enacted and celebrated collectivity in the 
public body of policy and service, pictured a twin image of theatrical 
participation. In this sense – and here is where the high significance of the 
Poet/director’s art lies – is that what was represented or imagined on the Athenian 
stage was meant to acknowledge the ‘mental infrastructure’ of a democratic body 
capable of acting ‘with foresight and judge with insight’ (J. Peter Euben 
‘introduction’ 23). Attending the theatre also affirmed, at the same time, that its 
site was an embodied, performed mode of knowledge that had the capacity to 
‘unsettle[d] normal ways of thinking’ (Monoson 108). 
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The relationship, therefore, between theatrical experience and democratic 
citizenship needs to be read as deeply interactive and interelational, and yet not 
simply between theatre and Athenian citizenship. Rather, it is precisely the 
relationship between ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ as being ‘the mental venture of 
politics’ of Athenian democracy, articulated in and through the practice of the 
Poet/director, that as a practice marks the theatrical venture of philosophy in the 
Athenian stage. To understand this complex interface between theatre, democracy 
and philosophy in the identity that comprises the poet/director, we need to look 
once again at its most impassionate rival – Plato. Indeed, in Plato, as we saw 
earlier, the poet’s function in the democratic theatre of Athens is coloured 
negatively; these artists are not only possessed, he tells us, but having misled the 
audience, they convince them that are capable of intellectual judgement (krisis). 
What this means is that poets have interrupted the hierarchical configuration of 
judgement, that, for Plato, is always reserved for the aristocracy – the excellent 
few that are capable of right judgement. This then results in a strange mixture of 
empowerment of the mob of theatre on principles of democratic freedom and of 
equality that, for Plato, are not even democratic, as there is no respect for self-
limitation in aesthetic expression. What emerges, instead, is what he calls 
theatrokratia – the ruling of the theatron by which he means the mob the way it 
behaves in theatre.  
What is important to note at this point, for the purposes of discerning the 
democratic composition (or not) of the poet/director, is the relation of power that 
Plato attaches to the poetico-directorial figures of the tragic stage. As Floch 
observes in his article, ‘Who Calls the Tunes: Literary Criticism, Theatrocracy, 
and the Performance of Philosophy in Plato’s Laws’, ‘upon the poets’ arrival there 
ensues a subtle but telling shift in the distribution of authority from the judges to 
poets. …poets appear as “rulers” or “leaders” [arxodes]’ (564). Floch points out 
that ‘arxodes’ is ‘a term with overtly political valence’ (564). Having 
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reconfigured judgement (Krisi) to a theatrical value, justice is subverted as 
something beyond the strictly legal confines and into the aesthetic. To be more 
precise, if the principle of judgement takes central stage in Plato, it is not only as 
a democratic paradigm invested with the theatrical values of seduction and 
pleasure, but principally an ethical paradigm infused with the poet’s aesthetic of 
seduction which corrupts judgement and turns a hedonistically predisposed crowd 
into an uncontainable political power relation.   
Aesthetic relativism is, therefore, for Plato, a theatrical vice that he 
unambiguously attributes to the poets. It transforms the important activity of 
judgement into the concurrent of poets and audience in which a) the definite 
criterion is pleasure and b) the redistribution of authority from the poets to the 
audience marks a political act. From this, it is only a small step to finally decry 
the stage as theatrokratia as a new kind of political pathology in which theatrical 
judgement acquires anarchic connotation. It empowers unrestrained freedom and 
critical deliberation as indistinguishable from those of moral and political 
deliberation. For Floch, ‘the result is a convergence of democratic criticism and 
democratic politics, a condition brought about by the transposition of the 
entitlement to judge from the theatre to the institutions of governance and by the 
ethical dispositions and forms of knowledge manifest in practices of literary 
judgment’ (567). And yet, I would further argue, that Plato’s implicit treatment 
of what he calls theatrocracy fosters, not only an awareness, as Floch holds, ‘of 
the discursive qualities of civic space’, (ibid.) but also a type of aesthetic thinking 
that shapes the forms of governance as a specific kind of theatrical enactment – 
an enrapture of poetic utterance, orchestrated by the poets, that is the equivalent 
to a performance of judgement. What this means, in Platonic terms, is that theatre 
is elevated to a form of rule (arxein) which performs judgement (krisis) as a way 
to redistribute political power and, in itself, is ‘constituting itself as an expression 
of that power’ (569). In other words, the event of ‘aesthetic formation’ articulates 
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in theatre the poet/director’s political feature that exhibits what John Wellach 
describes in The Platonic Political Art as the power that predisposes a society ‘for 
a particular politeia’ (364). But where precisely is the significance of the 
poet/director in this politico-aesthetic dynamic? 
In an article entitled ‘Theater and Democracy’, John McGrath argues that 
theatre’s role in the quest of authentic democracy is dialectical – that it is both in 
the sense of relating and interacting with the given society from which it evolves, 
and in asking the difficult question of how various social processes construct a 
given society while simultaneously providing an outlet for voicing dissensus and 
the opinion of the marginalised. He then turns to Castoriadis who provides ‘the 
most fecund interface between Democracy and Theatre’ (McGrath 134) and to 
whom I will refer on a twofold premise: a) that if the democratic paradigm of the 
theatre functions as simultaneous critique and affirmation of Athenian 
democracy, it is participating in political values shaped by the tragic poet, and b) 
if the poet’s tragic processes of signification, that is, processes of creation of 
meaning, espouse the political system of Athenian democracy, they do not have 
to do merely with the rational mastery of what is right in the rational ordering of 
laws in a democratic society. Rather, they point us towards what Rose calls aporia 
which, in the democratic theatre, is staged as an answer to human ethics. As I 
would like to suggest, aporia recognises the ethical dimension embedded in the 
distinctively creative relation that requires the democratic society to exercise the 
explicit autonomous activity of what Castoriadis calls ‘judging and choosing in a 
non-trivial sense’ (‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ 271). It is 
why, it seems to me, that tragedy not only opens up the pathway to democracy, 
but also forces the more difficult question of ethics as aporetic, and what posits 
the poet, too, as an aporetic democrat. I will return to this later in my discussion; 
for now, however, let us briefly examine the domain of ethics in Castoriadis’ 
terms, as a human affair, which will allow us to grasp the deeper implications of 
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the ethical dimension of the poet’s aesthetic constellation, that is also always a 
political dimension because it is ethical. It is a complex interface that not only 
implicates the political dimension of the poet with particular tragic conventions 
and the imagining of the democratic Athens, but also, as I will show later, the 
theatres of modernism, in the politico-aesthetic image of the figure of the director. 
 
 
Democracy, Hubris, Aporia  
For the Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, the invention and practice of 
theatre has been instrumental in shaping the democratic development of the city 
of Athens. This is because, he tells us, theatre is capable of shaping the processes 
of imaginary creation that give form to a society: ‘what holds a society together’ 
(‘The Greek Polis’ 268) is an active, intrinsic relationship between the creative 
form of theatre and the Greek democracy, that which makes society’s ‘world of 
signification’ (ibid.).This is a distinct type of knowledge that can be found in 
imaginary significations of this society. And, by ‘thinking and reflecting about 
Greece,’ he insists, and not about any other culture, ‘we are reflecting and 
thinking about the social and historical conditions of thought itself – at least, 
thought as we know and practice it’ (ibid.). Castoriadis draws a parallel relation 
between thought and theatre, which becomes particularly relevant for our 
grasping of their relentless interrelation, but also for the conceptual connection in 
the relation between the poet of the Polis and the theatre director of modernity. 
In exploring this link, I place, like Castoriadis, a significance on what he sees as 
an ‘intrinsic relationship’ (‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ 270) 
between Greece and our society, which itself proposes the possibility of ‘a 
potential universality’ to be found in the imaginary significations of the Greek 
society. By ‘potential universality’ (ibid.), Castoriadis refers not to human 
rationality but to a kind of ‘nontrivial thinking’, which he identifies in the practice 
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of ‘creative imagination’. It is the creative ability, in other words, to 
understanding another society and which is, for him, at the root of a potentially 
universal human essence. It is a ‘potential’ universality rather than a universal 
human essence because, according to Castoriadis, as Nana Biluš Abaffy observes 
in her article ‘The Radical Tragic Imaginary: Castoriadis on Aeschylus & 
Sophocles’, ‘most people never realize this essence: they never get to use their 
“radical” creative imagination… they are prevented in doing so by what 
Castoriadis calls “the cognitive closure of the institution of society” ’ (35). What 
is, however, most compelling, for the purposes of my own query regarding the 
socio-aesthetic composition of the tragic poet, who I conceive as a figuration of 
the modern director, is when he discusses the notion of the ‘creator’ as someone 
who does not stand for an individual figure but for a social process through which 
a society recognises itself as the creator of its own ‘social imaginary 
significations’ (‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ 270). Here, 
Castoriadis distinguishes between a heteronomous society, which grounds itself 
in something ‘other’ (e.g. religion or ‘the unlimited expansion of ‘rational 
mastery’) than itself and an autonomous society, which, like the Athenian society, 
grasps itself to be self-created. Capitalism, for example, is for Castoriadis a 
heteronomous society because its running is the result of the legitimation of an 
inherent ‘logic’ of that system – the logic of liberal capital. To change this society 
would not, therefore, be easy because each set of capitalism’s ‘social imaginaries’ 
would be acknowledged as ‘real’ by the logic of the very system that informs the 
existence of that society. What would make a difference, Castoriadis suggests, is 
the creation of new imaginaries, which is the prospect of, to borrow from Abaffy, 
‘a new human reality, with new meanings and laws and norms’ (36). 
So, would it not then be possible to re-appropriate and re-imagine social 
imaginaries from our ancient past, in order to bring out what Castoriadis calls a 
sort of a ‘revolution’? Castoriadis certainly seems to think so, and, whether it is 
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a feasible case or not, it is not the point here. Rather, what counts is the proposal 
that opens up to a revolutionary possibility which he locates in the act of 
‘nontrivial thinking’ (‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ 270), by 
which he means philosophical thinking, and which defines the concept of the 
‘creator’ in the autonomous society. Autonomy, as expressed and experienced in 
ancient Athens, describes the active engagement of constantly reforming their 
laws and systems, a process Castoriadis traces to around 682/683 BC and 
culminating in the establishment of the direct democracy of 508 BC. Athenian 
society posits its owns laws, explicitly recognising itself as its own creation, most 
profoundly visible, for Castoriadis, in the ‘activity of judging and choosing’ to be 
understood as the ability to judge-and-choose one’s own laws and truths that must 
be recreated – an activity that is auto (by itself) + nomos (law) = autonomous – 
but also an activity that is inextricably so much more democratic in the Athenian 
assembly as it is a poetic/philosophical in the Athenian theatre. No wonder it is 
at this point that his argument takes an explicitly theatrical turn and is particularly 
revealing, I think, of the aesthetic meaning that informs the shape of the 
democratic identity of the dramatic poet. 
Accordingly, the first thing to note is that ‘justice’ in Greece, in contrast to 
other societies, is posed not in divine terms, but as being genuinely human. It is 
also a question that ‘must remain open forever’ (ibid.) because an autonomous 
society knows that there are no fixed or predetermined laws, norms and meanings, 
but only the freedom of the creative imagination. It is how this society creates its 
social imaginary significations and knowing that it is their creators. But what does 
this have to do with the theatre or the poet? The question of such a human ‘justice’ 
that is integral to creative imagination can only have one criterion: self-limitation. 
This is at the heart of the Athenian democratic regime, but which received its full 
radical potentiality as a critique and shaper of democratic power on the Athenian 
stage in the form of the tragic hubris: ‘In a democracy’, argues Castoriadis, 
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‘people can do anything—and must know that they ought not to do just anything. 
Democracy is the regime of self-limitation [...] it is the regime of freedom—and 
a tragic regime’ (‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ 282).  
If democracy is the constant reminder for self-limitation, its tragic 
theatricalisation is exemplified by the concept of hubris. As a dramatic 
convention, hubris defines arrogant excess committed by the tragic hero, 
describing the subject’s drive to wittingly, or unwittingly, go ahead of norms or 
limits set by the consensus of a society. The absence of marked boundaries is 
specific to hubris and holds accountable the experience of suffering and 
dissolution of the tragic characters each time they seek to transcend, undermine, 
or altogether dismiss the equilibrium of a socio-political and moral composition 
that they find themselves entangled with. However, as an attempt to overcome 
self-limitations, it is an idea also related directly to democracy’s simultaneous 
openness and constant questioning of human and social limits. Presupposing  the 
absence of fixed norms, the essential vagueness of the ultimate bearings of our 
action. …Hubris exists where self-limitation is the only “norm,” where 
transgressed ‘limits are “nowhere” defined’ (The Greek Polis and the Creation of 
Democracy’ 282). It is why democracy, for Castoriadis, is not only a regime of 
freedom but of self-limitation too, which is another way of saying that democracy 
is a ‘tragic regime’ (ibid.).  
In relating the concept of tragic hubris to democracy and reading tragedy 
as essentially democratic, Castoriadis turns his focus on the creative venture of 
the ‘radical limitation of human beings’ (ibid.) that begins to embody the essence 
of democratic apparatus understood as fundamentally ‘tragic’. That is, 
‘theatrical’: ‘no one knows at what moment hubris begins, yet there is a moment 
when one is on hubris and that is when the gods or things intervene to crush you’ 
(World in Fragments 98). It is in this respect that democracy is seen to exhibit 
what I would like to call the creatively tragic character of politics understood 
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here as governance rather than government, which exhibits a ‘tragic imaginary’ 
that, in democracy, entails the acting out of a politics of tragic life, including, as 
Stathis Gourgouris observes, ‘folly without salvation’ as well as demanding 
‘lucidity in conditions of total uncertainty’ (‘Democracy is a Tragic Regime’ 
809). Gourgouris identifies, too, in the operative structure of democracy, the kind 
of ‘tragic’ imaginary in the manner proposed by Castoriadis, as a creative relation. 
The argument in both of them is that, if we accept that a democratic limit is always 
a matter of ‘self-limitation’, then the creative enactment of self-limitation as 
‘tragic life’ constitutes an imaginary signification that displays the limit of the 
political as the awareness that there is no such thing as a ‘guaranteed 
signification’ (Castoriadis, ‘The Dilapidation of the West’ 84). It is then, I would 
add, that we are confronted with the possibility of theatre as the place of 
imaginary creation; however, it is not only of a particular kind of democracy (that, 
for Castoriadis, is always ‘autonomous’), but of a creative relation of form-
making set in motion by the tragic poets as fundamentally aporetic. That is, 
without a fixed or determined ‘path’ or ‘centre’ of imaginary democratic creation, 
but one that needs to constantly be re-imagined, re-posed, and re-negotiated on 
the tragic stage.  
One good case in point is Aeschylus’ ontological questioning of ‘what is 
man’. His poetic/directorial imagining is a sort of ‘divine anthropology’ 
(Castoriadis, ‘Aeschylean Anthropology’ 38), viewing the human as what was 
given by the god Prometheus.  For Castoriadis, however, his imaginary creation 
only stages a heteronomous image of the human still trapped by ‘the cognitive 
closure of his faith in the gods’ (ibid.), which is then exceeded by Sophocles’ 
more autonomous creative thinking. While Castoriadis is right to point out that 
Sophocles ‘posits humanity as self-creation’, that ‘men have taken nothing from 
the gods, and no god has given them anything whatsoever’ (23-4), it is still the 
tragic imaginary already at work in Aeschylus that poses the ontological question 
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‘what is man’ and stages philosophy in the democratic theatre. But Castoriadis 
goes as far as to distinguish Aeschylus from Sophocles, saying that, unlike 
Sophocles, who was a truly autonomous democrat, Aeschylus could not have 
been. And he surely was not, but neither was Sophocles, as far as democracy in 
this sense is concerned. Rather, what their re-workings of religion and the gods 
reveal are tragic imaginaries of an aporetic democracy – that is, what Rose would 
call the difficult path of re-cognition, of resisting the choosing of the easy path, 
but staying with the difficult path that is always concrete and relational. It is not 
surprising, either, that Castoriadis would, in the end, have to come to a somehow 
shifted position. When reading the role of gods in both Aeschylus and Sophocles, 
he finally comes to acknowledge: ‘the first thing we notice – which forces itself 
on us and which I simply present here – is huge, astonishing: Aeschylus (like 
Sophocles) speaks of manticism and not of religion; he mentions the gods only in 
passing and from a utilitarian perspective. The entrails of sacrificial victims have 
to be examined in order to see if they suit “the pleasure of the gods”’ (‘Aeschylean 
Anthropology and Sophoclean Self-Creation of Man’ 18). The ‘concrete’, 
‘utilitarian’, secular purposes of religion are then taken as measures of democracy 
in his reading. In reality, however, what seems to be at work is an aporetic 
perspectivism that the poet/director creatively re-imagines, re-poses and re-
configures as another aporia of democracy.  
Let’s now take a closer look at the aesthetic structure of such an aporetic 
poetic in its major articulation: the Greek tragic imaginary. 
 
The Greek Tragic Imaginary  
Holding the wisdom learnt through suffering as the consequence of living in a 
‘chaotic’ world, Castoriadis reads the desperate need for an ethical system evoked 
as justice (diki) – which, in the performative matrix of tragedy, often appears 
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personified as a goddess, namely the Greek goddess Diki. Justice, in this sense, 
describes a distinct moral quality that differs from the democratically created 
ethics instituted through human nomos, being the laws made by humans. Instead, 
Diki is always seen from the eyes of each tragic hero, which is why ‘tragic’ justice 
is never fixed but a matter of perspective, continuously unveiling a new point of 
view – a new morality. Agamemnon’s victorious return, for example, in Oresteia 
is welcome by the chorus singing, ‘Justice […] she steers all things towards their 
destined end’ (761ff.), which is then followed by Agamemnon’s own invocation 
to Diki: ‘First, with justice I salute my Argos and my gods, my accomplices who 
brought me home and won my rights from Priam’s Troy – the just gods’ (797ff). 
However, shortly after, the real ‘masterpiece of justice’ is revealed when 
Clytaemnestra menacingly cries: ‘Quickly. Let the red stream flow… Justice, 
lead him in!’ (902ff). Even the chorus’ outrage at the murder is overridden by 
their own admission of justice: ‘Each change meets counter-charge. None can 
judge between them. Justice’ (1588ff). The change in perspective is, in turn, a 
striking change of transformation. As Nana Biluš Abaffy notes in ‘The Radical 
Tragic Imaginary: Castoriadis on Aeschylus & Sophocles’, there is an 
overturning of roles: Agamemnon, the murderer, who made Iphigenia into the 
victim, turns Clytaemnestra into an avenger, who will then turn Agamemnon into 
the victim, herself into the murderer, and Orestes into the avenger (49). Since 
perspective determines definition of the dramatic plot and the character’s ethos, 
justice can only be relevant, fluid and, above all, subjective in the sense that we 
are reminded, at the end of the second play of the trilogy, as again Abaffy rightly 
recalls, the Nietzschean saying: ‘all that exists is just and unjust’ (49, also The 
Birth of the Tragedy 51). But if justice is a matter of perspective, then what kind 
of ethical values describe the tragic universe in which ‘nothing is ever stable or 
unequivocal’? And, in effect, what does the interrelation between democracy as 
a tragic regime and tragedy as deeply political hold for theatre?  
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What is highly significant to note at this point is that the embodied ethical 
ambiguity conveyed by the righteous Diki of a divine descent is now placed in 
human hands which, in turn, embodies not so much any particular answer to 
morality itself, but a riddle. Yet, it is a riddle that asserts itself as something that 
can no longer be solved by simply saying ‘I believe’. It is precisely by 
acknowledging ethical ambiguity and turning it into a site of ‘vision’ that one can 
now finally say ‘oida’ – I know by having seen. In this way, the poet’s tragic 
imaginary arguably transforms the rational nature of politics and the democratic 
ethical system into a new kind of perspectival morality as a form of philosophical 
interrogation, in the shape of theatrical questioning. At the root of this ethical 
conjunction is what Castoriadis describes as the aspect of ‘creative imagination’, 
through which the apoeretic poet seems to render democracy as most theatrical 
and theatre as most philosophical. Creative imagination ignites the Athenian 
theatre in ways that reiterate the aesthetics of aporia in the structure of democracy. 
Aporia also seems to thoroughly inform the democratic meaning of the poet  who 
acts as an aesthetic figuration of the modern director to come.  
In this particular sense, aporia, then, could be said to re-create the social 
imaginary signification that, in the Athenian society, takes place in theatre 
through the poet’s creative imagination. For Castoriadis, creative imagination is 
the mental activity rooted in the potential human essence. It is what creates social 
imaginary significations in order to think through or re-imagine the structures and 
norms of this society by which it also holds together. Since social imaginary 
significations provide society with a ‘guarantee’, they assure that all of its 
particular meanings, laws, and norms are valid. Yet, in this way, the idea of self-
instituting the Polis constitutes itself as ‘a permanent process’ (‘The Greek Polis’ 
282) that actively engages the demos of Athenian democracy in constant reform 
of its system, including alteration of its rule through democratic participation and 
vote. This is the same process that leads society to conceive itself as the creator 
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of its own laws, norms, and meanings, which is to say, at least in Castoriadis’s 
terms, a society that conceives itself as the creator of its own social imaginary 
significations. But what precisely is a ‘social imaginary signification’, that also 
seems to denote the fundamental aesthetic structure of the democratic theatre of 
Athens, a theatre that is given shape by its poet? 
In Castoriadis’ thought, ‘meaning’ and ‘signification’, or what he means by 
these trickiest of words, are determined by the forms that society creates, always 
temporal and constantly reproduced. As a product of imaginary creation, by 
which he refers to the creation of new forms, the aspect of ‘signification’ is always 
completely replaceable, unstable and, each time, fixed anew. This creative 
relation he calls a Social Imaginary by which he describes the ‘creation of a 
human world: of “things”, “reality”, language, norms, values, ways of life and 
death […where a particular society posits a] particular complex of rules, laws, 
meanings, values, tools, motivations, etc.’ (World in Fragments 84). If society 
and its various forms that we have known through history are defined by 
‘imaginary creation’, Castoriadis argues, this is not to say, ‘the “fictive”, the 
“illusory”, the “spectacular,”’, but that which has to do with ‘the creation of new 
forms’ (ibid.): 
This creation is not determined, but rather determining; it is an unmotivated 
creation that no causal, functional, or even rational explanation can account 
for… (ibid.)  
It is at the core of this creation, which is essentially an activity of form-making, 
that Castoriadis identifies ‘social imaginary significations’ created by each 
individual society and embodied in its institutions. As he believes, each society 
creates its own forms by which society ‘sees itself’ and ‘gives itself a place’ 
(ibid.). In this way, the creation of such forms enables society to ‘constitute a 
system of norms, institutions in the broadest sense of the term, values, 
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orientations, and goals of collective life as well as of individual life’ (ibid.). 
Naturally, in this configuration, the focal point for creation becomes imagination.  
Indeed, not only does imagination spark imaginary significations that point 
to the roots of genuine art, but crucially it designates the lacuna by which ‘never 
does the soul think without phantasms’ (Aristotle, De Anima III 3). Of course, 
this association is strongly reminiscent of Plato’s worse fears in mimesis that 
‘fashions phantoms’ – which, again, are later revoked in Adorno’s 
phantasmagoria as the agora (economy) of the phantasma by which he describes 
the ‘illusion of the absolute reality of the unreal’ (In Search of Wagner 90). In 
both cases, the ability to create because of the ability to imagine is received 
critically. However, the irreducible fact that there can be ‘no image that does not 
have a minimum meaning and there is no meaning that is not borne by an image’ 
(Castoriadis, Les carrefours du labyrinthe 118) also problematises the poet’s 
ability to create so much as it does the director’s in aesthetic modernity, both of 
which are treated equally with suspicion in philosophical discourse of anti-
theatricality. For, if there can be ‘no thought without representations’ 
(Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution 341), there can also be no pure or simple 
phantasms but only imaginary creations entangled with the ethical problem of 
correctness and righteousness that, in the theatrical context of (the thought of) 
representation, is also always political. At this point, philosophy joins theatre, 
while theatre convenes democracy, as comrades and antagonists all at once. 
Castoriadis is right to observes in this respect: 
For, just as a philosopher cannot accept any external limitations on his 
thoughts, so democracy recognizes no external limits to its instituting 
power; the sole limits results from its self-limitation. (The Rise of the 
Insignificance 136) 
Castoriadis’s analysis both invites and resists comparison with Plato, but his 
emphasis on the social field of the emergence of the imaginary meanings upon 
which he understands Athenian tragedy – and, more generally, the art of theatre 
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– makes a clear link between significations and representations, which he reads 
as a creative relation that, in essence, is theatrical. As such, the polis that emerges 
out of the social imaginary is conceptualised on the theatrical scene, which 
functions as a aporetic mediating terrain, or meson. For, as the poet himself, it is 
situated between philosophy and democracy, yet always confronted by an 
unequivocal absence of limit – the kind of limitless that self-generates and self-
authenticates. This act of self-limitation in the democratic imaginary is at the core 
of the poet’s aporetic aesthetic. And yet, this is simultaneously an ethical 
imaginary in which social meanings and significations are called into question by 
treating them as otherness, ‘that phantasm of their self that allows them to come 
out of themselves’ (Pefanis, ‘Philosophy and theatre’ 135) and imagine as 
another.  
 
An Aporetic Ethics 
It is now a good time to make use of an earlier promise and consider an aporetic 
ethics by which I want to examine the interface between the poet’s act of ‘judging 
and choosing,’ the tragic imaginary, and the democratic regime that I read more 
generally as the relationship between the power of demos and the creative power 
of theatre. The aim of this theoretical itinerary, to which I will again return later 
in this thesis, is not the exposition of an inherently ethical argument in the 
interplay of theatre, politics, and histories. Rather, it is the more political 
significance of the ethical dimension in the perspectival interchangability 
between theatre, democracy, and philosophy in the instituting of a society that 
also informs, I believe, the meaning of the tragic poet in ways that prefigure the 
modern director. 
My hypothesis is that, if the creative dimension in the explicit autonomous 
activity of a democratic ‘judging and choosing’ as exercised by the poet/director 
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and, through him, the audience, embodies philosophical thought, then the 
theatrical paradigm exemplified in the aesthetic paradigm of the tragic imaginary 
receives the attention it does by raising the difficult question of what kind of laws 
and reality create society ‘beyond’ and ‘outside’ the existing society. As I want 
to argue, this is not a utopian speculation, but an aporetic perspective that 
involves, in Rose’s term, ‘the union’ (The Broken Middle 201) of the dramatic 
hero’s daily struggle and the recreation of society as a whole. ‘This [“beyond” 
and “outside”] implies disunion of the quotidian, “day”, and the cosmic, “world”; 
a path only definable oppositionally’ (ibid). The deeply political signification of 
an aporetic domain of ethics designates the quest for meaning by working towards 
a transformed understanding of ourselves and others. In Rose’s definition, the 
ethical route of enquiry ‘a-poria – without a path’ (ibid), concerns, to paraphrase 
Andrew Shanks who writes in Against Innocence, Gillian Rose’s Reception and 
Gift of Faith, the collapse of every existing understandings of the ethical before 
the irreducible singularity of each subject’s own first-hand experience (54). 
Taking misrecognition and exclusion seriously, an aporetic morality sets aside 
simplistic narratives and their attendant dualism, but insists on wrestling with the 
actualities of exclusion and difference inscribed in the lived experiences of the 
other, the law, and institutions, as a means of arriving at recognition. In the moral 
domain, an aporetic ethics, therefore, is never set out, but works towards 
comprehension of what is, always starting from the middle. If, as Kate Schick 
succinctly observes, in Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice, ‘recognition takes 
place on multiple levels: it directs the gaze inwards on a journey of critical self-
reflection and outwards on a journey towards comprehension of the stories of 
others’ (102), then experience of suffering and misrecognition are focal points 
because so are ‘the experiences [that] are shaped by institutions’ (103).  
In a similar manner, Scott Lash argues in his Critique of Information that 
‘the “aporetic” tradition speaks of irreconcilables, whereas in “dialectics” there is 
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either a resolution or at least an interpenetration of the two spheres (Kant’s two 
types of reason: logic (instrumental rationality, understanding, science) and pure 
practical reason (substantive rationality, moral law, moral action, religion, 
noumena)’ (8). Yet, contrary to dialectics, Roses’ aporia is not interested in the 
mere recognition that the resolution of the particular into the absolute is possible, 
but that the solution of cultural, ethical, social and civic, or political, questions 
cannot come through abstraction. She thus reads in Hegelian philosophy the very 
labour of the dialectical interplay; between the way ‘the Other’ manifests itself in 
the particular, which is always a matter of the relation between the ethical and the 
political, rather than one between the universal and particular. As in most of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Rose’s approach is concerned with the necessary 
appearance of the moral law, which involves the sphere of ‘the other’, of freedom, 
of substantive reason. In Traversing the Middle: Ethics, Politics, Religion, ‘this 
interminable interplay may be understood,’ observers Gavin Hyman, ‘as a 
manifestation of what Rose has called the “equivocation” of the ethical. Where 
one domain is prioritised, …the aporia is mended, and the result is both ethically 
and politically destructive’ (xi).   
It is in this respect that an aporetic ethics, it seems to me, is a deeply 
relational approach, between thought, democracy and representation, that is 
profoundly political and inextricably theatrical. Aporia places ‘mourning’ as 
central to the political negation of difference and questions any fixed binaries 
between universal and particular, self and Other, precisely by drawing attention 
to their mutual constitution. Attending to the complex matrix of norms, imaginary 
significations, practices, and institutions of the human experience, an aporetic 
ethics is infinitely bound up to recognition as ‘justice’ in the political and moral 
domain. An ethics without a path, without ‘poria’, Rose tells us, is a difficult path. 
Again, as Schick usefully notes, ‘it is inherently risky to bring social and political 
actualities into focus, instead of silencing them, and to interrogate one’s own 
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implication in violent structures and norms’ (103) – which is what the Athenian 
tragic theatre does. Indeed, the uneasy negotiation of the difficult path of an 
aporetic ethics requests the seriousness of political and personal agency and 
profoundly condemns ignorance. The tragic subject and, similarly, the mode of 
agency of the democratic subject through the poet’s embodied ‘lesson’ on stage, 
exerts an antagonistic relation to the perspective of power and the order of the 
law. It is why, too, we might say, hubris always conveys the subject’s drive for 
taking political risk. And yet, it is the failure for the pursuit, as argues Rose, of a 
‘good enough justice’, of not willing, in other words, to stay in the middle and 
work through the brokenness, that brings about destruction. The recognition of 
this failure on the tragic stage is ultimately what enacts radical transformation.  
 
Theatrocracy in the Middle 
The text that may be viewed as a sharp attack on Athenian democracy is Plato’s 
Laws – a critique that is fired on the democratic paradigms of theatre-going and 
audience participation as the Athenians understood them. Blaming theatre for the 
excesses of liberty in democratic society, Plato draws attention to the experience 
of being a theatēs which, he says, involved stomp-feeting, rowdy behaviour, and 
a very much active spectatorship. The problem for Plato is that such spectators 
also believed that he or she could practise sound judgement and wise deliberation 
in regards to the moral teachings contained in the dramatic performances. Or, to 
put it in Plato’s own words, it caused everyone to think that he or she ‘is wise in 
everything’ (701a), which, in effect, exaggerated one’s confidence in what is 
good and what is not, resulting in the kind of civic condition that politically was 
expressed as the rule of the spectators – theatokratia. Theatokratia (or 
theatrocracy in English) describes the typical Athenian spectator understood by 
Plato as excessively confident, noisy, strong-minded, and uninhibited (Monoson, 
226). Yet, this appraisal was not entirely dismissive of the experience of theatre-
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going or of being a theatēs. Rather, in Plato’s text we see him lament the misuse 
of ‘vision’ as a resource for philosophical truth and intellectual labour having 
succumbed to a corrupted force, a force led by phantasmic disillusionment and 
misrecognition.  
What is interesting here is that Plato also links the cultural practice of 
theorising as spectating with the practice of philosophy in Laws as regulation of 
foreign travel. As he tells us, these travellers were called ‘theoroi’ and, according 
to David Cohen, could be male or female (27-40) with the mission to survey other 
cities, reporting back on the ‘nocturnal council’ as part of the institutional 
structure of the city. For Monoson, ‘a theoros was typically an envoy sent to a 
foreign city either for diplomatic reasons, to consult an oracle, or officially to 
represent the home city at a panhellenic festival (for example, at the Nemean or 
Olympic Games.) The sending of such official missions was called theōria’ (229). 
It was from such activities that the intellectual work was conducted from visiting 
places, seeing, and reporting back. Plato considered such endeavours of great 
significance to the development of the city’s political, to which he projected a 
philosophical foundation. Why? The answer has to do with the principal resource 
of the act of ‘seeing’, which, in his philosophy, is a primarily philosophical act. 
Another reason is the fact that the task of ‘theorein’ was linked with the theatre, 
not only as a mode of seeing, but as a mode of interpretation which is speculative 
in intent. This interface, between theatre and philosophy, as speculative modes of 
vision, can be further seen from the work that any theoros did which was not only 
about reporting subjectively but reporting correctly. And this was done so to a 
correctly appointed committee after having collated the material carefully, which 
then would be interpreted with the group of people from the committee before the 
report was opened up to the public.  
In the light of such an intensely interpretative activity, it is difficult to not 
think that what Plato was doing here was mostly drawing the association between 
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the theōros (as a speculative act of spectating) and the chorodidaskalos’ equally 
intensive mental work of interpreting and transferring the knowledge contained 
in dramatic texts. This is precisely the kind of work that foreshadows the 
interpretative work of synthesis and appropriation later associated with the art 
and role of the modern director. If we look closer at the image of the theoros (the 
foreign traveller) in Plato’s Laws, in contrast to the image of theatēs in The 
Republic, what we find is a specifically theatrical image meant to represent 
serious intellectual work but also linked to the act of presentation, framing and 
interpretation of experience which in theatre is the work of the chorodidaskalos. 
Now, knowledge which is also understood as virtue in Plato brings political 
empowerment, which is why he considers knowledge as the domain of 
philosophy only, and not theatre. His deep meditation of ‘spectating’ in the Laws 
essentially lays out the main premise that, in engaging with political activity, it is 
philosophy that can perform a better job rather than theatre. Ironically, the way 
Plato presents his argument is by dialogic thought that stages his ideas. He 
employs a kind of dramatic philosophy, in other words, that functions as a form 
of thinking for his writings. Plato’s theatrical imaginary in the Laws, in particular, 
could accord to a ‘spectral’ configuration that, as always, remains in his thoughts 
regarding the relationship between philosophy and democracy. What Plato asks 
there is how might one study another politeia as a spectacle? And how does the 
politeia of Athens constitute a spectacle? What kind of spectacle is this? And so 
forth. Yet the interface between theatre, politics and philosophy seems to meet at 
the particular configuration of theorein which is the aspect that also drives 
creative interpretation both in theatre and the Polis. We should not forget, for 
instance, that Solon himself, the great engineer of the Athenian democratic 
constitution, was a theoros, having travelled for ten years, mainly in Egypt, which 
then led him to propose on his return a number of reforms leading to democracy 
in his home city. It is now easy to decipher the link between the chorodidaskalos 
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in theatre and that of the affairs of the city which was a central part of the theoros-
job. This link has to do with questioning. A questioning of what was witnessed 
and experienced, what was reported and interpreted, and finally how the material 
was to be presented or represented. 
By engaging with theatre-going, therefore, and the act of the theatēs and of 
the theōros as modalities of knowing, Plato can be seen as a deeply demotic 
thinker, despite his seeming objections and denunciations of theatre that, after all, 
are mostly ‘performances’ of his own dramatic argumentation. Indeed,  Athenian 
democratic politics should be viewed as intimately linked with the practice of 
philosophy through the practice of theatre. These are continuities that are fully 
articulated in Plato, interweaving in what could easily be read as a poetics of 
theatrical thought that, I believe, later reappear in what constitutes the aesthetic 
foundation of the director as a modality of thought in theatre. Platonic language 
and imaginary, in its ability to articulate the intellectual enterprise of theatre, 
while problematising actual democratic values and ideas on the aesthetic 
paradigm of theatre, prefigures the modernist function of the director and the role 
this figure claims in the intellectual and political landscapes of aesthetic 
modernity. It is something similar to what Floch calls the ‘tensions between 
theatre and symposium [as being] most pronounced precisely in terms of their 
political valence and the paradigms of literary judgment they enable’ (560). The 
only difference is that the director is the point of contact in modernism, enacting 
the various tension already felt and sketched out in Platonic thought. It is what 
ultimately casts this figure right in the middle of Plato’s most intense conflict: the 
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The Poet as a Form of Thought 
As Floch rightly points out, Plato’s treatment of Athenian theatrokratia as ‘a 
democratic paradigm of theatre judgment’ (561) serves as an ‘antitype’ against 
which Plato proposes his own Politeia. Similarly, Laws enquires of ‘the moral 
psychology of theatrical judgment’ (561) and the development of a model of 
theatre as the performance of philosophy. However, the most interesting question 
that Plato poses is not what are the perils of theatrical judgement, but what is the 
moral psychology of theatrocracy as the democratic paradigm of theatrical 
judgement? To answer this, in Laws, Plato rejects current practices of theatrical 
judgment and traces constitutional changes from aristocracy to democracy, and 
finally to anarchy, in the emergence of aesthetic formation and novel artistic 
expression. 
 
…as time passed, poets became rulers, leaders of unmusical lawlessness, 
and though they were poetic by nature, they were ignorant of what is just 
and lawful in music. In bacchic frenzy and extensively possessed by 
pleasure, they mixed dirges and hymns, paians and dithyrambs. They 
mimicked the songs of the aulos with the songs of the kithara. They 
confounded everything with everything else. Through their mindlessness 
they unwillingly bore false witness against music, as though it were a thing 
with no form of correctness, and as though its correctness should be judged 
by the pleasure of the one who enjoys it, regardless of whether he is better 
or worse.  
 
In making such poems and reciting such speeches, they inspired in the 
masses lawlessness in music and a sense of daring, as though they were 
equipped to pass judgment. Because of this the once silent theatres became 
full of voices, as though the audience understood what is fine and beautiful 
in music and that which is not; and rather than an aristocracy in music, there 
developed a debased rule of the spectator – Θεατροκρατíα. 
 
Yet if a democracy of free men had occurred only in music, the 
development would not have been so terrible. But now among us it was 
from music that lawlessness and everyone’s belief in his own universal 
wisdom arose; liberty followed. (Floch’s translation 563, my emphasis) 
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What emerges from Plato’s account, which is particularly relevant to tracing a 
figuration of the director in the democratic paradigm of the Athenian theatre, is 
that democracy was indeed the result, not of political upheaval, but of an aesthetic 
development directly attributed to the poet. Thus, it was not the theatre as an 
institution, nor the spectator nor actor. Rather, it was the chorodidaskalian figure 
of the poet, who Plato considers as a form of thought capable of political 
intervention. Poets, he argues, have introduced the phenomenon of aesthetic 
relativism that result from the emergence of democratic liberty. 
The thesis that theatrical judgment in the democratic theatre of classical 
Athens reaffirms the fundamental principles of democratic politics has been 
recurrently reiterated in contemporary critical scholarship. It is a premise that is 
usually read on the democratic identity of the Athenian spectator. Yet, the truth 
is that the spectators, ‘beyond the influence of noisy expressions of approbation 
and disapprobation’ (Floch 567), did not play any direct role in choosing the 
judges or passing verdicts. Rather, the crucial point here was the role of the 
poet/chorodidaskalos, something that is well evidenced in Plato’s thought.  Poets, 
he tells us, incite emotional fervour led by infatuated performers which, in turn, 
seduce the audience, which is also driven by hedonistic impulses. Similarly, in 
Ion we find a portrait of the artistic process, which depicts an Athenian 
performance culture overwhelmingly underpinned by an image of ‘irrationality’, 
explained in Plato, as Floch argues, as ‘a perverse economy of pleasure between 
uniformly senseless poets and audiences’ (567). It is what brings Plato to describe 
in Ion, using the voice of Socrates, poets as possessed by the Muses, while, in the 
Laws, the poets and the audience are depicted as enraptured by pleasure (568). 
What all this leads to in Platonic argumentation is theatrocracy – which, contrary 
to the Platonic Cave parable, entails an audience which is far from a silenced 
victim. Socrates is portrayed to point out in the Republic that spectators influence 
poets’ choices through their overpowering uproar and, thus, assume the role of 
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the active collaborator shaping the meaning of the performance. It is why 
theatrocracy is presented by Plato, not so much as a theatrical problem as we have 
seen so far, but as a political one. Theatre, capable of unregulated aesthetic 
innovation, is perceived to directly link with political change in Platonic thought, 
which, in turn, leads to anarchy, because in theatre one obeys collective and 
individual psychological impulses.  
For Plato, therefore, the result of theatrocracy, as Weber observes, has to 
do with ‘the theatrocratic usurpation of the rule of the law [which] is driven so 
much by fear as by pleasure’ (Weber 34). Weber sees the Platonic designation of 
theatrocracy in the dimension of contemporary ‘multimedia’. He even goes as far 
as to suggest that the theatrocratic theatre is not the same canonical theatre of 
Aristotle because Plato’s theatrocracy is not even a theatre. It is ‘a specific place 
or site’ that is ‘disrupted, disorganized by the different media that converge upon 
it’ (ibid.). What Weber suggests is that ‘the “rule” of the theatron’ actually stands 
for the ‘absence of all stable rules’ (ibid.) and is meant to reiterate the cave 
paradigm, only this time as an ‘open-air version’ that specifically denotes the 
experience and practice of the Athenian theatre. While I would agree with Weber 
that theatrocratic theatre is the theatrical equivalent of the Platonic cave, in the 
sense that it is a mimetic theatre run by shadows (thespians) and shadow-movers 
(poets), I would go a step further by proposing that theatrocracy is a 
predominantly speculative theatre in which thought and aesthetic innovation are 
mediated on the poet/director’s democratic paradigm of theatrical judgment. This 
is a reading that goes against Benjamin’s conception of theatrocracy as the enemy 
of all innovation and change that poses real danger when it draws on the ‘false, 
dissimulating totality’ of the mob as an ultimate and unquestionable criterion in 
criticism. Although Benjamin’s aim is to highlight the potentiality of the 
spectators to function as a mass that is, for Weber, ‘monolithic and immutable’ 
(35), which then dangerously imposes a certain potentially fascist set of relations, 
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I read theatrocracy as the empowerment of the audience to think through the 
embodiment of the poet/director’s choreographed lesson in dramatic 
performance. 
In many respects, Benjamin gives voice to Plato’s concerns. Although Plato 
disapproves of mimetic theatre, he paradoxically ends up reclaiming a certain 
kind of theatre, but one with which he stages his philosophy. This philosophical 
theatre is equally theatrocratic as far as theatrocracy defines not only the rule of 
the spectator, but the type of ruling ‘through seeing.’ The use of dramatic 
dialogues dramatise Plato’s philosophy while rendering him into a poet of his 
own theatre. But the rule of this theatre is not of the tragic poet but the 
philosopher. The philosophy that is being performed stages ‘seeing’ as a form of 
knowledge not that dissimilar from what theatre does, which, for Plato, only leads 
to theatrocracy itself.  
One of the main questions that theatrocracy poses, particularly in 
identifying an early figuration of the director in the aesthetic structure of the 
Athenian theatre, is in terms of power-relation. What kind of relation is a 
theatrocratic theatre? And what is the relation of the poet in the theatres of 
theatrocracy? For Weber, it is a relation that he associated with the siteness of 
theatre – the fact that ‘the nature of the theatrical site’ has, first and foremost, to 
do with its ability to influence ‘the perceptions and behaviors of those who fall 
under its sway’ (Theatricality as Medium 35). ‘The resurgence of thauma’ exerts 
a particular kind of power that is difficult to control because it appeals to one’s 
emotion, what today could be referred to as affect, or affective values. This is, to 
use Plato’s own words, the phantasmic power of theatre which comes down to 
‘harrowing the feelings of their audience with their language, rhythms, and 
lugubrious strains, and the choir which is most successful in plunging the city… 
into sudden tears…’ (The Laws 800c-d). And yet, there is a counter effect: the 
choir enters the sacred space of the altar, disturbing the public rites by their 
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overwhelming voices – an image which is, of course, reminiscent of the theatre 
audiences caught in the frenzy of emotion, disturbing the voice of reason 
(philosophy). 
In examining the role of pleasure and the emotions in the life of virtue, Plato 
also comes to propose a philosophical model as a kind of theatre in the virtuous 
life. It is conceived and argued against the theoretical space of theatrocracy that 
is simultaneously an agonistic place. Theatre is set against philosophy, yet in a 
way that Plato can rehabilitate theatre as a performance of philosophy, replacing 
theatre altogether with the philosophical theatre of philosophy. In the 
choreography between real and utopian, performative and philosophical, 
theatrical and synoptic, the performance of philosophy is intertwined with the 
philosophy of performance played out in theatre in the role and image of the 
poet/chorodidaskalos – a figuration that foreshadows, as I have argued in this 
chapter, the role and identity of the modern director. 
As I have already tried to show, the middle of theatricality is relational and 
situational. Its in-between space indicates, as Weber claims, ‘that it can never be 
construed as self-contained or self-regulating’ (43). This chapter has been asking, 
what kind of participant is the poet/director in this configuration? Perhaps, one 
thing we know for sure is that theatre indicates spectating as an inter-play between 
place and identity that is never fixed, but (dis)embodied at the audience in the 
presence of the actors. That in-between status is also, in this way, an indication 
of otherness, but an otherness that offers itself as a meson, in-between role and 
actor, spectator and character, identity and non-identity, rather than something to 
be merely observed. In other words, the middle of theatricality where I locate the 
director, participates as a decisive element to alter place, space, identity, and so 
on. And, by doing so, the middle (as the director) constitutes itself as a mode of 
perception in and through participation with an alterity that, ultimately, the 
middle is. That ‘alterity’, that in the end only can function as a ‘middle’, since it 
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is always relational and reflective in theatre, might justify its place as ‘a podium’ 
that, in Benjamin’s words, ‘have risen out of the fathomless depths’ (‘What is 
Epic Theatre’ 44), but a spectrally confounding one, as both a site ‘to see from’ 
and a ‘sight’ to think by. The director, I want to propose, occupies that conflictual 
bottomless pit procedure of theatricality that simultaneously problematises its 
podium as a place of potentiality in the thought of theatrical form. That thought 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Event of the Modernist Director 
 
Now that you have come to know God – or rather, to be known by him…  
– Saint Paul, Gal 4.9 
 
The artistic event is signaled by the advent of the new forms. 
 – Alain Badiou, Philosophy and the Event 32 
 
 
Badiou defines the Event as the state of ‘pure emergence’ or ‘pure beginning’. 
The Event always makes an opening, he argues, that is epochal, deeply 
transformative and relational. It exposes not only what is possible and impossible, 
but overthrows what was or could have been (Ethics 32). In Logic of Worlds, 
Badiou removes the domain of ‘existence’ from the category of ontology and 
instead claims it, following Lacan’s psychoanalytic line of thought, as a category 
of ‘appearing’, or of ‘making appearance’ instead of ‘being’. This configuration 
is most explicitly articulated in Badiou’s philosophy in terms of ‘truth 
procedures’, which he distributes among the four fields of thought – art, science, 
politics, and love (but not philosophy itself which, according to him, does not 
have the capacity to produce truths). Through these procedures, Badiou 
maintains, genuine events are being produced which, in turn, bring out what he 
describes as ‘eternal truths.’ When, therefore, this ‘created’ possibility is lived, 
embodied and enacted in real life, its truth procedure is also created. As such, an 
Event only denotes the source of possibilities that may (or may not) materialise 
at a certain point in time, but is and continues to be a source of actual possibilities 
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‘still present with a situation throughout an entire sequential period’ (Badiou, 
Philosophy and the Event 12).   
The significance of the Event’s theoretical premise for theatre begins to 
emerge when the ontological framework of ‘appearing’ (rather than ‘being’) is 
thought of as something closer to a proposition that creates – or, we could say 
‘stages’, a possibility for it to become reality. As Adrian Johnson observes, what 
we see in an Event is what was not authorised ‘either by the mathematical-
ontological order of [what Badiou calls] “being qua being” or by the logical 
system of transcendental structures regulating the play of appearances within 
circumstances in a given world’ (Badiou, Žižek and Political Transformations 
10). The Event’s sudden (if not wholly shocking), unexpected, but also 
sometimes mysterious or hard to comprehend appearance of an occurrence 
signals the opening up of a new horizon of possibilities, at its most elemental, 
fundamental change. But the dimension of the Event shares something of the 
‘theatrical’ – or, what for Badiou is located in ‘theatrical truth’. Theatre, he writes: 
is a completion or an accomplishing. …[It] is the virtuality of the Idea that 
has come to arrive in the perishable actuality of the scene. Moreover, this 
properly theatrical virtuality exists only in this coming or arriving. Thus 
theatre is the coming that alone accomplishes the Idea. (Rhapsody for the 
Theatre 101)  
 
When ‘reality’ itself is indistinguishable from its ‘appearance’, then reality is also 
seen to come into being in its very ‘disappearance’. This is why, for Badiou, any 
theatrical act is ontologically Evental. It produces in itself and by itself ‘a singular 
and irreducible effect of truth’ (ibid.) which, in turn, yet most significantly for my 
argument here, lays out the conceptual foundation of theatre as simultaneously an 
Event of thought. In this configuration, the director is a key part of this Evental 
history of theatre. As I want to show in this chapter, the director’s emergence in 
the historical moment of modernism that, in this thesis, signposts an 
understanding of theatre as a philosophical theatre, a ‘theatre of ideas’ for 
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Puchner, is in itself an Event. There are two important ways of critically thinking 
the Event of the director. The first is as a theatrical technology that identifies a 
new, speculative relationality between the artifice of the spectacle (theatre) and 
the severity of philosophical argumentation (Idea). This relation is already 
traceable, as we saw in the previous chapter, on the paradigm of the Athenian 
tragic imaginary and, most particularly, on the interface between the poet/director 
and the theatrical philosophy of Plato. The second is a mode of spectating, which 
I read as inextricably linked with the philosophical mode of knowing and which 
is further exemplified in terms of theatre’s centrality to philosophy.  
       Badiou’s philosophy frames the discussion of this chapter. The use of 
philosophy in this context draws specifically on Badiou’s notion of the Event 
upon which I explore the director as a type of Evental subjectivity in modernist 
theatre. Philosophy, in this particular sense, provides a conceptual and critical 
framework in my analysis through which I aim to discuss the director not in the 
traditional sense of philosophical discourse (as something that disregards any 
experience of evidence and generates an effect of universal self-evidence), but as 
a mode of speculative thinking that proposes the director as an Event. 
My hypothesis is the following: if it is possible to think of theatre as a mode 
of thought, what Puchner designates by his term of the ‘theatre of ideas’, and as 
what stands for, in Badiou’s writings, as the Event of theatre in philosophy, then 
surely the figure of the director occupies a very similar modality, mediating 
between the two. How exactly does this interface unfold and how can the director 
be possibly grasped as a type of philosopher, as a ‘thinker of representation’? 
How can the director be thought of as enacting philosophy, as staging ‘forms of 
ideas’ and, in this way, be inverting theatre into philosophy? And, if this is so, 
then what does this figure of the director signal for philosophy?  
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Framing, Reframing, Enframing 
For Žižek, the distinctively ontological character of the Event is experienced in 
the physical realm as a marked shift in ‘the very frame through which we perceive 
the world and engage in it’ (Event 10). This shift in the perspective is normally 
the exposure of a reality that was previously unthinkable or overtly inexistent, yet 
which suddenly becomes represented in the (new) situation. Badiou, too, in both 
his Logics of Worlds and Being and Event, reiterates this view by claiming that 
an Event can dramatically change the world within which it surfaces. The change 
procured includes the redistribution of the degrees of existence in a world so that 
‘another world’ is created. This modification, else described as reframing, is the 
very manner by which new appearances in that world are ordered. In the context 
of theatre, which is always about presenting and representing a world on stage, 
processes of framing and reframing are naturally at work. But what is particularly 
distinctive in the modernist theatre is how these processes are formulated a) as 
the modernist quest for a language of the stage, and b) as technology of ‘making 
appearance’ itself by which the director is also brought into being. Indeed, from 
Wagner to Brecht, reality and its various simulations are constantly framed and 
reframed theatrically, but in a manner that not only represents their world orders 
on stage, but reworks and recreates their reality and theatres anew, while formally 
establishing the new role of the director as another form of reframing.  
This distinctively modernist process can be said to start with the formal 
structures in Wagner’s phantasmagoria, the music-dramas of which strongly 
articulate what both Badiou and Žižek call as ‘the artistico-political unity of the 
event called Wagner’ (Five Lessons on Wagner 165). Or, as Žižek puts it: ‘Was 
there an artist who questioned more radically the very fundamentals of power and 
domination?’ (ibid.). To grasp Wagner’s radicalism in such Evental terms, one 
only has to look at the performative matrix of his operatic masterpieces. For 
example, as Žižek further points out, in Parsifal, Wagner’s use of the idea of the 
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Grail as the vessel that contains the blood of Christ symbolically represents that 
part of Christ that continues to shine, giving life and remaining alive. It denotes 
the politically subversive dimension of the part of Christ that ‘does not expire on 
the cross’ (Tarrying with the Negative 190), but allows ‘the surplus of the divine 
jouissance, the part of it which was not evacuated from the domain of the big 
Other’, (ibid.) to legitimise power. In other words, for Žižek, Wagner’s radically 
perverse idea was to ‘get Christ down from the Cross, or rather stop him from 
getting on it’ (ibid.). By doing so, Wagner as the new artist of the director, on the 
one hand, radically reframes the Christian imaginary by which a new political 
meaning emerges; yet, on the other hand, he utilises formal means of technology 
by which he actively seeks to re-think reality through reshaping and restructuring 
it on the Wagnerian stage as a ‘totality’ – Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk.  
The Gesamtkunstwerk is a highly significant part of the history of the 
director. As Andreas Huyssen observes in his revisionist After the Great Divide, 
it announces the modernist breakthrough during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century theatre (37). The Gesamtkunstwerk also represents, we should not forget, 
the most advanced stage in the development of opera and music-drama, as 
Adorno, Wagner’s most unyielding critic, could not but recognise. Yet it is as an 
Evental site, it seems to me, that we can begin to perceive Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk as a mode of technology and a philosophical construct in the 
formation of the director. It is what elevates the function of the director to a 
philosophical function, while rendering the modernist theatre as a place of and for 
philosophical thought.  
Most specifically, as Hallward observes in his book Badiou, A Subject To 
Truth, an Evental site is, for Badiou, the ‘limits of currently available resources’ 
(117), yet it is at these limits that any Evental site is located. In art, it denotes the 
‘place from which radical innovation can take place, innovation beyond the 
normal means of the situation to interpret, classify, and forget’ (120). To perceive, 
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therefore, Wagner as an Evental site is to approach Wagner’s Ttotal Art-Work as 
an attempt that not only creates a ‘technology’ of the stage, but what re-creates 
the stage as a technology – which is why Wagner has been considered as the end 
of opera, because he confronted the limit of opera; or as Hallward puts it, ‘of what 
is recognizable as ‘music’ (117). Wagner’s saturation of the tonal system, for 
example, in his Tristan and Isobel, is a development that led to the overcoming 
of this barrier in the classical tonal system. But can this by itself classify Wagner 
as Evental? 
What we need to understand about the Evental dimension of Wagner is that 
it cannot be solely contained in the particular historical moment of Wagner. 
Rather the Event is something that emanates, as Badiou claims, from a principle 
of ‘anticipatory certitude’ – that is, what derives from a trace, yet which instigates 
and drives forward fundamental change and expansion. The technology of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, aesthetically speaking, is characterised by such a change. But 
it is its Evental dimension that marks Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk  as a mode of 
technology that changes opera and theatre once and for all. It is why we think of 
Schoenberg’s gesture towards dissonance as already being initiated in the 
possibility of Wagnerian music, which was also what had made the 
materialisation of dissonance in Schoenberg an actuality. The historical avant-
garde’s ‘integration of art and life’ is also another such expression of the Event 
of Wagner’s technology. This time, Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk reformulates the 
total reality, not of the ‘unreal’ (phantasmagoria) but of the ‘real’ (reality itself) 
by re-organising a new life – which, in the words of Peter Bürger, comes ‘from 
the basis in art’ (41). As Groys argues in The Total Art of Stalinism, there is a 
total integration in the avant-garde which is a position already voiced in 
Benjamin’s ‘aestheticisation thesis’. The same can be said of Brecht’s political 
efficacy of the ‘gestus’, which is practically positioned as another technology of 
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the stage and can be read as the direct rendition of Wagner’s phantasmagoria into 
the dialectical, epic theatre.  
But the mode par excellence in this respect, which resolutely provides the 
director as an Event in the history of theatre through which we also come to grasp 
the director as the Event of thought in theatre, is perhaps Naturalism and Realism. 
Given the advent of a rather sophisticated illusionistic aesthetic at the late-
nineteenth century stage, Naturalism, rather than Wagner, has always been 
historically considered to be the birthplace of the modern director. Naturalist and 
Realist theatres reframe the reality of life by offering it as an on-going experiment 
of new social ideas. In his recent The Antinomies of Realism, Frederic Jameson 
goes as far as to claim that ‘if it is social truth or knowledge we want from realism, 
we will soon find that what we get is ideology’ (6). This development is 
immediately felt in the ways aspiring directors such as André Antoine, in staging 
the works of Zola, and Aurélien Lugné-Poë in the Symbolist plays of Maeterlink, 
introduce the aesthetics of truthful illusion through which they not only portray a 
society in transit, but reframe it through its stage as that kind of reality and that 
kind of place which engages with new ideas or, indeed, new ideologies. Towards 
this aim, the body acquired focal attention as thoughts and ideas are generated in 
structures of affect and distinguish themselves from mere emotion. Jameson is 
once again useful here for differentiating affect as something that ‘eludes 
language and its naming of things (and feelings), whereas emotion is 
preeminently a phenomenon sorted out in an array of names’ (29). Put more 
simply, there is good reason why the naturalist stage, which is also referred by 
many commentators as ‘Realist’, is a shocking place. Naturalist theatre normally 
describes the overall aesthetic approach of the illusion of a natural environment 
or behaviour, while Realist theatre is used in the context of physical and 
psychological portrayal of actions and character. Yet, in both cases, especially in 
relation to theatre, the staging of a ‘slice of life’ is also always ‘the emergence of 
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the phenomenological body in language and representation’ (Jameson 32), which 
is the fundamental Naturalist and Realist proposition of the stage as affect. As I 
will later discuss, it is a type of affect that enacts in modernism the sensory vehicle 
of thought between the actor’s heightened psychological representational 
presence and the dynamics of an emancipated sensory spectatorship. This is how, 
for example, the emerging discourses of psychoanalysis and theories of the 
environment, which become reconfigured and highly inflected on the Naturalist 
stage particularly through the psychosomatic forms of Realist/Naturalist acting, 
end up seeking to re-materialise, de-centre, and puppetise the human form of the 
actor while conjuring the new form of a critical, empathic, and deeply 
emancipated new spectator. (Taxidou, Modernism and Performance 51) 
What would these psychic systems at work in Naturalist/Realist 
characterisation mean in Lacanian terms? That a new signifier is forced, which 
also simultaneously proposes an intimate inner psychic life that might feel fully 
natural and human, yet which is always slightly out of reach. Therefore, 
Naturalist/Realist characters are forced to objectify themselves by their 
experience of inner and outer contradiction, while the actor’s body and psyche 
undergo the obligatory ‘passage’ of a system (Stanislavsky) or method 
(Stransberg) – what soon becomes known in the terminology of the director’s 
stage as ‘an actor’s training’. Interestingly, in either case the trace that is forged 
theatrically in psychosomatic terms comes to also designate the Event and stands 
in for it. This forgery allows actors, characters and spectators to access the truth 
of the experience because the signifier that hits it (and, which simultaneously will, 
also, inevitably miss it to a certain degree) produces something new, as ex nihilo. 
One might say that Henrik Ibsen’s Miss Julie is representative of the Naturalist 
movement because it enacts, in a very subjective way, this very novelty of the 
modern emblematic woman. Similarly, one may consider the way female 
characters feature in their psyches and bodies the ambivalent contradictions of 
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self-reliance and self-fulfillment as ways of exposing the hysteria of the 
stereotypical womanhood, either as a deprived mother or otherwise outcast, most 
notably in Ibsen’s plays such as A Doll’s House, Ghosts, and Hedda Gabler. But, 
the point of forging what might be a subjective position in these plays (e.g. the 
new woman), yet which cannot ground itself on anything that is already in place 
in the Symbolic order is, I think, the means by which the new technology of the 
director reframes reality. The director stages a reality as real as the acts and 
decisions embedded in the idea of a desirable outcome, or a future that may or 
may not arrive. In other words, the Event of the Naturalist/Realist director is not 
only in the dramatic act of bringing something new into the world, but drawing 
on a temporality that already pre-exists in possibilities but it is still veiled – that 
is to say, the temporality of the Evental. Its appearance, therefore, as a form 
Naturalist representation or Realist portrayal of life and ideas, when finally 
emerge on these stages, can only be ‘radically unconditioned’ (Barclay 174). For 
these portrayals of life and ideas seemingly appear seemingly appear ex nihilo, 
independently of the knowledge that preceded them – what is arguably the 
metaphysical dimension of the Event. Something suddenly appears in the 
historical moment that is so profoundly transformative, and yet seems to have 
come as out of nowhere. 
The Evental dimension of Naturalism/Realism is further highlighted by the 
concept of ‘truth’ in the portrayal of ‘real life’ on this stage. It is also what 
connects this theatre with the idea of ‘knowledge through seeing’, which is 
employed by philosophy as a theatrical mode of thinking. Philosophical concepts 
and ideas are performed as stages – just like in the Platonic cave. The only 
difference here is that this knowledge is an embodied knowledge represented by 
social behaviour and human psychology, that claims a reality more ‘truthful’ than 
reality itself. Indeed, Stanislavsky, the high priest of theatrical Naturalism, 
despite his more aesthetic preoccupation with the internalising and externalising 
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of the psychological nuances of the Naturalist stage, was explicit in the role of his 
theatre in terms of the ‘search for truth’; ‘what we are undertaking’ he stressed, 
‘is not simply a private affair but a social task’ (in Braun, The Director and the 
Stage 60). Similar emphasis was placed by one of his most talented students, 
Vsevolod Meyerhold, whose bold experimentation with the aesthetic form 
quickly morphs into a political call for a revolutionary, so much in theatre as in 
real life. Meyerhold’s identification with the revolutionary politics of Russia 
undoubtedly foreshadows the more aggressive integration of aesthetics with 
politics that was soon to mark the theatrical landscapes of the avant-garde 
activity. His theatrical experiments with the human form in space radically 
reconfigure the illusionistic aesthetic of the naturalist theatre, acting as a 
paradigm for theatre artists of the avant-garde, especially Futurists and 
Constructivists. Indeed, by framing and reframing the reality of illusion, 
Meyherhold altogether exposes this reality as another dialectical process by 
which the very frame of illusion needs to be re-materialised, through the body, 
intellect and the technology of the stage, into the bare ‘real’.  
The apogee of this process properly arrived in its full grandeur with the 
avant-garde’s ability to render theatricality into the only actual space that, not 
only partakes in the shape of a new reality, but stands as a model of this new 
reality. The idea here is to aestheticise and theatricalise reality in an effort to bring 
about and engage with a renewed, reconfigured, essentially integrated – or, to use 
the Hegelian term, ‘mediated’ – reality; a reality in which the organisation of a 
new life can only be founded in the instantiation of ‘truth’. And yet, this is a 
process of re-theatricalisation that ironically can only arrive through error, failure 
and misrecognition. In other words, the avant-gardish reframing of reality as 
radicalism, which often has been read as the confounding of the categories of the 
aesthetic and the political, as Groys many other commentators of the historical 
avant-garde have claimed, perform a type of what Žižek calls a ‘transference’. As 
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a framing/reframing device, transference is not so much meant to reflect reality 
as it is to constitute it anew. But transference is, in fact, an illusion. As Žižek 
argues, ‘the point is that we cannot bypass it and reach directly for the truth. The 
truth itself is constituted through the illusion proper to the transference’ (in 
Bistoen 843). In this sense, the avant-garde’s reclaim of theatricality in the actual 
‘real’ is not dissimilar with most theatres of modernism. What is different, 
instead, is the avant-garde’s strange temporality. While there is an always 
relational and subjective process, like in all forms of modernism as a product of 
the director’s creativity and experimentation, in the avant-garde the subjective 
mistake, error, or misrecognition seems to arrive paradoxically as a mediation, 
before the truth in relation to which we are designating it as ‘error’. To borrow 
from Žižek, if ‘truth’ becomes ‘true’ only through ‘error’ (‘The Truth Arises from 
Misrecognition’ 190-191), then, in an equally true Hegelian manner, the avant-
garde recreates the illusion of error, failure, and misrecognition to reframe a 
reality that is to become. And, by doing so, it emerges as the only reality that is. 
‘Take away the illusion,’ Žižek insists, ‘and you have lost the truth itself’ (Event 
106). 
This now brings us to an understanding of the Event of the director, from a 
shift in the relationship to reality to a radical change of this reality itself. It is in 
this sense that the aesthetic subjectivity of director can be understood as a mode 
of technology. In Heidegger, the ‘essence of technology’ is used by means to 
indicate a kind of fundamental fantasy by which reality, and how we relate to it, 
is structured. This is, for Heidegger, the significance of his notion of the Gestell, 
which usually translates to ‘enfarming.’ What is particularly interesting here is 
how Heidegger attaches the meaning of technology as something radical. As 
Žižek observes, for Heidegger the idea of ‘enframing’ does not only designate ‘a 
complex network of machines and activities but the attitude towards reality’ 
assumed when is engaged in such activities (Event 31). Enframing, therefore as a 
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mode of technology denotes the ways by which reality, at least for Heidegger, 
discloses itself to us while posing itself as what objectifies oneself – the kind of 
enframing perhaps that, in the modernist stage, reduces the human form to what 
is no longer properly human, but more than human, such as Craig’s 
Übermarionette or Meyerhold’s tribune actor. This is the kind of reality that loses 
the very feature that allows openness to it, only to theatricalise it as the only ‘real’. 
And yet, paradoxically, it is this contradiction in acknowledging the essence of 
technology as a mode of enframing that makes it possible to overcome it, as 
Heidegger insists, by traversing the fantasy which then introduces the notion of 
the Event. This in Heidegger appears as Ereignis. 
The radical configuration of Ereignis refers to the new epochal disclosure 
of Being, that kind of emergence of a new ‘world’, or perhaps a horizon of 
meaning within which all entities appear (ibid.). Its processes, therefore, operate 
not so much in reality itself, but, like in Badiou’s thinking of the Event, define a 
matter of pure relationality that is, itself, a relation of technology capable of 
producing the effect that seems to exceed its causes. To understand this delicate 
point, I will now turn to explore the Event of thought in theatre that makes up, 
ultimately, the constitution of the Evental director. 
 
 
Mediation as the Evental Director  
After Stéphane Mallarmé, after Paul Verlaine, after Gustave Moreau, after 
Puvis de Chavannes, after our own verse, after all our subtle and nervous 
rhythm, after the faint mixed tins of Conder, what more is possible? After 
us the Savage God.  
W.B. Yeats in Taxidou, Modernism and Performance 1 
 
Alfred Jarry’s highly subversive experimentation in Ubu Roi (1896), with the 
dramatic references from the all too familiar Shakespearean Macbeth, was not so 
much the crux of the controversy for W.B. Yeats. As Taxidou observes, it was 
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not ‘that Yeats disliked the performance as that he was simply shocked by it’ 
(ibid.). Jarry’s formal experimentation of the ‘dramatic’ into what could be 
described as the anti-dramatic, not only instigates another (new) form, but 
something like a mental overload that is shocking because it enables an 
overturning in thought-processes steering one’s unconscious – what Freud would 
have probably defined as knowledge which doesn’t know itself, yet which was 
there all along waiting to be discovered or spoken. It is, then, this act of form as 
a mode of thought or knowledge that constitutes, while it is simultaneously 
constituted by, the performance itself that signals a new subjectivity – in this case, 
the theatrical identity of Jarry as a modern director/author, and of Yeats as the 
modern spectator/critic, both of which are brought together, given form and 
definition in the artistic work itself. As Badiou would argue, the main question 
that artistic work poses is within the domain of form. In theatre, it evolves around 
theatre’s power for appearance and its relation to ‘being’, which is found at the 
core of theatre art as aesthetic form – what also pronounces the Evental director 
as fundamentally an embodied mode of forming ideas. If modernist 
experimentation is the domain of aesthetic formation, then it is so in the sense of 
the formal resources that give way to aesthetic potentialities, which are at the core 
of innovation and experimentation. It is what allows, Badiou claims, the invention 
of Abstraction, Symbolism, Realism, Expressionism and so forth to take place 
and simultaneously be shaped as aesthetic form. This experimentation, I further 
add, is signalled and made possible in modernism on the interrelation between 
appearance, being (as truth), and representation. While artistic presentation is 
wholly occurring in the sensory sphere (aesthetic) as something that is seen, felt, 
and heard, theatrical form simultaneously operates, as argues Badiou, ‘the order 
of appearing, of that which appears’ (Philosophy and the Event 55. Yet, the 
significance of this interrelation, which is also found at the core of the artistic 
subjectivity of the director, is in indicating that something essential is ‘felt’ to be 
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present through one’s aestheses (senses), although it is also slightly veiled at the 
same time. Aesthetic form, in this sense, is part of what renders the director into 
an Event, not only formalistically, but by ways of opening up possibilities of 
understanding the very situation of what produced the phenomenon – a 
phenomenon of mediation, to be more precise, through which the director’s 
subjectivity becomes the aesthetic materials themselves.  
The advents of new forms on the modernist stage are, therefore, not meant 
to only describe formal possibilities lurking to be expressed in the background of 
theatrical innovation. They are specific thought processes or ‘Ideas’ – what 
Badiou describes as ‘forms of truth’, which are implicated in the sensory realm 
and are, at the same time, advents of a new subjectivity precisely located in the 
artistic works themselves. Once again, Badiou carefully points out that 
‘subjectivity is signalled by the possibility of an Idea, of a new Idea’ (Philosophy 
and the Event 74). This ‘new Idea’ is not a matter of thinking anew something, 
but of actively engaging in the creation and reception of this idea through 
acceptance and incorporation. What is striking in this presence is the relation of 
an inter-activity and intra-connectivity with the subject that makes this idea both 
‘appear’ and ‘possible’ in the work’s existence. In conceptualising the subject as 
‘the real of the Idea’, as that which is ‘what makes it exist, what causes it to be 
real’ (ibid.), Badiou is already signalling towards what seems to be an embodied 
mode or trope of thought that I read as the director’s subjectivity. If the director 
is who makes the ‘idea’ possible, then the director is the medium by which this 
Idea receives material expression on stage always positioned between the actor 
and the spectator, the word and the action, the theatrical space and the civic place. 
That meson is naturally a hybrid form that also seems to work between theatre 
and thought. To fully grasp this dimension, which will also allow us to think of 
the director as a type of an Event, I will briefly draw upon Badiou’s fascination 
with the Apostle Paul.  
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‘For me,’ Badiou argues, ‘Paul is a poet-thinker of the event… he brings 
forth the entirely human connection, whose destiny fascinates me, between the 
general idea of a rupture, an overturning, and that of a thought-practice that is this 
rupture’s subjective materiality’ (Saint Paul 2). What offers Paul as a 
paradigmatic thinker of the event is the fact that he radically restructures his 
thought in relation to the Event of Christ’s resurrection, yet in a form by which 
practically reshapes faithfulness to the Event itself. ‘Form’, in this respect, is not 
just any representation of a particular occurrence or temporality, but is exactly 
what allows thought to be reshaped by the Event whilst emerging itself as the 
thought of the Event. To translate this beautifully complex philosophical 
proposition in theatrical terms would be to look for those formal configurations 
and structures in which theatrical presentation is exemplified in experimentation, 
situated between form and content, through which theatre also becomes reshaped, 
but as an activity of thought. To understand this interesting interplay, it is 
important to note that, for Badiou, the significance of St Paul is in the apostle’s 
ability to think the new and embody it in time and space, while disconnecting it 
from the perceived knowledge and social conditioning. What this then also means 
is that his encounter with grace (e.g. the Event of Christ), is not the climax of a 
long history and cannot be considered as merely transformative, but an altogether 
new creation. Indeed, for Badiou, quoting Saint Paul when he writes ‘by the grace 
of God I am what I am’ (in Barclay 175). The meaning of this encounter is the 
deeply subversive process of self-creation through the divine that leads St Paul to 
chart a third discourse. This ‘third’ is, as John Barclay observes in his article 
‘Paul and the Philosophers: Alain Badiou and the Event’, a discourse that is ‘a-
cosmic and il-legal: its co-ordinates and meaning are entirely formed by the event 
itself’ (ibid.).  What this might mean for the director, when read in Pauline terms, 
is the deeply mediative nature of this figure which pronounces the self-creation 
of a new aesthetic subjectivity as the result of a process (Event) of its own 
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‘becoming’, which is what necessitates a third discourse (the director) as the very 
processaulity (mediation) that simultaneously de-substantialises it. For example, 
the loss of some presumed unity or harmony in the theatrical stage that never 
quite existed and which needs to always be recognised and negotiated – what 
results, to recall Rose, is the triune relationship of the broken middle – a broken 
middle that I identify with the Evental figure of the director. 
Antoine Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty is an exemplary case in point. His 
opposition to the ‘oppressive authority’ (Puchner, ‘The Theatre in Modernist 
Thought’ 525) of the dramatic text from which the theatrical stage should be 
freed, reverberates with the unmediated prerogative of theatricality already – a 
recurrent modernist position already voiced loud and clear in Craig’s and 
Adolphe Appia’s aesthetic writings earlier in the twentieth century. As Puchner 
observes, in his article ‘Theatre in Modernist Thought’, ‘the single most 
important component of Artaud’s theater is its violent and uncompromising 
critique of dramatic masterworks and, by extension, of the dramatic text as such’ 
(ibid.). What ultimately emerges is not a critique of the stage, but the essence of 
theatre which, for Artaud, is re-created in the programmatic, even impossible, 
utopian terms of the phantasmic – an association that seems to me to display 
Artaud’s conceptualisation of his Theatre of Cruelty in Badiou’s Evental terms. 
Whether it is materialisable or not, the aggressive formulation of its own 
theatrical imaginary as ‘cruel’, anti-literal, anti-textual and, to a great extent, 
fantasised, forces a particular theatrical existence that is equivalent to the form of 
its thought – that is, in fact, a mediated position represented and made possible 
by Artaud in his role as a director, connecting his theatre with the Event of 
thought. To put it differently: Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty does not denote the 
mere ‘breaking away’ from previous structures; neither is it accounted for, nor 
structured by any preconceived generality or any pre-constituted community. 
Rather, it describes an opening of an epoch, a ‘pure beginning’ in Badiou’s terms, 
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in which the transformation in the relationship between what is possible and what 
is impossible invites the third discourse of the director, which ultimately is a-
poretic. This embedded a-poria in the mediating subjectivity of the director bores 
a hole right in the middle of theatre, giving birth while rupturing the very fabric 
of established knowledge and practices. This kind of a-poretic place, which, as 
we saw in the previous chapter of this thesis, designates the difficult path with-
out a path, now comes to also claim a ‘centre’ (poros) with-out a centre – which, 
in modernism, foregrounds the theatrical skene as a hole (poros), giving birth to 
itself each time–perhaps the greatest Event of all, namely the Event of 
modernism. So, to return to the earlier Badiouian analogy, the director, like St 
Paul, is the figure that dares to not only conceive and articulate the Event of the 
modernist theatre in the self-creating activity of thought, but positions the figure 
of the director as an Evental figure itself –what renders this new artist of the 
director into a certain embodied type of a philosopher. 
It is in this sense, too,  – to make this densely philosophical hypothesis more 
concrete in terms of the political expression of the director – that we see the ever-
increased democratic project of modernity articulated as what might be 
considered the democratic identity of the director. Wagner and his totalising, 
aesthetic stage is the first to paradoxically articulate and instigate such a modern 
democratic impulse. We should not forget that, despite the totalisation of 
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk and the critical reception that followed it in 
conjunction with the totalising political discourses of the early twentieth century, 
Wagner’s aesthetic conception of the ‘total art-work’ was politically configured 
on the idea of the democratization of all art forms and inspired by Wagner’s own 
revolutionary, anarchist action, as we shall later see, and had led him to live a life 
of exile. This does not mean that we should overlook the totalising meaning that 
also informs the role of Wagner as a composer/director, and, indeed, of the 
aspiring figure of the modern director more generally. Rather, that the totalising 
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dimension, first identified and set into motion by Wagner, is a part of the history 
of the director’s Event because of the director’s ability to relate dialectically with 
both totalising politics and with democracy. This can be seen more clearly in how 
later, more radically subversive, movements of the avant-garde channel Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk into the political notion of performance as the total integration 
of life and art, ultimately functioning as another type of revolutionary, anti-
conformist, negative totality, yet a totality nonetheless.  
If the Hegelian logic that governs the subversive nature of the Evental 
director is what appears only in its disappearance, its speculative procedure posits 
mediation, in Hegelian terms, as a mobile, structural activity conceived as a 
relational movement, not an entity. It is this logic that characterises how the 
Evental director behaves within the aesthetic trajectory of modernism – a relation 
of movement of opposition and renunciation that keeps aesthetic relations in 
modernist theatres in play, while directly conversing with philosophy.  
One such good example, apart from Wagner’s monumental impact on the 
philosophical thinking of his time and the theatres of thought to come, both in the 
shape of critical commentators of the Frankfurt school and the language of the 
modernist stage, is Naturalism’s interrelation to the political efficacy of the avant-
garde and Brecht’s ‘epic’ Realism when proposing the social gestus. Naturalism’s 
affirmative aesthetic not only radicalises the illusion of the stage as the only ‘real’ 
reality, but is what enables the more radical politics that shape the stages of both 
Brecht and of the various subversive experimentations of the avant-garde.  
In the next section, I will explore the relationship between theatre and 






	   103	  
Theatre and Philosophy  
 
… philosophical theatricality means this, that the essence of philosophy… is a 
[theatrical] act.     
–  Alain Badiou, Conditions 44 
 
To propose the director as an Event is to read the director indistinguishably from 
philosophy. The director’s appearance in the theatrical enterprise of the late-
nineteenth century dialectically interacts with philosophy by which this figure 
establishes itself as a permanent feature in the structure of the modernist theatre, 
but also in the very intellectual structure by which modern philosophy produces 
philosophical thought. Philosophy’s stable argumentation through ideas is 
recuperated by the figure of the director as a kind of enacted and embodied mode 
of thought that also claims to stage philosophical ideas. This phenomenon is first 
signalled by Wagner and receives its climax with the openly dialectical stage of 
Brecht, forcing philosophy to engage discursively with his ‘epic’ theatre, while 
he directly converses with philosophy. In many respects, this new modern figure 
of the director channels philosophy into the theatre by means of both rendering 
the theatrical stage into a platform of philosophical thinking and by theatricalising 
philosophical enquiry. Their encounter does not come without its conflicts or 
contradictions. One may only recall the seminal, all-encompassing, indeed, 
formative interaction between Nietzsche and Wagner. Their passionate love-hate 
affair is perhaps one of the most extreme examples of this contradiction. Not only 
does Nietzsche advance his steep polemic against Wagner, but he offers him a 
distinct opportunity to perform, as Taxidou argues, the openly ‘tragic’ conception 
of his thought, which he also configures as a form of philosophy itself (The Mask 
5). Wagner, in his turn, created his operatic masterpieces as the inception to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Indeed, Wagner not only acknowledges 
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Schopenhauer as his true intellectual mentor, but he actively endorses his 
philosophy, seeking to re-create it theatrically in the forms of his later music-
dramas. Similarly, Craig’s writings, through which he formulates the aesthetic 
theory of the modern theatre, develop in response to Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
which he incorporates, absorbs, and reiterates as his own in his various theoretical 
and practical schemes. Nietzsche’s philosophical proposition of the Übermensch, 
conceived as the ultimate modern symbol and an active shaper of new values 
within the moral vacuum of nihilism, acts for Craig, and for many of the aspiring 
modern directors, as a catalyst. In Craig’s case, Nietzschean thought, but also 
Schopenhauer, formulates and gives direction to the various aspects of Craig’s 
Theatre of the Future, particularly his famous notion of the Übermarrionette 
deriving directly by Nietzsche’s Übermensch, by which Craig introduces his 
acting theory.  
Nietzschean philosophy, at least for the formative years of the modernist 
theatre and the new form of the director, was far from figurative or an empty, 
symbolic gesture. Rather, it displayed an impact that was literal and real. In this 
context, not only Craig but also the dramatic new waves of writing by Joseph 
Conrad, Arthur Symons, Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde demonstrate an aesthetic 
consciousness formulated by the Nietzschean principles, while Bernard Shaw 
writes and stages Man and Superman (1903), a play derived dramaturgically by 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch. It depicts the persistent attempts of a confirmed 
bachelor who avoids the pursuit of Ann Whitefield, referred to as ‘the Life Force’ 
(Modernism, Nationalism and the Novel 62). Moreover, in Russia, Fyodor 
Sologub publishes the influential article ‘The Theatre of the Single Will’ in 1908 
that proposes a Nietzschean model of theatrical practice conceived in as the 
creative expression of the single artistic ‘will’. The sincerely Nietzschean themes 
are also echoed in Nikolay Evreinov’s essay ‘Introduction to Monodrama’ 
(1908), which proposed the various aspects of the new theatre as projections that 
	  
	   105	  
belong to the psyche of one artistic consciousness. In France, too, Edouard Schré 
publishes the essay ‘Theatre of the Soul’, which speaks of the idea of renewal and 
rebirth as a collective catharsis, another philosophical concept deriving from and 
being developed in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. On the level of theatre 
practice, the impact of philosophy was even more radically felt, shaking the 
foundation of the theatre as it was known until then. This can be seen in 
Marinetti’s masculine aggressive imaginary of the machine aesthetic, or 
Dadaism’s negative poiesis that seemed to re-invoke and re-play Nietzsche’s 
thesis of ‘the eternal recurrence’. But it is equally present in Structuralism, 
Expressionism and Surrealism that can be understood as fully blown theatrical 
elaborations of Nietzsche’s famous existential statement: ‘only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified’ (The Birth of 
Tragedy 59). In this particular sense, the modernist theatre emerges not only as 
Nietzschean to its core but Übermenschean. And the director has claimed it as a 
role somewhat between theatre and philosophy.  
The great rivalry between the philosopher and the director is an old one. 
Already in Plato, as we saw in the previous chapter, the poet is banished by the 
philosopher. But this is not because the philosopher (Plato) hates the theatre. 
Rather, it is an act that shows ‘a writer who wants to get rid of his rivals’ (Puchner 
The Drama of Ideas 523). What this results in, in terms of the philosophical 
tradition that follows through the centuries, is another Platonic cave, this time for 
philosophy. Indeed, the way by which philosophy tends to ‘stage’ its ideas is in a 
manner akin to the theatre director. The examples here are numerous. From 
Wagner to the Naturalist directors and Marinetti, and from the various Dadaist 
artists to Brecht, philosophy continuously restages the figure of director as a 
particular ideological construction while producing philosophical thought. 
Strangely enough, the director also appears in this configuration as another 
engaged thinker that paradoxically seems to somehow also reconcile the 
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remarkable, long-standing difference that entangles theatre and philosophy. The 
director as the mediating link in this relation is considered by both as the cause, 
the effect, while the difference between the philosophical dramatisation of ideas 
by philosophers and the director’s dramatic representation of ideas in space and 
time is not that dissimilar after all.  
In Plato’s Republic and The Laws, for example, what is  significant in this 
respect is Plato’s philosophical oeuvre. Here we  see the dramatisation of the lay 
out of his thought, but it is made in such a way that elevates a certain sensory 
understanding which he draws directly from the form of theatre as a sensory mode 
of ‘knowledge through seeing’. The aim is to get to experience philosophical 
‘knowing’ as more ‘true’ or ‘real’ than reality itself. Just like a director, therefore, 
Plato the philosopher ‘stages’ his philosophical thought.  
This centrality of the theatrical paradigm in philosophy continues 
throughout the philosophical tradition. In Schelling’s writing, it appears as a kind 
of philosophising scene, while in Sartre it appears as a kind of theatricality by 
which the philosopher appropriates the doctrine of freedom. In contemporary 
philosophy, philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Burke, Badiou, Rancière, Zizek, 
and Deleuze are seen to draw on the form of theatre not only as a method by 
which to theatricalise their philosophy, but to directly appropriate the idea of 
‘theatricality’ in all its related concepts as ways of thinking philosophically and, 
as such, they write a theatrical type of philosophy. This paradoxically intimate 
(though, often, hostile) relating is further seen in Schiller’s The Robbers, the main 
hero in which inspires Hegel’s thought on the Absolute of self-consciousness. In 
the same spirit, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who ironically dismisses theatre in 
Gevena,  then goes on and writes his own operetta, The Village Soothsayer. In 
Brecht’s theatre, this fascinating interaction acquires its most exemplary form; 
By actively claiming the role of the philosopher, Brecht de-theatricalises theatre 
into his own deeply theatrical model of the Epic theatre, which he presents as an 
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intellectual practice (philosophy) that is also simultaneously a practice of art 
theatre. As Brecht announces in the introduction of his Lehrstück plays (learning 
plays): 
With the learning-play, then, the stage begins to be didactic. (A word of 
which I, as a man of many years of experience in the theatre, am not afraid.) 
(The Measures Taken and Other Lehrstück Plays 1) 
In his article ‘Afterword: Please Mind the Gap between Theatre and Philosophy’, 
Puchner discusses some of these complex problematics in the relationship of the 
two disciplines. The article is the published version of a keynote presented in the 
inaugurated conference of the Performance Philosophy Network – an 
international network of currently over 3,000 members that a group of mainly 
new scholars established in 2012. Suggesting that there is something irrevocably 
distinct between theatre and philosophy, Puchner argues that the two cannot be 
bridged by a shared mode of ‘thinking through doing’ and ‘doing through 
thinking’, or at least not in the way the growing body of scholarship under the 
intellectual network of Performance Philosophy seems to suggest. Instead, ‘what 
makes the study of theatre and philosophy interesting, even thrilling,’ Puchner 
suggests, ‘is the very fact that the two are so utterly and irreconcilably different’ 
(‘Afterword’	  543). In many ways, here Puchner simply tries to reiterate, in this 
manner, the long-held philosophical thesis of anti-theatricality. Even if theatre 
has always provided philosophers, already since the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
he claims, with new and fresh procedures by which to renovate the critical 
instruments of philosophical thought and its thinking, for Puchner this is not any 
proof by which to claim that such intimate intellectual endeavours diminish the 
gap that separates the two respective disciplines. Neither does it help to dissolve, 
let alone cancel, he argues, the anti-theatrical prejudice that runs through this 
ancient relationship. Rather, what would be more fruitful in this task would be to 
look at the deliberate appropriation of theatre by philosophy. On this premise, 
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Puchner refers to Kenneth Burke’s proposed ‘dramatism’. For him, Burke’s 
‘dramatism’ provides sufficient evidence of a type of philosophical 
reconstruction of what might be a ‘playing theatre’ employed as an instrument of 
philosophy that Burke, in his role as a scholar, adopts for use in the discipline of 
drama. Burke’s proposed model draws on theatrical terms such as ‘act’, ‘agent’, 
‘agency’, ‘purpose’ and ‘scene’ through which he examines the entire history of 
philosophy. 
On the one hand, Puchner is right to bring up Burke’s theatrical 
appropriation as a good example of the level of appropriation that characterises 
the relationship between theatre and philosophy. After all, it is a common practice 
in producing philosophy ever since Plato. It is here that we see Nietzsche turning 
to Wagner and, subsequently, Adorno following a similar route. We further see 
Benjamin producing philosophical thought from reflecting on Brecht, Lukács on 
Realism, Deleuze on Antonin Artaud, and most recently, Badiou, Žižek and 
Rancière among others developing a theatrical type of political thought. This 
method of appropriation of the form and concept of theatre is undoubtedly a 
philosophical tool rather than any accurate representation or analysis of the 
historical moment of these theatres or their directors. Sometimes, it is indeed with 
the aim of producing new philosophy and sometimes for elaborating deeply 
philosophical concerns (the question of ‘truth’, of metaphysics, of ontology, etc.). 
In this sense, theatre, and specifically the modern figure of the director, serves as 
a scapegoat for philosophical argumentation and critique. Thus, these 
‘philosophical’ theatrical models and their reconstructions are the very points of 
fusion between theatre and philosophy that re-construct the former in order to 
construct the latter, as something akin to theatre and something of theatre and yet 
not theatre.  
As a result, this process is deeply transformative and constitutive for both 
theatre and philosophy. However, it does not so much end up bringing the two 
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disciplines in an ‘arranged marriage’ (‘Afterword’	  543), as Puchner would have 
it, but in what might be a truly dialectical relationality that allows a process of 
profound creative and intellectual interaction between the two, necessarily 
resulting in the transformation of each other. But it is a transformation that is 
diremptive. As Rose describes, diremption is the point that brings re-cognition 
through this encounter. It draws attention to and re-imagining something that was 
never united or complete to start with, yet which is precisely what allows them to 
come together, enriching each other. This point of diremption which is the 
difficult point of bringing  together two irreconcilables, is embodied in my 
argument by the figure of the director. If theatre and  philosophy are supposed 
opposites that constitute and are constituted by one other, the director stands at 
this broken middle, enabling theatre and philosophy to think themselves anew. In 
this sense, the director might be thought as a figure that unsettles dualisms in the 
structure of theatre and replaces them with a triune Hegelian structure; the 
philosopher/director as a third term. Yet this ‘third’ does not account, in my 
examination, as the mere reconstruction of any particular theatre into a 
philosophical theatre, or of any particular theatrical figure or movement. Rather, 
it is the specific process by which mediation, as we shall see in the following 
chapters, allows the possibility of a renewed understanding of aesthetic structures 
of these theatres and their discourses. This is what bestows the mediation of the 
director with a continual working-through in the chasm between ‘thinking’ and 
‘appearing’. This is the kind of relational configuration that inaugurates the 
director into the Event of thought in theatre at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
Puchner’s analysis seems to ignore the meeting point between theatre and 
philosophy which is the figure of the director. His reading, like most examinations 
in theatre studies, is mostly limited to discourses of anti-theatricality and his 
approach to the interaction between theatre and philosophers is as a dramatic 
idiom. This forces him to necessarily limit the possibilities and various 
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expressions this intersection has, had, or even is capable of. As I want to argue in 
what follows, the theatrical project of modernism appropriates philosophy as 
much as philosophy appropriates theatre through the figure of the director which, 
in turn, renders the director into a mode of embodied philosophy.  
As a type of embodied philosophy, the director bridges these two 
antagonistic, often oppositional, fields of knowing that need to be negotiated by 
the director through theatrical representation. Philosophy, in this thesis, is 
generally understood ‘as a search for truth’ (Groys Introduction to Antiphilosophy 
1’ and the philosopher as the figure that does the truth-seeking. To view therefore 
the director as philosopher is to see this theatrical figure as someone who also 
seeks to find the truth and represent it on stage. Furthermore, being a mediating 
subjectivity, the director is capable of confronting the limits and possibilities of 
philosophical truth on stage. It is how modernist theatre is seen to now reflect the 
move of philosophy, that begins with Marx and Kierkegaard, which wishes to not 
only explain but change the world. The performative idea here that characterises 
much of the work that the director develops in theatrical modernism is that once 
the world is changed, the true nature of this world will be revealed. This world-
change will be triggered and put into effect by the director’s theatre, or at least, 
this was the aspiration of the various theatrical schools of directing. 
Consequently, the appearance of the modernist director conveys in theatre this 
new philosophical scheme that embodies thought as a ‘command’ for life-action 
rather than as ‘a purely philosophical decision’ in the intersection of truth (Groys 
Introduction to Antiphilosophy xx). 
As such, when, for example, ‘Brecht the thespian’ is seen to introduce ‘a 
philosopher into the theatre’, it is not to ‘estrange’ theatre as Puchner would 
suggest; rather, it is more the case of Brecht ‘the director’ introducing ‘the 
philosopher’ into the theatre in order to embody the command for change just like 
a philosopher.  
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Chapter 4 
 
‘Feeling Together’: Richard Wagner’s Affect Aesthetic Politics 
 
I understand perfectly when a musician says today: “I hate Wagner, but I 
can no longer endure any other music.” But I’d also understand a 
philosopher who would declare: “Wagner sums up modernity. There is no 
way out, one must first become a Wagnerian.”  




The mind will tell us So it is! but only when the feeling has told us So it 
must be! 




Wagner’s Philosophical Opening  
Wagner was composing Siegfried from The Valkyrie (in The Ring) in September 
1856 when a recent plea to be allowed to return to his native Germany had been 
rejected. By then, Wagner had already endured for more than six years the 
deprivations of life as a political refugee. His participation in the planning and 
execution of the failed Dresden uprising of 1849 had forced him to flee his 
homeland. Indeed, by using someone else’s passport, he had narrowly eluded 
arrest while safely crossing over to the neighbouring Switzerland. Yet, living in 
exile was to continue for nearly twenty years, during which time he often found 
himself threatened with imprisonment due to various unpaid debts and had to rely 
on faithful friends and benefactors for his survival, such as Hans von Bülow and 
Franz Liszt. Liszt had also helped to produce Wagner’s Lohengrin in 1850 in 
	  
	   113	  
Weimar. Yet, the premiere of Wagner’s next opera was not to be until 1865; this 
time, it was to be Tristan. I will return to Wagner’s anarchist activity of his 
younger years later in my discussion in which, as I hope to show, its significance 
has not received adequate critical attention. This is partly due to Wagner’s 
appropriation by the Nazi propaganda, and partly due to the various negative 
critical appraisals as proto-fascist pronunciations. Indeed, Wagner’s highly 
anarchist activity as a form of democratisation is seldom mentioned by his major 
critics such as Nietzsche, Adorno, Heidegger, or Lacoue-Labarthe. Yet what is 
important to note for now is the decisive role that Wagner’s attitude to politics 
played in shaping his creative ideas that also drove him to philosophy in the first 
place. As I argue in this chapter, Wagner’s intimate philosophical entanglements 
position him as an active interlocutor in theatre, actively engaging and interacting 
with philosophy. Led by his deep-seated belief that another world was possible, 
he formulates theories that call for a new form of music-drama and correspond to 
the call for political change through which this new world of the future could be 
possible. With this in mind, Wagner proposes the theory of his Gesamtkunstwerk. 
Meaning the total-art-work, Wagner’s theoretical formulation is conceived as a 
way of building a new world order that he calls the world order of the ‘future’; 
this new world is distinctively inspired by the widely spread democratic 
aspirations and ideals of the untangling project of modernity and Wagner, as we 
shall see, signals its arrival in theatre. 
Wagner reads with painstaking devotion the philosophies of Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Hegel and, later, Arthur Schopenhauer. At the same time, he immerses 
himself in the anarchist ideas of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, but also Michael 
Bakunin, with whom Wagner becomes especially closely associated. However, 
such an intimate acquaintance with the intellectual currents of his time goes 
beyond what could be considered as mere influence, although, and without a 
doubt, Wagner’s thought and practice was most definitely inspired by these 
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philosophers and their ideas. What takes place, instead, is the kind of interaction 
that causes a philosophical oeuvre to occur that leads to the formation of the 
director as a mode of philosophy through which, I claim, that the new form of the 
modern director comes into being. I argue that the interface between Wagner and 
philosophy is part of the history of the director as a philosopher; first by 
actualising philosophy on the formal level of theatre by which he revolutionises 
the medium of operatic drama with the aim of addressing pressing matters of 
political nature involving the widespread call for democratisation at the time. And 
secondly, by constituting himself as a mode or trope of philosophy by directly 
engaging with philosophers and their philosophies. 
 By doing so, Wagner positions his role as a director in-between theatre and 
philosophy, leading him to create a theatre of change through his interaction with 
philosophy. At the same time, it is a position that is to be characterised by the 
kind of tension and debate that fuels the various intellectual constellations and 
contradictions in the theatres of modernism.  
Another significant development associated with Wagner is the function of 
theatricality that is recast from the actor manager’s ‘representational regime’ 
(Aesthetics and its Discontents 29) as Rancière points out, to what heralds in late-
nineteenth century the ‘aesthetic regime’ of the director’s theatre. Indeed, through 
Wagner, in his role as this new figure of the director, theatre is reconfigured in 
purely ‘aesthetic’ terms that are not only simultaneously political but offer theatre 
as a site of intellectual interaction, capable of ‘thinking’ as philosophy. This is 
how Wagner as a specifically modernist formation situates the phenomenon of 
the director in theatre as a philosopher. To better understand this, we may want 
to recall Badiou’s notion of the Evental (that I explored in the previous chapter) 
that claims, in regards to Wagner, that a new situation is created. It is a situation 
created between music-theatre and philosophy and institutes ‘a special kind of 
philosophical debate about [Wagner] that must inevitably also carry with it a 
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broader debate about music, even if it involves a much more extensive debate 
about mythology, theatre and so forth’ (Five Lessons on Wagner 56).  
Now, we should not forget that Wagner’s operas have traditionally been 
associated with claims of ‘totality’ and the pro-fascist connotations that follow 
such claims. Yet, in reading Wagner as an Event, Badiou denotes totality in 
Wagner as being  ‘uncoupled’; that is to say, Wagner articulates, for him, a 
universal-like ‘human emancipation’ and its possibility in phantasmic forms is 
understood as the very emancipation of thinking about reality itself, while also 
seeking to formulate it anew. I employ Badiou’s definition of totality in 
rehabilitating Wagner, in what follows in this thesis ,which I further examine as 
a fundamentally ‘theatrocratic’ trait in its Rancièrean sense, meaning 
‘emancipation’ of the audience. By inverting Plato’s notion of theatrocracy, 
Rancière argues for the rule of the phantasma in theatre as something that claims 
‘equality’ in thinking and staging of its representation. Theatrocracy here 
empowers the audience to have a voice and is a power that relates, as I will further 
show, to what we would today refer to as ‘affect’. 
We have seen already in Chapter 1 the way by which the term of 
theatrocracy appears in Platonic thought and how it has always described the 
intrinsically political value of theatre. Later, it is reinvented as ‘phantasmagoria’, 
the term Adorno coins to denote the specifically political function of mimesis, 
not only as a form of government – the rule of the spectator – but as an economy 
of spectacle that functions as commodity. Adorno’s sharp critique is targeting not 
just any mode of production that produces the commodified culture, but the most 
ambitious modern technology of the nineteenth century theatre – Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk. That is, for Adorno, the specifically Wagnerian gesture of 
theatricality that possesses the power to spellbound the spectators with the magic 
of the spectacle, while demanding the audience’s obedience that is materialised 
through the application of technology. In this sense, the Gesamtkunstwerk is 
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considered to consciously deliver a rationally constructed artificial wholeness 
which simultaneously repudiates free will, at least in Adorno’s reading. Here 
Adorno echoes Nietzsche who had pronounced Wagner as a great sorcerer. 
Focusing on the physiological effects of the Wagnerian operas, Nietzsche 
repudiates Wagner’s aesthetics for indissolubly being tied to biological 
presuppositions by which he means the coersive instrumentality of affect – what 
I would like to call in this thesis as Wagnerian affectivity. Indeed, in Wagner’s 
theatre, affect corresponds to an augmentation of a body’s capacity to act which, 
given its social nature in the setting of theatre, becomes indistinguishable from 
theatricality itself. It is what brings Nietzsche to protest that Wagner’s music 
aims, first and foremost, towards physiological expressiveness, the effect of 
which causes the audience to suffer exhaustion because of the impact of Wagner’s 
operas. Thus Nietzsche denounces Wagner as a pathological phenomenon that 
designates nothing less than a disease. Wagner is a neurosis, he writes, a sickness:  
because nothing is more modern than this total sickness, this lateness and 
overexcitement of the nervous mechanism, Wagner is the modern artist par 
excellence, the Cagliostro of modernity… Wagner represents a great 
corruption of music. He has guessed that it is a means to excite weary 
nerves—and with that he has made music sick. (The Case of Wagner 55) 
 
Similar claims are later made by Heidegger. For him, too, Wagner personifies the 
archetypal metaphysician in actual ontic terms. But as Badiou explains, this is 
because Wagner denotes, for them all, ‘the supremacy of the One, the capturing 
of Being by the One’ (Five Lessons on Wagner 57). The general accusation is, 
though, is the bigger claim, that Wagner’s theatricality, conceived by his 
Gesamtkunstwerk as a technology, is capable of manifesting a certain vision into 
a reality. In other words, that Wagner affects the audience; by manipulating the 
spectators’ sensory receptivity, he not only gets them to ‘think’ in a certain way, 
but gets them to also act in a certain way. This can be seen in Wagner’s use of 
the melodic line or of how difference is subordinated to itself and, subsequently, 
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with his image of a contactor; as that ‘One’ that reigns supreme by getting 
everyone else to follow behind by the blow of the conductor’s baton.    
This chapter looks at Wagner’s relationship to philosophy with a view to 
revising, while bringing into a sharper focus, Wagner’s overtly negative image 
and reception of his theory and practice of the total artwork. By rethinking the 
ways in which the introduction of aesthetics into politics, usually indebted to the 
aesthetic import of Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, is presented or misrepresented 
in philosophical discourse, I wish to identify certain unexplored, or at least little 
acknowledged, intellectual and artistic trajectories that connect Wagner to the 
revolutionary philosophical thought of his time. I also want to question how 
Wagner channels philosophy into what constitutes the new form of the modernist 
director-conductor that, in turn, constitutes itself as a form of philosophy. My 
argument is, first, that Wagner reconfigures the form of opera by 
‘emotionalis[ing] intellectual matters’ (Wagner and Philosophy 58) which turns 
the Wagnerian theatre, as I argue, into a form of embodied philosophy. The key 
here is affect which Wagner fuses with intellect in his operatic-dramas. The idea 
is to make one ‘feel’ the true nature of the social situations projected in the staging 
of his operas and get the public to feel as being part of them as in real life. So, in 
this sense, the spectator is actively involved with the action on stage that is ‘felt,’ 
rather than just having to witness emotions represented on stage as it was 
normally the tradition with opera and the codified conventions of the actor-
manager theatre. Through his staged operas, Wagner seeks, I argue, to 
consciously get his audiences to understand the true meaning of their social 
structures and any future society that may be possible.  
The second part of my argument concerns the politico-aesthetic 
ramifications of Wagner that, like Badiou, I read as a theatrical project that 
necessitates an opening in the ideological terrain of philosophy. This 
philosophical opening is not isolated from the historical contingencies of Wagner 
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technologically and politically, but intertwined with Wagner’s artistic 
innovations and the intellectual models that traditionally belonged to philosophy. 
It is, in other words, a philosophical opening that remodels theatre as philosophy 
by foregrounding questions such as form and content, value and appreciation, 
reception and representation, theatricality and identification., which in turn 
produce a theatrical model of philosophy.   
 
 
Wagner, the Philosopher 
It is widely accepted that Ludwig Feuerbach was the vital link between the 
philosophies of Hegel and Marx. His ideas were considered to have transitioned 
Hegelianism’s Idealist philosophy of the 1830s and 1840s to Anglo-French 
Materialism. Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity was so influential that, as 
Engels accounts:  
 
set materialism back on the throne without any beating about the bush. […] 
One needs oneself to have experienced the liberating power of this book to 
have a clear idea of it. The enthusiasm was universal. We were all, for a 
time being, Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new 
idea, and how greatly he was influenced by it, in spite of all his critical 
reservations, one can read in The Holy Family. (quoted in Magee 50) 
 
But Marx was not the only one being so profoundly influenced by Feuerbach. 
Wagner was undoubtedly another keen disciple who also set out to write his own 
Feuerbachian philosophy for the art of the future. Indeed, having discovered 
Feuerbach’s writings during his Paris and Dresden years, Wagner becomes 
obsessively involved with their study, which only increases after the experience 
of the failed Dresden insurrection and his subsequent immigration to Switzerland. 
It is then that Wagner devotes his entire time, to writing his best-known 
revolutionary aesthetic theories , instead of composing operas. As he would later 
recall, he felt in complete surrender ‘to the inner excitement nourished in me by 
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my acquaintance with the principal work of Ludwig Feuerbach’ (Richard 
Wagner’s Letters 51): ‘Immediately after my arrival in Zurich,’ he confided in 
his autobiography, ‘I began setting down on paper my views on the nature of 
things, as formed under the pressure of my artistic experience and of the political 
excitement of the era.’ (ibid.) The length to which Wagner’s fascination with 
Feuerbach’s philosophical propositions traded can also be seen from presenting 
his book as Feuerbachian. He named it The Work of Art of the Future, a title that 
consciously evoked Feuerbach’s own book The Principles of the Philosophy of 
the Future and publicly dedicated it to Feuerbach. In this book he presents the 
overarching conceptual frameworks for his Gesamtkunstwerk. Arguing for the 
interrelation of poetry, music and dance on a synthetic premise, Wagner believed 
that a more direct communication would be achieved between the creative artist, 
the operatic work, and the audience. This  synthesis would meaningfully set off 
the process of aesthetic engagement as a unifying experience that, for Wagner, 
was  a fundamental part of the existence of any creative work and the sole purpose 
of art itself.  
Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk was not entirely novel though. Its 
concept had already received sufficient philosophical attention by German 
thinkers such as Franz Brentano, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich 
Hölderlin, Novalis, Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich von Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck and 
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder. Wagner had read most of these writers’ works 
preceding the revolution (Wagner, My Life 508). Additionally, Hegel had already 
identified tragic drama as a speculative mode of thought in a lecture in 1803. And 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling had embraced Greek tragic drama as ‘the 
highest incarnation of the “An-sich” and the essence of all art’. (in Magee 87) 
Finally, Schelling’s conception of tragedy as a model for uniting all arts 
prefigured Wagner’s aesthetic arguments and, perhaps, provided him with a 
Hegelian understanding of theatre as a speculative function. Even 
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Gesamtkunstwerk as a term itself, as Juliet Koss has demonstrated in her 
comprehensive Modernism After Wagner, was traced back to 1827 in the writings 
of the Berlin philosopher Karl Friedrich Eusebius Trahndorff (13). Rather, what 
was truly novel about the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk was the idea of artistic 
co-operation as an aesthetic mode that enabled each art, and each part of the 
theatrical experience, to meet its full potential by the practice of what Wagner 
considered as ‘working in common’. (ibid.) In ‘The Art-Work of the Future,’ he 
writes:  
Each [artform] attains the capacity to be and do the very thing which, of 
their own and inmost essence, they long to do and be. Each, where her own 
capacity ends, can be absorbed in the other... proving her own purity, 
freedom, and independence as that which she is. (189) 
 
Wagner’s doctrine of artistic synthesis, then, led him to re-invent the 
operatic form as a unified music-drama, which, for Benjamin, was a prerequisite 
for ‘the allegorical way of looking at things’ (The Origins of German Tragic 
Drama 181). Yet, for Wagner, it was always a matter of bringing together a new 
spectatorship that not only shared a unified experience, but of a common way of 
thinking and acting in the world. It is why Wagner turned to the poetic drama of 
the classical Greek theatre, which he considered as an exceptionally communal 
paradigm that blended together music, poetry and dance for the creation of a 
democratic spectatorship. Indeed, the largely democratic culture of the Athenian 
theatre was an aspiring proposal for Wagner in 1849 when he conceptually 
sketched out the Gesamtkunstwerk, essentially becoming a radical means at the 
wake of the failed revolution, of encouraging the audience’s active engagement 
and participation. This aim was clearly stated in the central argument of Wagner’s 
two important treatises, Art and Revolution and The Art-Work of the Future, both 
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of which articulate the communal experience of aesthetic engagement and the 
kind of spectatorship the Gesamtkunstwerk would both serve and create.  
Furthermore, Wagner’s reflection on Hegel is revealing, not only as being 
proof of his own political radicalism at the time, but of his growing belief that, 
for the cause of revolution, theatre was a better place for actualising philosophical 
ideas than philosophy. ‘I felt impelled,’ Wagner confessed, ‘to get to the bottom 
of what was termed “the [philosophical] Absolute” and everything connected 
with it. The revolution interrupted this effort; the practical considerations 
involved in the restructuring of society distracted me…’ (My Life 429-10). Was 
this meant as an expression of discontent with the limitations of philosophy? In 
that, perhaps philosophy’s capabilities in inciting action and thus real social 
change cannot be compared with the power of theatre to embody and enact 
philosophical ideas on stage.  
To a certain degree, Wagner was highlighting the limitations of traditional 
philosophy that sought to uncover meaning and truth, yet failing to mobilise any 
real change, becoming instead a kind of commodity rather than truth. As Groys 
explains, ‘From Socrates, via Marx, to the critical theory of Frankfurt provenance, 
it is held that any truth that appears as a commodity is no truth.’ (Introduction to 
Antiphilosophy xviii) What Wagner, then, suggests is to use theatre as a medium 
that activates philosophy (and philosophical truth) as a mode of (political) action 
and change, transforming philosophy itself, at the same time, from an assumingly 
passive, contemplative, critical attitude to a command for change that is active, 
speculative, embodied, and revealing. A world that ‘must first be changed’ before 
‘its true nature’ is shown (Groys, Introduction to Antiphilosophy xx), is a 
philosophical trend that comes under the rubric of antiphilosophy as a critique of 
the discipline of traditional philosophy. Although I have chosen not to make this 
distinction in my analysis – since my interest is on the mediating function of the 
director as a type of a speculative philosopher – my understanding of 
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antiphilosophy as a ‘command’ for world-change unveils as a profoundly 
embodied knowledge through the medium and art of the director that can already 
be seen in Wagner.  
In this context of radicalisation and revolutionary upheaval, Wagner’s 
publishing activity comes to shed further light on the new form of music-theatre 
that he proposes in the place of philosophy in his role as a composer-director. The 
fact that Wagner’s fame as a writer ran ahead of his fame as a composer only 
reinforces the placement of this theatre as a philosophical theatre. While his 
matured operas were performed after 1865, most of his theoretical writings were 
published in the period around the year 1850. These writings, mostly the result of 
his growing frustration with the current state of German opera and, more broadly, 
with German operatic styles in relation to Italian and French operas, had brought 
‘Wagnerianism’, rather than Wagner’s music, to be known as a set of ideas first, 
and then as artistic works. Coupled with his political radicalism as a result of 
studying philosophy seriously throughout his creative years, the reaction 
unleashed on an international level, before even a tone of his major operas was 
heard, sets a whole new thread characteristic of theatrical modernism that Wagner 
pioneers and sets in motion as a modern director: ‘I had always felt an 
inclination,’ he explains, ‘to try and fathom the depths of philosophy, rather as I 
had been driven by the mystical influence of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony to 
plumb the deepest recesses of music’ (in Magee 70).  
Although it has often been speculated that this new development, of 
producing theories that supersede practice, marks modernism’s disanalogous split 
between theory and practice, it is essentially what introduces the director as 
someone who necessitates a rethink of existing theatrical conventions and the 
conceptual foundation of theatre as a practice itself. As such, we witness in 
Wagner’s writings of 1848 the unleashing of an extensive and sharp critique of 
the Dresden Court Theatre, in which he highlights the various issues concerning 
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the incompetence of unqualified heads of artistic institutions and the erosion of 
standards by business interest. Equally, in his Zurich writings (1849–51), he 
advances an overtly Hegelian argument for opera in which all arts are subservient 
to each other in which he also locates their redemptive quality. But what carries 
such an enormous significance in Wagner’s theoretical writings is not only his 
ideas, most of which set forth the developments that announce the modernist 
aesthetic, but the positioning of theatre in terms of theory that claims the status 
of knowledge in a similar way as in philosophical knowledge. With Wagner, 
theatre offers philosophy by dramatising thought in which the possibilities of a 
new society rest. Yet these are presented not only theatrically, but 
philosophically, by formulating new theoretical terms. Gesamtkunstwerk (‘Total 
Work of Art’), Zukunftsmusik (‘Music of the Future’), Unendliche Melodie 
(‘Unending Melody’), are performative notions that already place theatre at the 
centre of a theoretical articulation about the nature of its art more broadly, but 
which, most crucially, supersede mere definition of new terms for practice. These 
terms become, instead, catalysts of change in the thought of theatre and 
simultaneously denote a practice as an embodied mode of knowledge equal (if 
not superior) to philosophy. It is in this light that Edward Lockspeiser remarked, 
in his discussion on Wagner’s synthesis of the arts, that Wagner’s ideas of drama 
were experienced with a sense of brutal finality. Or, when Deathridge speaks, in 
his book Wagner, Beyond Good and Evil, of them being ‘in [themselves] an 
aggressive obstacle’ (48) for anyone wishing to meaningfully engage with opera 
after Wagner. Wagner’s ideas essentially express the change in the nature of art, 
which marks an intrinsic change about how Wagner forces us to think about opera 
as a theatrical experience, but also about how, most fundamentally, I think, of 
engaging with the aesthetic form in the thought of theatre; of turning the stage 
into a space of ‘thinking’, in which performance is elevated into a place capable 
of thinking in itself.  
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It is with this in mind that we can best grasp the idea of the Event of Wagner 
that Badiou repeatedly suggests; it is in this pure emergence of a new powerful 
relation between thought and representation, articulated in the sensory realm. 
Wagner, in his role as a thinker/composer/director, signals the advent of the new 
form of the director as a new artistic subjectivity in the conjunction between 
theatre and philosophy. It is also what allows us to think of the modernist director 
as an Event itself. Its subjectivity is constituted by the artistic event of an 
embodied philosophy in the operatic dramas of Wagner, which transforms the art 
of theatre and all its parts, namely spectatorship, acting, composing, staging. 
After the image of Wagner, this new artistic subjectivity can be seen to exert a 
sense of ‘incorporation’ as a requirement in the new relationality of theatre that 
actively seeks to transform one’s subjectivity, whether it is the spectator, the 
artist-creator, or the various arts that take part in creating theatre. It is also this 
relationality that, for me, is shaped speculatively in the fact that it does not only 
create new spectators, new actors, or even new traditions of philosophers. Rather, 
that these are all created and caused by this relationality, while having created 
and caused in return, the appearance of the new form of the director in the chiasm 
between philosophical ideas and theatricality. It is this split, I think, that we see 
unravel in the various and unique ways in the subsequent modernist debates, 
anchored fundamentally in questions of (theatrical) form and (philosophical) 
content. 
I will now turn to explore the philosophical function of Wagner in ways 
that manifest in the aesthetic materials themselves. I will also examine the ways 
by which Wagner employs the form of theatre and its medium as a philosophical 
mode. Wagner’s innovations, as I shall also hope to make clear here, were not the 
mere result of natural change and evolution that normally shapes artistic trends 
and orientations, but something a lot more fundamentally embedded in the 
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philosophy of the time that gave way to something truly and uniquely novel: the 
director as another (type of) philosopher. 
 
Wagnerian Affectivity 
The theme of sympathy and communal feeling are key to understanding Wagner 
as a philosopher. In his new art-form of the music drama, they are expressed in 
the aesthetic principle of the Gesamtkunstwerk by which Wagner wished to create 
a new kind of spectatorship: the communal audience. In her revisionist 
Modernism After Wagner, Koss examines this communal aspect by sketching out 
the possibilities by which the Gesamtkunstwerk promotes ‘communal efforts’ 
among the arts, while signifying at the same time ‘the spectator’s own senses 
united and ennobled by the encounter with it’ (18). Then there is the sense of 
‘participation’ which, in the presence of the Gesamtkunstwerk, indicates the 
spectator’s entry to a process of collectivity; whereas the spectators disregarded 
their own identities as individuals, they re-emerged as a unified audience. This 
fundamental aesthetic proposition was not a forced process, but a willing and 
willful communal one. Its full aesthetic value was attained from what Wagner 
saw as the principle of collaboration and was measured ‘by the intensity of the 
overall effect produced on the spectator’ (ibid.). In other words, what Wagner had 
in mind with his Gesamtkunstwerk was the shared aesthetic experience of a 
communal audience in its function as affect. 
Discussions of ‘affect’ or ‘affectivity’ are prevalent within recent cultural 
and political theory. Whether used as entirely synonymous with ‘emotion’, or as 
a distinctly visceral term that denotes ‘feeling,’ affect essentially defines a 
dimension of experience. For the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, ‘affect’ 
describes a physical and psychological feature of experience that normally has to 
do with the domain of varying intensities not fully articulated, individuated and 
represented in consciousness (Gilbert, Common Ground 145). By contrast, 
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‘emotion’, as Fredric Jameson explains, is usually understood as ‘named’ states 
of feeling, or as ‘named emotion’ with which the individual identifies and is 
experienced inwardly (Antinomies of Realism 29). There is a marked structural 
difference, therefore, between emotion and affect which involves the intervention 
of language, because ‘emotion is pre-eminently a phenomenon sorted out into an 
array of names’. (ibid.) For Jameson, such names, in this sense, might be love, 
hate, fear, anger, pleasure, disgust, and so on, whereas affect is regarded to 
‘somehow elude language and its naming of things (and feelings)’ (ibid.). This 
bodily sensory dimension that describes ‘affectivity’ as a category of experience 
is also explored in Spinozas’s major work Ethics and, later, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus in which ‘affect’ is thought of as: 
 
a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential 
state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution of 
that body’s capacity to act… (with body taken in its broadest sense to 
include ‘mental’ or ideal bodies). (Deleuze and Guattari xvi) 
 
To now grasp the ways by which this process works in Wagner, one may want to 
consider the role that sound plays as a communicative medium in his performative 
structures. If tonality is what creates dramatic possibility in Wagner (and both 
Badiou and Jameson have extensively written on this), it also produces a level of 
chormatism by which affects determine the semantic content of the dramatic 
narrative, not only emotionally, but sensory or bodily. Chromatism derives from 
the Greek word chroma translating into skin or skin colour, which designates the 
interaction between sensory form (also produced by colour) and its relationship 
with the body itself, or the context of embodiment more broadly. However, its 
affective dimension in Wagner is twofold; first as a bodily modality and, second, 
as a formal vehicle capable of political and artistic transformation and 
metamorphosis, to which I will return in the next sections of this chapter. For 
now, I want to discuss chromatism as a mechanism of affect and how it operates 
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in Wagner’s operatic structure as another highly important function, that also 
accounts for one of the key characteristics of affect itself. It indexes change, as 
much in the physical state of the singer/actor (in terms of heart rate, breathing, 
etc.) as it is in the way affect impacts, in the same bodily manner, upon the 
recipients/spectators who experience changes occurring in their bodies’ 
capacities to act. As the political theorist Jeremy Gilbert observes in his recent 
book Common Ground, this is the power of affect which brings the recipients to 
‘become more or less open to persuasion, more or less likely to react with anger, 
more or less sexually aroused, more or less willing to go to war, and so on’ (145). 
In Nietzsche’s ferocious criticism of Wagnerian operas, chromatism appears as 
‘expressivity’ – or, rather, as Wagner’s desire for insidious expression, by which 
Nietzsche means the practice of theatricality at all costs. But, if Wagner’s key 
objective of uniting all aesthetic elements of the music-drama stage was to 
generate an emotional affectivity, then clearly Wagner was employing 
theatricality as a means by which he could exercise influence over the spectator’s 
mind in a subconscious way. The question, then, is towards what end?  
The key to this question is to understand the experience of affect to the 
extent observed that bodies constantly influence each other, as Simondon would 
argue. For Simondon, this is a matter of relationality which is constitutive of the 
capacity of bodies to act in the first place. For Spinoza, too, these actual states of 
the body are always relational states as he observes in his Ethics. They already 
appear in Wagner’s reference in his writings as ‘sympathy’ – a term that we also 
find at work in David Hume and Adam Smith’s theories of ethics and morality. 
Indeed, while for Hume ‘sympathy’ describes an affective relation enabling 
humans to share the feelings of others and be affected by events that occur in 
other people’s lives, sympathy, as a fundamental element of human relations, also 
involves a sense of what Girard and Borch-Jacobsen calls ‘mimetic identification’ 
in the sense that bodies automatically experience the affective states which our 
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brains, being partly composed of ‘mirror neurones’, perceive what other bodies 
are to be experiencing. Deleuze and Guatarri, two pivotal thinkers in the shaping 
up of ‘affect theory’ today, draw on Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson, in 
their effort to shift emphasis from the verbal element of communication to more 
sensory, corporal elements and processes of affect. Indeed, especially for 
Deleuze, but also for many other theorists who read his work in the context of 
what might be called ‘affective politics’, such as John Protevi, the high 
significance of affect begins to be felt more clearly when positioned as an ethical 
and political response in which the potential power of bodies emerges simply by 
being together, sharing together and, more broadly, becoming able ‘to form new 
and potentially empowering encounters’ (Political Affect 51).  
In this sensory framework, therefore, Wagner’s operatic dramas, which no 
doubt as musical dramas of emotions actively sought to ‘affect’ the participants 
directly through their emotions, were configurations that were seeking to harvest 
the radicalism of ‘being together’ – of bodies sharing together affective states. 
This dimension of feeling, however, should not be confused with what his operas, 
conceived as complex psycho-emotive compositions, were asking the audience 
to do – which was to intelligently listen. The experience of Wagner’s music is, 
rather, the experience of listening. Or, as Magee puts it, ‘a changing web of 
sounds actively recognizing variations, recurring motifs, orchestral 
modifications, participating in the work as a dramatic event’ (107). It is in this 
sense that, in Wagner, listening is active, not passive. This level of attentiveness 
exceeds the kind of pure receptiveness claimed by Adorno, who classifies the 
Wagnerian experience as passive. Indeed, Adorno famously criticised Wagner’s 
deliberate use of music for inducing a state of mystical Einfühlung, by which 
Adorno meant a collective subjectivity that resulted in a denial of rationality. 
Here, the idea is ‘feeling is everything’ which, Adorno argued, once 
universalised, justified the power of the ‘director conductor’ through the exercise 
	  
	   129	  
of beats, to deny the ‘rupture between subject and object’ (In Search of Wagner 
44) – the rational autonomy of the subject. In this scheme of things, Wagner’s 
‘denial of freedom’ is rooted in the almost subliminal stimuli of his manipulative 
technology of music that effectively sums up the mechanism of totalitarian mind 
control. But even when Wagner uses music as ‘effects’, their compositional 
structures always demonstrate a clear reason that ties into the dramatic structure. 
Just as Siegfried becomes an ‘accomplice’ of Wotan’s will to self-destruction, so 
too are all of Wagner’s dramas directed at creating the ideology of transcendent 
individuality (or the loss of individuality), freed from the oppression of society 
through the power of sound. 
To put it differently – and here is where Wagner’s philosophical 
significance may mostly account in his role as a director – is the way he 
conceptualises the capacity of bodies to form productive relations with other 
bodies. Therefore, beyond and outside the obvious philosophical influence that 
underpins his dramatic-music narratives, it is these formations that are also, to 
borrow from Gilbert, ‘an augmentation of potential and relationality’ (Common 
Grounds 147) identified specifically with joy itself – the ‘joyous affect’ for 
Protevi (ibid). As Gilbert maintains, the significance of such a reading of 
affectivity compared, for example, with Freud’s and Le Bon’s paradigm of group 
psychology, conceives affective relations as pathological and both dependent 
upon individual identifications, while, for Deleuze, Guatarri and Protevi, such 
relations of affect are considered as ‘the key medium of collective agency and 
creativity’ (ibid). It is on this basis, too, that we need to understand the contrast 
between the Wagnerian model of a totalising, affective theatre, which creates a 
space of communal feeling directed by the theatrical experience, yet still allows 
dissensus, and later, the very different Brechtian model of a theatre that sets out 
to short-circuit affective response and disrupts the affective, communal 
experience. The claim of totality in Wagner’s theatre, which undeniably is also 
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what could be said to suppress and submerge identity and the individual, needs to 
be viewed at the level of collective affectivity as a form of constitution. Through 
affective-emotional themes which create a mixture of representation and action, 
Wagnerian operas attempted a sense of collectivity that also allowed collective 
groups to constitute themselves. What this means is that the integration of arts in 
the Wagnerian model does not necessarily have to solely imply totalisation 
experienced in the twentieth century politics as fascism, but it can also indicate 
democratic participation. Indeed, Wagner’s aspiration with the Total Art-Work 
was to bind groups together so (political) action could be inspired by a set of 
shared sentiments and sensations that also invited dissensus to be understood as 
provoked action that challenged the hierarchical order of a given set of social 
arrangements. For Rancière, such a challenge to hierarchical order is what 
proposes action to be taken under the presupposition of one’s equality. 
(Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics 4)  
In the case of politics, however, it is collective action that is required rather 
than individual. It is the kind of action that concerns a group of people, and 
anyone else in solidarity with this group that is thought to be unequal by any 
particular hierarchy but acts as equal and thus disrupts the social order itself. In a 
similar way, in Wagner’s operatic theatre, this collectivity is affectively and 
structurally enacted by the Gesamtkunstwerk on the principle of equality among 
the various arts that disrupts the theatrical conventions of opera, and by 
projection, the power arrangements of the social order as well as, arguably, the 
perceptual and epistemic foundation of that order. To put it more simply – and it 
is here that I believe Wagner foreshadows Brecht’s formulation of the 
distanciation model of the Epic Theatre – Wagner’s complex totalising, affective 
and communal mode of theatre simultaneously poses a disruptive model in the 
aesthetic interaction of opera with theatre, society and politics. What is more, its 
enacted dissent from the affective-emotive structure of the Gesamtkunstwerk 
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further reveals the contingencies of the perceptual and conceptual order in which 
any ethico-political and social arrangements are embedded – such contingencies, 
once again for Rancière, are concerned with the partition or distribution of the 
sensible. (5)  It is in this sense that we can discern a dissensual political character 
in the totalising effect of the Wagnerian model and can be seen to reframe 
theatrical experience to a common experience in which new perspectives and 
possibilities are formed.  It is also what allows us to view the evolution of the 
directorial paradigm within modernism as one of continuous interaction between 
aesthetics and politics, but also one of contrast, difference, and dissent, already 
starting with Wagner. 
 Now, the problem with affectivity as a medium of agency is that ‘affect’ 
can also be employed negatively – in the sense of indexing a diminution of agency 
or manipulation of the relations produced. And it is in such a manner that affect 
disguises exploitation and commodification which have often coloured the 
critical assessment of Wagner’s theatre and his totalising image as a 
composer/director. This theoretical position has been famously argued in 
contemporary political theory in Hardt and Negri’s concept of ‘biopolitical 
labour’, in which forms of labour are thought to require a degree of affective 
involvement, which is what gears them towards the production of affects, social 
relationships and forms of life (Commonwealth 131-3). But this distinctive 
affective feature of commercial activity that, for Hardt and Negri, is attached to 
biopolitical labour is also precisely what prompts Adorno’s critique of Wagner. 
I will not expand on Adorno’s critique, which has been repeatedly explored 
elsewhere. It is enough to say that Adorno’s critical engagement with Wagner 
was lifelong and was fuelled by a desire to discern the various problematised 
aspects that made up modernity and the development of modern art. Through 
Wagner, Adorno not only opens up various avenues through which to question 
his seemingly rigid division between autonomous art and the culture industry, but 
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he intermingles aesthetic and ideological criteria, claiming that aesthetics and 
ideology are inseparably intertwined. However, what is fascinating is that 
Adorno’s reception of Wagner functions as another dramatisation of Wagner that 
serves the purposes of philosophical and ideological discourses that motivated it. 
An earlier, more fruitful perhaps, construction comes from Charles Baudelaire’s 
Richard Wagner et Tannhäuser à Paris (1861), which already provides us with 
insightful observations on how Wagner’s musical innovations were creating 
emotional structures that were affecting the spectator’s minds, while overly 
changing how music was understood in the nineteenth century more generally. In 
this sense, Baudelaire’s article paves the way for thinking about the operatic 
experience as ideological structures that intermingle and determine aesthetic form 
and vice versa. 
Frank Trommler’s article ‘The Social Politics of Musical Redemption’, 
reads Wagner’s ‘challenge to established compositional structures’ as carrying 
the political potential of Wagner’s own rebellious tendencies which, as he 
maintains, have received ‘surprisingly little scholarly attention’. (131) In what 
follows, I explore this proposition in more detail. I agree with Trommler’s 
observation, which receives particular significance once placed in the context of 
Wagner’s overall musical experience in theatrical terms. Let me rephrase it as a 
question: What is the real intention of appealing to one’s emotions through the 
phantasmic power of theatre? If, as Baudelaire insisted, Wagner’s ‘intent on 
frustrating the fulfillment of the fixed, conventional, closed schemata’ was to 
force us ‘to relocate ourselves, to find our centre anew, in a procedure whose 
meaning we are constantly asked to reassess’ (in Trommler 130), then this 
experience was unmistakably political in its intention, drawing on the ability of 
music-dramas to evoke emotions that could potentially propel in the audience, on 
a subconscious psychosomatic level, the experience of and desire for action. This 
is again a political action for Wagner and which, as we shall see below, is infused 
	  
	   133	  
with the socialist ideas of anarchist thinkers, including the philosophies of Hegel 
and later Schopenhauer. 
 
 
The Politics of the Common 
Already in Wagner’s writings of 1849, the notion of ‘public sphere’ – 
Öffentlichkeit – featured heavily and pointed to the ability of theatre performance 
to reach out to a large number of people. Similarly, given that Wagner’s stage 
performances were the product of synthesis, the principal of the Gesamtkunstwerk 
would produce not simply an audience made up of individual spectators, but an 
audience that brought these individuals together and who, most importantly, 
experienced together the operatic works. The significance of linking this shared 
aesthetic experience to public sphere evokes the form of ‘tragic drama’ [which] 
as an art form, that was communally produced and communally received, 
represented ‘the entry of the people’s work of art [Volkskunstwerk] into public 
political life’ (The Art-Work of the Future 135). In this manner, Wagner’s 
conceptual framework of his Gesamtkunstwerk was seen to be actively pursuing 
a kind of synaesthetic creativity as an explicitly political, but also experiential, 
activity in common. What was at stake, then, for Wagner was more about how 
this communal creative experience would convey his Gesamtkunstwerk as a 
fundamentally active participatory and, most importantly perhaps, revolutionary 
model of spectatorship? This was a model of engagement was always a 
correlative matter. Once the three arts were united (as he was proposing with his 
Gesamtkunstwerk), he believed that they would successfully raise ‘the will of the 
drama to direct and potent deed’ carried out precisely by one’s participation in a 
communal audience. Yet, to achieve this, Wagner still had to provide the answer 
to the following question: what was it exactly that tended to bind people together? 
The answer for him was simple: common feeling.    
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Once again, Simondon may prove useful for us here, as his theories of collectivity 
and individuation are a good starting point to understanding Wagner’s emotional 
structures as embodied thoughts. The central argument, which then shapes much 
of the thinking of contemporary philosophers, such as Deleuze and Guatarri and, 
by extension, Hardt and Negri, is the significance Simondon ascribes to the 
concept of affect: 
If we can speak, in a certain sense, of the individuality of a group or of a 
people, it is not by virtue of a community of action – too discontinuous to 
be a solid basis – nor of an identity of conscious representations, too broad 
and too continuous to allow the segregation of groups; rather it is at the 
level of affectivo-emotional theme, mixtures of representation and action, 
that collective groupings constitute themselves. Inter-individual 
participation is possible when affectivo-emotive expressions are the same. 
The vehicles of this affective community are elements in the life of groups 
which are effective but which are not only symbolic: the regime of 
sanctions and rewards, symbols, the arts, objects which are collectively 
valorised and de-valorised. (my italics, in Gilbert Common Ground 143) 
 
Simondon’s shift of emphasis, from identification and common activities to ‘a set 
of shared sentiments and sensations which operate at what [Simondon] calls a 
“subconscious” level’ (Common Grounds 144), is not to be entirely understood 
on the Freudian psychoanalytic model. Rather, Simondon argues for a 
‘fundamental layer of the unconscious, which is the subject’s capacity for action, 
(ibid.), and his argument differs, in this way, from Freud’s radical separation 
between conscious and unconscious in his personality model. However, 
Simondon is specifically interested in this ‘capacity for action’ which he calls the 
‘affective’ or “affectivo-emotional” subconscious’ (Common Grounds 147). Yet, 
the deeper meaning of his proposition that seems to me to deeply correspond to 
the synaesthetic experience of Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk is to be understood, 
not so much on the subject’s capacity to act in the world as such, but on reading 
this capacity as being dependent upon one’s relations with others and, through 
these relations, one’s subjectivity is also constituted.  
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Indeed, on closer examination of the dynamic sensory structure of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, we encounter what Wagner viewed as the aesthetic activity of 
individuals through which the audience is formed. Not only as active, 
participatory, or even fundamentally new, this spectatorship for Wagner was 
radically communal precisely because of its ability to co-relate. By exercising 
‘sympathetic [sympathetisch] gaze’, (The Art-Work of the Future 80) the 
spectator, and not the work alone, activated the aesthetic activity of the work by 
the activity of ‘feeling with’(187) – what Wagner describes as Mitfühlung (ibid). 
As Koss explains, this ‘process of sympathy’ was meant to emotionally and 
psychologically transfer the spectator into the work while bringing the performers 
to be ‘absorbed into the surrounding audience’ (21). Or, as Wagner himself would 
put it: “By looking and hearing, [the spectator] completely transports himself onto 
the stage; the performer becomes an artist only by complete absorption into the 
audience” (The Art-Work of the Future 185). However, the real meaning of this 
creative synergy between performers and spectators as a collective acquires its 
full potential when, as would later describe, it is experienced as “fellow-feeling 
and fellow-creating friend” [mitfühlenden und mitschöpferischen Freunde] 
(Wagner ‘A Communication to My Friends’ 283; “Eine Mittheilung an meine 
Freunde,’ 4: 244)), pointing to the notion of sympathy as Einfühlung, or “feeling 
into” (The Art-Work of the Future 168) as an explicitly psychophysical state of 
experience and an affective shift that calls for action. Or, to use Wagner’s own 
terms, through “a thorough stepping out of oneself into the unconditional 
sympathy [Mitfühlung] with the joy of the beloved, in itself” (ibid.), relations of 
mutual influence would increase the capacity to act in ways that enable new forms 
of potentially empowering encounters to manifest. 
What is really described here is the Gesamtkunstwerk’s aesthetic structure 
as an affective structure. For Jameson, music is already intimately related within 
modernism with what we call today ‘the affective turn’. Arguing that the 
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evolution of music is ‘a vivid way to describe the logic of affect’ (39), he explores 
its first full expression in the innovations articulated by Wagnerian music. For 
example, the reorganisation of sonata-form temporality into the repetitions of the 
Leitmotives; the transformation of heightened dissonance into ‘vehicles for affect 
rather than simple preparations for resolution’ (ibid.); and, equally the Wagnerian 
endless melody. As we saw earlier, for Jameson, these innovations all project a 
specific ‘chromatic temporality’ that is different ‘from the past-present-future’ of 
the known sonata music forms, constructing a pure present as ‘eternal’ (ibid). 
Chromatism is thus meant here as ‘a waxing and waning of the scale’ in 
Jameson’s words, ‘a slippage up and down the tones’ (ibid.). Wagnerian 
chromatism, then, may point us to the formal tensions with sonata introduced by 
Wagner, which is already a political move. For, its real significance is in 
indicating the means by which Wagner utilises ‘affect’ to displace the operatic 
supremacy of the traditional aria. Towards this aim, Wagner also introduces his 
famous long storytelling passages by which he replaces the emotional content, 
operatically delivered in the form of the aria, with the new embodied forms of 
rhetorics, which function as affect. I will explore this dimension in the following 
section which I read as an explicitly Hegelian appropriation in Wagner’s dramatic 
narrative. However, its function as affect, I think, can be best understood in 
relation to Nietzsche’s main philosophical argument, which rests on questioning 
the foundation upon which values can be validated. In response, Wagner makes 
the equally compelling philosophical proposition that not only confirms 
Nietzsche’s claims that there cannot be any absolutes and, therefore, no 
transcendental standards of comparison, but also provides an answer to the puzzle 
of value creation and what controls its subjective mechanism. That is, again, 
relationality – or, as Wagner would explain, a matter of relation to value as a 
relation of the common, in which the individual’s relation to collectivity is 
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determined in terms of the creation of shared feelings and affections, shared 
interests and shared goals.  
Therefore, for Wagner, there is no such thing as an isolated, universalised 
identity in thinking about the self, but a subjectivity shaped by community and 
common tradition and history. Thus, it could be argued that, in Wagner’s operas, 
this communal conception of existence does not deny individuality as Nietzsche 
claimed. Rather, the sense of communal being was anchored in the conception of 
another key Wagnerian philosophical idea – ‘das Werden’, or ‘becoming’ to 
which I will  turn. 
 
 
Wagner’s Philosophical Gesture of ‘Becoming’ (‘Das Werden’)  
How affective relations functioned in Wagner’s theatre is an important question 
for both our understanding of Wagner’s use of theatricality as mode of collective 
experience – what, in Lawrence Grossberg’s terms, would be called ‘an affective 
alliance’ (162) – and as a distinctively thinking mode of embodying ideas. To 
start with, if we accept that configuring shared affective predispositions is a 
practice that takes place at the level of mimetic identification, then the Wagnerian 
stage already presupposes a particular type of theatricality as a process of 
‘becoming’ that the audience is able to participate in. This can be seen from the 
manner in which Wagner proposes the new music-drama form on the theoretical 
premise of his Gesamtkunstwerk, by which the merging of all elements into the 
theatrical gesture creates a ‘living’ whole, which, like a ‘complete and living 
body… draws its life from inner life-needs’ (Opera and Drama 342). It is what 
brings in his own Festspielhaus in Bayreuth, the demand that lights are dimmed 
during performances, that the orchestra pit is sunken, and that the orchestra is 
entirely concealed from the audience. The blending of instrumental and vocal 
sound is, for Wagner, opposed to ‘ready-made’ melody. As Edwin Østergaard 
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argues in his article ‘Darwin and Wagner: Evolution and Aesthetic Appreciation’, 
Wagner’s repeated reference in regards to the formation of melodies is in terms 
of ‘organic growth’ which, by itself, ‘clearly shows that he is deeply influenced 
by the concept of organicism and the mechanism-organism debate of the mid-
nineteenth century’ (93). What is even more important is how Wagner utilises the 
notion of ‘organic generation’ by which a new sense of ‘becoming’ is affectively 
experienced as a process of generation in which one is made to participate in order 
to grasp its essence. As Wagner carefully points out: 
A ready-made melody – so we have seen – remained unintelligible to us, 
because open to arbitrary interpretations; a ready-made Situation must 
remain just as unintelligible, even as Nature herself remained unintelligible 
to us so long as we looked on her as something made – whereas she is 
intelligible enough, now that we know her as the Being, i.e. the forever 
Becom-ing: a Being (ein Seiendes) whose Becoming is ever present to us. 
(Opera and Drama 337) 
 
‘Becoming’ is a term already traceable to ancient Greek philosophy and, later, 
most characteristically reworked by Nietzsche and Deleuze among others, and 
receives central attention on the conceptual basis of existence as a dynamic and 
processual expression. ‘Becoming’ in this sense, especially for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophies, indicates processes of transformation by which they read 
the notion of ‘existence’ as a whole. It is why, for them, nothing is actually static 
or stable in its identity and that change is at the core of every physical entity, of 
even rocks and mountains. In a similar manner, Wagner’s interest in the idea of 
‘becoming’ displays an equally transformative conception of relation to reality as 
‘being’ or as what it is. This approach to existence as ‘becoming’, denoting 
transformation as a vector expressed relationally, in the formation of ‘becoming-
x’, has a clear task in Wagner. For Østergaard, it enables the audience ‘to 
experience the process of change by taking “an active share” in the generation of 
the drama’ (93). Or, as Østergaard puts it by quoting Wagner: 
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Plastic art can display only the Finished, i.e. the Montionless; wherefore it 
can never make of the beholder a confident witness to the becoming of a 
thing... The Drama, alone, is the artwork that so addresses itself in space 
and time to our eye and ear, that we can take an active share in its becoming, 
and therefore can grasp the Becoming as a necessity. (Opera and Drama 
337) 
 
What essentially Østergaard suggests is that Wagner’s idea in the Art-Work of 
the Future was to create the space in which the audience could take an active share 
in the creation of Becoming and, therefore, grasp this Becoming as a necessity. 
Moreover, the form of music-dramas, being made of space and time, means that 
the composer is compelled to investigate the Becoming as a necessity. In this 
sense, Østergaard is right then to observe that Tristan present us with the most 
radical artistic manifestation of ‘becoming as a necessity’, which Wagner also 
discusses in his long essay Opera and Drama. Yet, while his implicit 
understanding of Wagner’s operatic rendering of the idea of ‘becoming’ 
highlights the evident organicity of the Wagnerian stage, which is already a 
sensory, affective category, what also needs to be further stated is its implicit 
contradiction as a gesture of theatricality. For, in Wagner, ‘becoming’ emerges 
not as a relation of imitation, but as a process that is always seen to occur between 
two terms. These terms not only end up destabilising any clear idea of existence 
– or, more concretely, identity – but precisely mobilise, through this process of 
distabilisation/transformation, various affective potentialities of bodies 
concerned – bodies which are no other than the bodies of the spectators and of 
the actors. 
To understand this process in actual terms of Wagner’s practice, and 
identify the ways by which it articulates a new mode of philosophy as an entirely 
theatrical mode through the mediating subjectivity of Wagner as a 
director/composer, I will examine Wagner’s application of Hegelian philosophy 
as both embodied ideas and a process of ‘doing’ that embodies thought in theatre. 
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Wagner’s Left Hegelianism  
The way in which philosophical ideas are conveyed in Wagner’s operas is an 
examination carried out with admirable detail in Bryan Magee’s book, Wagner 
and Philosophy. But my interest in this relation is on the speculative dimension 
of Wagner as a mediating subjectivity in his role as a director/composer.   In what 
follows, therefore, I examine instances in which Wagner’s thought is formed and 
enacted, particularly through his written theories and operatic compositions, both 
of which enable us to grasp the form, meaning and identity of the director as a 
type of philosopher in theatre. As I argue, it is the appearance of the director in 
the structures of the late nineteenth theatre that allows modernist works to be 
perceived as philosophical manifestations. This is particularly true for Wagner, 
whose reception has produced a remarkable body of philosophical thought. One 
only need to look at operatic dramas, such as Tristan and Isolde, Parsifal and The 
Ring, that have not only been thought to have been constructed around intriguing 
philosophical hypotheses, but have motivated a new kind of critical philosophy 
to take shape in return. By focusing on them in a contextual way, rather than at 
the level of production practice, I want to identify the director’s philosophical 
thinking embedded in these works as a form of embodied thought itself. This 
choice may at first create an overlapping between the function of the director and 
the playwright which is one of the various overlapping functions of the director. 
What differentiates, however, the director from the typical playwright is the 
mediating subjectivity of the director which is not something external to the three-
dimensional thinking of the theatrical experience but internal. The director’s 
mediating subjectivity that I examine here, through Wagner’s theoretical 
writings, musical and textual scores, releases a ‘what thinks’ that embodies 
thought for its content. Arguably, this is nothing new since plays, already since 
the Greek tragedy, can indeed demonstrate philosophical values and 
interpretations. But as I hope to demonstrate in this thesis, what is different with 
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the emergence of the director, starting with Wagner, is that the director 
reconfigures the dynamism of ‘thinking’ into a mobile, structural activity that is 
both relational to experience, knowledge and temporalities, and enacted in the 
very process of positing thought. In other words, we experience the director’s 
theatre not simply as being invested in philosophical ideas or understood as 
philosophy, but as living representations of mediation that produces a ‘thinking 
about’ that goes beyond this point of theatrical representation and includes this 
‘thinking about’ and a ‘thinking-over’ in various form, both written and embodied 
– this complex intersection describes the director as a speculative subjectivity. In 
other words, my analysis is interested in how ‘thinking’ becomes the director, and 
what type of thought is formed by the director’s mediation, starting with Wagner. 
           For Žižek, for example, the ending of Götterdämmerung conveys the three 
main positions that are found in the philosophies of Feuerbach, Bakunin, and 
Schopenhauer: 1) the reign of human love, 2) the revolutionary destruction of the 
old world, and 3) the resignation and withdrawal from the world (192). As Žižek 
argues, The Ring exhibits a Feuerbachian celebration of sexual love combined 
with the Proudhonian revolutionary demand for the abolition of private property 
(‘Afterword’ 214). Additionally, one cannot ignore the Hegelian logic either, 
which is traced throughout Wagner’s universe, all the way to Parsifal, whose 
final message, as Žižek insist, is a profoundly Hegelian one: ‘The wound can be 
healed only by the spear that smote it’ (‘Afterward’ 216). 
In his Wagner Beyond Good and Evil, John Deathridge captures Wagner’s 
remarkably transformative Hegelianisme:  
 
During and immediately after the composition of Lohengrin, Wagner 
became enraptured with Young Hegelian ideas, devoured Freubach’s 
critique of Christian belief (which threw a rather difficult light on the 
Christian symbolism of the opera), turned into a ferocious orator against the 
old feudal order in Germany, fought on the barricades in the 1849 Dresden 
Revolution, more or less gave up composing to write lengthy, socially 
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critical tomes about the future of art, nearly jettisoned his marriage and 
‘domesticity’ (as he put it to Stahr), and began to develop a huge work that 
eventually became the Ring, in which myth and music were to combine in 
a utopian Artwork of the Future expressing profound insights into the world 
in ways no existing art form had ever done before. (32) 
 
Wagner’s own transformation, that Deathridge brilliantly conveys, and which 
originates from a more radical sense of change of the past ‘not by rejuvenating 
the old order’ (ibid) but by ‘destroying it completely’ and replacing it altogether 
with a new one – Wagner’s new democratised order of the future – was setting 
him already on a radical agenda in his engagement with theatre and opera. His 
fervent conversion of Feuerbachean and Left Hegelianism then leads him to issue 
a radical re-examination, through essay writing and the dramatic form, of the 
prevailing middle-class values and institutions. For Deathridge, Wagner entirely 
conceives The Ring of the Nibelung as an ‘onslaught on the bourgeois-capitalist 
order’ (48) which, in a typically Hegelian fashion, did not succeed in healing what 
Wagner considered as the wounds of an afflicted society.  
The Hegelian Left background of The Ring and the intellectual ferment of 
1840s formed Wagner’s communal ideas about the future of opera while 
simultaneously foreshadowing the political function of theatre in modernism. For 
Thomas Mann, Wagner was a Kultur-Bolshevist ahead of his time (‘Richard 
Wagner and Der Ring’ 178) that, as Deathridge explains, positioned Wagner as 
some kind of moral anarchist creating social dramas, which, despite their 
mythological paraphernalia, ‘outdoes even Ibsen’ in showing how middle-class 
life has become enmeshed in a failing social order. Here, Deathridge echoes 
Deryck Cooke who, in his book, I Saw the World End, claims that, in the 
emotional structure, the Ring’s dramatic narrative works exactly as the kind of 
‘play of ideas’ later to be fully realised in the Naturalist dramas by Ibsen and 
Shaw (12). Wagner’s ‘ambition of the social drama’ for Deathridge overcomes 
the nineteenth-century theatre conventions with a startling emotional clarity in 
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the portrayal of characterisation that is undoubtedly modernist. One only needs 
to follow Wagner’s depiction of Wotan and Brünnhilde as an unfolding of deep 
affection between father and daughter which, for Badiou, is also representative of 
Wagner’s powerful passages of dramatic possibility through which subjective 
identity is formed. 
The conclusion of Götterdämmerung narrates the destruction of the gods 
delivered through an enormously long text that involves Brünnhilde talking about 
the end of the world of the gods against the background of destruction. In her 
monologue, however, she retells already shown aspects of the story. This makes 
Wagner, in Badiou’s words, ‘a true discipline of Aeschylus’ because he never 
‘misses a chance to tell a story everyone is familiar with all over again (Five 
Lessons on Wagner 104). However, such a process of telling and retelling is 
essential, as Badiou argues, as the declaratory nature of the speech forces the 
character to confront the existential dimension of their beings: ‘Who am I in the 
overall situation of the world, in terms of the meaning it may have for me and for 
everyone else?’ (116). The character’s text, therefore, not only creates in Wagner 
subjective possibility, but ‘the possibility of a new subjectivity’ (ibid.) which is 
also, it seems to me, a way of thinking about the situation that the characters find 
themselves involved, not pre-determinately or externally, but dialectically – by 
speculatively exposing and relating the facts that surround the story he or she is 
involved in and through which to decide on the next course of action. So, when a 
character asks a question that another character responds to by retelling the events 
that have taken place up to this point, it is the means by which the character comes 
to a conscious realisation of his or her situation from a new subjective point of 
view, which then also throws light on an understanding of themselves as 
characters. That is to say, not only from our perspective, but internally from them 
as characters. In other words – and this is also the position argued by Badiou’s 
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revisionist reading of Wagner’s dramatic narratives – the characters get to know 
themselves and the part they play in the story up to the point of their retelling. 
In Five Lessons on Wagner, Badiou makes this point by drawing on Sachs’ 
monologue at the beginning of Act III of Die Meistersinger. As he tells us, ‘the 
decision is arrived at entirely by means of the character’s inner transformation or 
by what might be called the immanent inflection of the themes’ (88). Badiou 
refers to Sach’s monologue as ‘the decision monologue’ since the character 
arrives at a decision without explicitly making one, but through the more subtle 
process of inner transformation. As Badiou insightfully observes: ‘it is this 
transformation that really conveys the subjectivity metamorphosis, thereby 
making the decision appear immanently, not in terms of “I was such and such a 
way before, but now I am different” but rather in terms of a change from one state 
to the other in the discourse itself’ (89). It is why Wagner insists that dramatic 
possibilities are created through the music, which is why ‘affect’ is hugely 
important in the aesthetic structure of these works. By creating ‘dramatic 
possibility’, the music does not merely support the dramatic narrative or reinforce 
its situation, but ‘create dramatic possibility’ as Badiou claims (ibid.). But what 
is even more interesting is how the emotion is configured in the dramatic 
possibility, which in the end is the subjective process of the character’s decision 
– what ultimately transforms Sachs. And yet, the process of transformation is the 
result of something not dramatic, but as something created by the music. That’s 
why, in Wagner, dramatic possibility is always musically constructed by which a 
new dramatic situation is created: so ‘the new Sachs,’ as Badiou explains, ‘will 
be the Sachs of a tentative new peace and, it might moreover be said, of a new 
alliance. The possibility for a new alliance between art and the people is 
ultimately the true content of this whole process.’ (ibid.) 
Wagner’s Hegelianism that can be detected in his operas represent the 
exploration of a possibility reminiscent of the known theories of his time, such as 
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the evolution of species (Darwin) and dialectical materialism (Marx). Wagner’s 
chromatism is once again applied functioning here as means of creating a 
hypothesis. Consider Parsifal, for example, in which the musical colour scheme, 
in conjunction with the thematic structure and overall rhythm, formulate the 
overtly metaphysical and ontological hypothesis that something else exists 
beyond Christianity. Or, in Götterdämmerung, whether gods can die and what 
would that means for humans.  But as Susan Sontag has pointed out, Wagner’s 
music-dramas involve ideas rather than beliefs (‘Wagner’s Fluids’ 208). This can 
be seen most clearly in Wagner’s use of motifs, which communicate insights 
about the psychology of power in ways that cannot be put into words. Indeed, 
with motifs, Wagner orchestrates the staging of complex ideas into music. The 
multitudinous and endless subtle metamorphoses of these motifs already involve 
the means of articulating ideas, at their most refined, more precise and 
sophisticated expression. Absorbed in the living tissue of the work, ideas are 
unobtrusive and yet not concealed in any way. Most importantly, perhaps, reality 
itself is articulated and rethought, not as a state of affairs, but as a process, 
something going on, as we saw, a ‘becoming’. This underlying pattern of process 
as perpetual change, never ceasing, is a constantly self-renewing triad of thesis-
antithesis-synthesis. The supreme impact that this way of thinking and 
interpreting the world had, can be seen from the revolution it was setting off in 
the previously established states of affairs and constants. In physics, for example, 
the Laws of Motion in Newtonian physics were shattering existing models of 
thoughts offering a new way at looking at and rebuilding this reality anew in a 
Hegelian dialectical manner; the world as an unending process of perpetual 
change and speculative synthesis. It is in this way, too, that Wagner sought to 
change the world through an aesthetic theatre of an explicitly Hegelian bearing. 
 
	  
	   146	  
Anarchist Wagner 
The concept of anarchism should not be confused with its contemporary meaning 
typically used to imply a form of terrorism. Rather, the concept of anarchism 
originally designated anything but the expression of disorder and violence. 
Originating from the ideological position of ἀναρχία  (anarchy), deriving from 
the Greek ἄναρχος [anarchos], meaning ‘one without rulers’ from ἀν- [an]- 
‘without’ and ἀρχός [archos], ‘leader’, ‘ruler’, does not necessarily describe 
action that resorts to violence, but of action that is pacific in intent. According to 
Proudhon, who was the first to proclaim himself an anarchist in 1840, 
philosophical anarchism was conceptualised as the ideological space in which 
reason and civilisation would be capable alone to overthrow the need for 
sovereign leadership. With this in mind, he advocated voluntarily co-operation, 
which was necessary to sustain this new type of society. Once there is no longer 
a need for a leader, the conflict dissipates and the maintenance of order no longer 
rests on force by a policing authority. Instead, it is social voluntary co-operation 
and working in common that preserves social justice naturally and a sense of 
fellow citizenship of equality that guarantees that no-one’s labour is appropriated 
for the benefit of someone else, or that property ownership forces individuals out 
of the land that they live and work on. Other relevant ideas that propagated 
resistance to any ‘compulsory form of association’ (Magee 37), such as the 
institution of marriage or the industrialisation of work and life, were axiomatic 
among anarchist circles which wished to dispense altogether with the notion of 
rule and government, viewing society as an entirely voluntary association of 
individuals. The key idea was co-operation in every respect of life and social 
relation, an idea that also ran deeply in the thinking and practice of Wagner as an 
anarchic activist himself. 
Indeed, the link between anarchism and aesthetics fuels Wagner’s creativity 
in theatre as a real commitment to transforming society through the practice of 
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music-drama, that also overcomes in the process any mere formalistic concerns 
with innovation and reform of the operatic stage. For Deathridge, Wagner’s stage 
was a theatre of ideas ‘about love, power, property, nature, religion, and the 
possibility of social change’ (94). One such example is The Ring, which Wagner 
began composing in the late 1840s and can be read as an allegorical reflection on 
social unrest from the experience of the Revolution of 1848–49. Later, it was 
expanded into an emotional examination of human destiny, which brings 
Deathridge to read it as ‘politics [turned] into philosophical poetry’ (Wagner 
Beyond Good and Evil 49). Wagner was conscious of the need of capturing the 
revolutionary spirit in a new form of theatre that also possessed the power of 
expressing and putting into action revolutionary change. This aspiration is 
confessed in his autobiographical essay A Communication to My Friends (1851), 
in which Wagner claimed that Lohengrin was the moment of his vivid realisation 
that a new form of operatic drama was needed to set off change. This did not refer 
to required theatrical innovation or stylistic renovation of theatrical expression, 
but rather the inciting of action through the medium of theatre in its ability to 
form communal feelings that inspired social action. It is this realisation that 
rapidly turns into an obsession for him, leading him to actively compose dramatic 
musical narratives as philosophical treatises of revolutionary action.  
Accordingly, an aptly (anarchist) Feuerbach reading can be deciphered in 
Wagner’s depiction of Alberich in which he is shown to curse on love. At the 
beginning of The Ring and Brünnhilde’s ending monologue, love needs to return 
to human aspiration and feeling as opposed to a life led by a misguided sense of 
justice and love onto God.  Wagner’s emphasis on ‘feeling’ is once again pivotal 
for his own philosophy as a director/composer, as I have argued so far. Likewise, 
in the first scene of Das Rheingold, the Nibelung dwarf Alberich is not only 
portrayed in Marxian terms snatching the gold and heading to build his own 
industrial empire in Nibelung, after he has renounced love, and by projection, his 
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alignment with humanity. Rather, it is the dramatisation of this very idea that 
forces the spectator to experience it as a primal feeling of conflict, yet which 
rapidly dissolves into philosophical poetry that incites a sense for action in the 
audience. However, this is not to say that the audience was made to perform any 
actual action during performance (in the way, perhaps, we are today accustomed 
with interactive theatre practices), but that by inciting strong feelings in the 
audience for political change it would be possible to also actualise these feelings 
as material ‘deeds’ in real life.   
Feuerbach’s idea of the liberation of human kind through love is one of the 
central preoccupations of The Ring’s libretto, which was penned by a Feuerbach-
intoxicated German socialist not long after 1844. Many of the characters of The 
Ring are Gods that consciously evoke Feuerbach by presenting Gods at the early 
stage of the development of the human world. Moreover, this new human order, 
instituted by taking responsibility for their actions, is configured not by leadership 
or power, but of love and compassion – there were Feuerbach’s basic principles. 
It should also be noted that the years leading to the insurrections of 1848–49 were 
years of revolutionary intellectual activity on arts and politics alike; Proudhon’s 
What is Property? was published in 1840 and Feuerbach’s two most influential 
books, The Essence of Christianity and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, 
had come out in 1843. These books are key to the events that led many to the 
barricades and helped form the ideas towards a new aesthetic outlook so much in 
theatre as in real life itself. But the backbone that provided those revolutionary 
texts and ideas with a firmer and more continues foundation was, as mentioned 
above, the rich tradition of Hegelianism. This is the source that also gives shape 
to the dialectical materialist thought of Marx, who was a contemporary of 
Wagner. 
As I will argue in the next sections, Wagner’s anarchist activist was linked 
with the causes of the rising socialist Left. He actively sought to carry the 
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revolution into the arts with the belief that a new communal era would be initiated 
through the form of music-drama, which would liberate society from the 
constrains of commercialisation and exploitation. Towards this aim, Wagner also 
invents the new aesthetic form of the Total Art-Wok on the socialist principle of 
co-operation. However, there was a crucial turning point in the realisation of this 
goal; the anti-parliamentary coup of Paris in December 1851 that brought Wagner 
to experience extreme depression and loss of the belief in radical activity (Magee 





The Radical Turn: Schopenhauerism  
 
We must learn to die and to die in the fullest sense of the word; fear of the 
end is the source of all lovelessness. (‘Letter to August Röckel’ 6:67) 
 
Within this context for change, always political and social, Wagner’s turn to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy can be properly read as a mark of his radicalisation 
in anarchist thought that also comes to define, more broadly, Wagner’s role as a 
composer/director/philosopher. Although it has frequently been claimed that 
Wagner’s encounter with the philosopher’s writings caused him to abandon his 
radical political ideas and realign his personal sympathies with more conservative 
perspectives, in reality this could not be more removed from the truth. Yet, most 
critical accounts have traditionally argued for the former. In Magee’s analysis, 
for instance, despite his lucid argument about Wagner’s philosophical dimension, 
he still insists that it was Wagner’s disillusionment with politics and political 
hope for immediate radical change and democratisation (127) that led him to find 
consonance in Schopenhauer’s pessimism: ‘Suddenly,’ asserts Magee, ‘because 
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there was no hope of revolutionary political and social change, there was no hope 
for the future of art, and therefore no hope for the future of Richard Wagner. He 
was plunged into depression... in the full clinical sense of that term. It was felt by 
him subjectively as unmistakably the most significant turning point in his life up 
to that point.’ (128) Magee then swiftly concludes that, ‘What Schopenhauer did 
for Wagner was to give to someone who was already depressed and disoriented 
by the loss of an almost religious faith in political solutions a new way of looking 
at the world, a view that saw all public affairs, including politics, as trivial, and 
positively advocated disillusionment with them, a turning away from the world 
and its values’ (ibid.).  
Magee is not the only one to have misread Wagner’s conversion to 
Schopenhauerism. Nietzsche and Adorno are most vocal in this respect. As John 
Tietz argues in his Redemption or Annihilation? Love versus Power in Wagner’s 
Ring, both Adorno and Nietzsche willfully misunderstood Wagner’s supposed 
resignation from the phenomenal world and the subsequent false dichotomy 
between idealised humanistic redemption and the kind of decadent, pessimistic 
renunciation. For Adorno, it is more precisely an expression of pure sociopathic 
alienation, epitomised most profoundly in Parsifal. At the same time, as for 
Nietzsche, Wagner is championing transcendence of the phenomenal world 
through sensuality, which ultimately ends up corrupting our spirits. 
Another point of reference in this respect is Wagner’s emphasis on love, 
which misguidedly identifies the pathos of metaphysics as the material expression 
of love through redemption coupled with self-destruction. Adorno reads in 
Tristan the denial of social reality impersonated by the idea of the transcendence 
of the individual, holding Wagnerian redemption as a substitute for ‘the mirage 
of the enduring upwards soaring individual who vanishes into thin air at the 
moment of his annihilation… In the innermost core of Wagner’s idea of 
redemption dwells nothingness, it too is empty’ (In Search of Wagner 149). This 
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is, moreover, seen in The Ring, in which the doctrine of redemptive annihilation 
is, for Adorno, most clearly played out as Wotan’s death wish of a capitalistically 
alienated society while, in fact, it is a glorification of a self-destructive 
transcendence through death rather than the victory of love over power. In other 
words, it is not the victory of people over capitalist exploitation and manipulation. 
Rather, as Adorno argues, it is the bourgeois revolution of an industrialised 
society that, in Wagner, is offered as a solution and which also functions as the 
ultimate and idealised escape from capitalism through romanticised subjectivity 
(Tietz, Redemption or Annihilation? 104). 
Similalry, for Nietzsche, Wagner reduces values to subjective states. 
Wagner believed that, by manipulating the experience of others, one can create 
values in accordance with their subjective states. Yet, it is well known that 
Nietzsche was interested in the relation between truth and illusion. As Nietzsche 
argued, what value and truth are concerned with is life itself, but it is always ‘us’ 
who ‘create’ values in ordinary life and who seek the truth. The problem, 
therefore, when faced with Wagner’s reduction of values to subjective states, is 
that the ‘reverence for truth’, which is seen, in Nietzsche, as the ‘consequence’ of 
an illusion, is understood in the Platonian sense as what associates truth in general 
with universality. But, if what we expect to find in truth is ultimately the 
universal, then how is it possible to have truth that is not the opposite of illusion? 
Or, to put it in plain theatrical terms, why could the destruction of illusion only 
lead, as Nietzsche believed, in the creation of new illusions? How was it possible 
that truth depended on illusion when illusion was synonymous with deception? 
And, most importantly perhaps, if truth was not situated beyond illusion, how 
could it ever be possible to eliminate illusions altogether, even if in favour of 
truth?  
To fully understand these rather abstract philosophical aporias, one needs 
to place them in the wider context of the nineteenth-century German traditions of 
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philosophies and arts, which were often preoccupied with the complex 
relationship between illusion and reality. They can be summarised as three main 
queries: a) What are the universal truths and values that constitute our society; b) 
Can contemporary values be justified or be relative to the given historical 
circumstances or tradition.? and c) How is Wagner connected with these 
preoccupations? The answer to all three is, formalistically. Wagner’s operas, 
especially evident in the values implicit in The Ring, are suddenly seen capable 
of problematising such questions that are also posed by Nietzsche himself as a 
philosopher. And, most crucially, they are problematised by Wagner, not merely 
in terms of what the nature of truth itself is – but, more essentially, in what truth 
there actually is. As Tietz insightfully observes, ‘The Ring does not advocate 
subjectivity or self-destructiveness but it sees these as part of a larger context of 
change and contingency’ (130). In The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche’s analysis of 
the character of Siegfried is one such representative example. As Peckham 
argues, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s refusal to read Wagner’s Schopenhauerian 
pessimism and the idea of resignation of the human prospect as a stripping of the 
self: 
 
The Ring strips the self of… divine authority and asserts that… heroic effort 
is futile and must necessarily be frustrated. The self is now absolutely – and 
terribly – free, neither supported nor justified. For the first time it is really 
stripped bare, its values entirely self-generated. (Beyond the Tragic Vision 
269)  
 
In Žižek’s revisionist examination of Wagner, the shift from early revolutionary 
to his later ‘mature’ years of Schopenhauerianism is ‘usually conceived as a shift 
from humanistic belief in the possibility of the revolutionary transformation of 
existing reality – in other words, from the belief that our reality is miserable due 
to contingent historical reasons – to the more “profound” insight into how reality 
as such is miserable, and that the only true redemption resides in withdrawing 
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from it into the abyss of the ‘night of the world (‘Afterword 192). It is how the 
performed wish for wholesale destruction takes a distinctively revolutionary ideal 
in Wagner’s operas. The old world needs to be destroyed so that a new, better, 
democratic world can set foot. But how could one get people to change the world? 
Wagner’s profound realisation that derives from his encounter with 
Schopenhauer comes from trying to find an answer to this. And the answer is, 
that the world does not really change. The only thing that does and can change is 
oneself. In this sense, the most radical change is to deny oneself the reality one 
finds oneself in, not by means of escapism, but of ‘resignation’, understood in its 
Hegelian meaning as radical negativity. 
Hegel’s concept of negativity arrives from the way he considers the 
conditions and relations of being and reality which, for him, are fundamentally 
negative because they do not fulfil their actual potential – that is, of what they 
could truly be. It is why the notion of ‘becoming’ denotes a negative mobility 
simultaneously negating existence, while affirming it most forcefully on exactly 
the dimension that negates it – its ‘becoming’. Radical negativity destabilises the 
premise of existence, but in a manner that intrinsically reaffirms the possibilities 
of ‘being’ in the all-encompassing actualisation of ‘becoming’. It is what leads 
Wagner to Schopenhauer’s philosophical thought of resignation that Wagner also 
reads dialectically in Hegelian speculative terms; that is, as an affirmation of the 
potential radical life that can be actualised by revealing the constitutive 
contradiction of life as a life of ‘becoming’, and yet it does not embrace the 
inherent change of existence itself. It is, therefore, in this sense of radical 
negativity that Wagner employs as ‘resignation’ directly drawn from 
Schopenhauer. In many respects, Schopenhauer simply offers Wagner the means 
by which he not only radicalises the communal aesthetics of his 
Gesamtkunstwerk, but the mode of thought that he embodies in his role as a 
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composer/director/philosopher and comes to function as a radically negative 
modality itself. 
 
The Aesthetics of Metamorphosis 
Wagner became aware of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation in 
the autumn of 1854 through his friend poet Goerg Herwegh and soon found 
himself in the study of his other philosophical treatise, the Parerga and 
Paralipomena. As he confined in a letter to his friend Franz Liszt, Schopenhauer 
had come as ‘a heavenly presence in my loneliness’ (in Magee 180). Wagner’s 
discovery of Schopenhauer came at a time when he was composing the music for 
The Valkyrie and was planning to start working on the music for Siegfried and 
Götterdämmerung, although he had already written the libretti for them. After 
reading Schopenhauer, Wagner created the operatic compositions Tristan and 
Isolde, The Mastersingers, and Parsifal. Indeed, from the fall of 1854, Arthur 
Schopenhauer became one of the most pervasive influences over Wagner’s 
thinking, writing, and composing (Stein, Richard Wagner 113).  
Schopenhauer’s classical doctrines of pessimism and renunciation appealed 
greatly to Wagner’s radical revolutionary drive of breaking with the past that had 
also led him to experience disappointment and discouragement. He wrote to 
August Röckel on February 5, 1855:  
 
I confess that I had reached a point in my life where only Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy could be completely adequate and decisive. By accepting 
without reservation his very, very serious truths I have satisfied my inner 
needs most fully, and although this has taken me in a direction which is 
widely divergent from my former course, it alone was consonant with my 
deeply suffering conception of the nature of the world. (Selected Letters 52) 
 
Schopenhauer identifies the Kantian Ding an sich as the metaphysical will, which 
he then accepts as the ultimate reality behind the world of phenomena. Setting up 
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the eternal Ideas or unchanging forms of Plato as direct objectifications of this 
will, as ‘a kind of generic mid-point, independent of the laws of time, space, and 
causality, between the will and the phenomenal world’, Schopenhauer considers 
all forms of art, except music, as revelations that point to phenomena of these 
eternal ideas. Indeed, in Book III of The World as Will and Idea, he makes the 
case that music which does not derive its material form from phenomena, is 
independent of the world as representation and, thus, constitutes an 
objectification of the metaphysical will itself rather than of the Ideas, which is 
what all the other art forms do: 
 
Music, having no connection with the Ideas, is independent also of the 
phenomenal world. …Music is by no means, like the other arts, an image 
of the Ideas: but an image of the will itself, whose objectification the Ideas 
are. It is for this reason that the effect of music is so much mightier and 
more penetrating than that of the other arts; for these speak only of the 
shadow, music however of the essence. (340) 
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of quietism attracts Wagner and, as a result, his own 
revolutionary theories become more radicalised rather than defused or 
denounced. Indeed, Wagner’s renewed position of the Gesamtkunstwerk is on 
conceiving the synthesis of music and visual action as complementary 
revelations, or objectifications, of the metaphysical will. Dramatic dialogue is 
relegated to a subordinate position functioning as a mechanical aid to clarifying 
the mimetic action. And yet, it is the shift between word and music that is 
fundamental. The predominance of music invalidates most of theoretical 
hypothesis in Opera and Drama. However, the question to be asked is not in 
terms of a newly formed hierarchy in relation to the various arts, but on how an 
unequal association of one art to another enables the metaphysical justification of 
the synthesis of music and dramatic representation on stage. Or, to put it 
differently, what does this new understanding of the synthetic relation of art tell 
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us about Wagner’s theoretical position? If, for Schopenhauer, music represented 
the direct objectification of the real essence of the universe, what he describes as 
‘the will’, it was because it was impossible to communicate this will to the human 
conscience in terms of the phenomenal world. But, the relationship of music as 
[Platonic] Idea and the impossibility of its nature to ‘be directly presented as Idea’ 
(Schopenhauer 339) provides Wagner with a revelation that had already been at 
work in his theories and practice all along: dramatic music in organic connection 
with dramatic action becomes a manifestation of the metaphysical will, which 
can be transmitted to the people’s consciousness and, therefore, effect radical 
socio-political change. This is what brings Wagner to compose and articulate an 
aesthetics of metamorphosis. He does so in two ways. First, he concludes that the 
inner laws of music are also the inner laws by which drama is constructed: 
Music… includes the drama within itself, since the drama itself expresses 
the only Idea of the world adequate to music. Drama towers over the 
limitations of poetry in the same way that music towers over those of every 
other art, its effect lying in the realm of the sublime. Just as drama does not 
depict human characters, but lets them display themselves directly, so 
music gives us in its motifs the character of all phenomena of the world 
according to their innermost essence. Not only are the movement, 
configuration and evolution of these motifs analogues solely to the drama, 
but the drama representing the Idea can in truth be completely understood 
only through those moving and evolving musical motifs. We would then not 
be in error if we saw in music the a priori qualification for fashioning a 
drama. As we construct the phenomenal world by application of the laws 
of time and space which exist a priori in our brain, so this conscious 
presentation of the Idea of the World in the drama would be conditioned by 
the inner laws of music, which assert themselves in the dramatist 
unconsciously much as we draw on the laws of causality in our perception 
of the phenomenal world.’ (quoted in Stein 160) 
 
Second, the placement of the role of drama itself that continues to be central, even 
after Wagner’s self-conversion to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy. In his 
‘Beethoven’ essay, he makes his position clear by stating that the only factor that 
could condition music was the drama, not as dramatic verse but as dramatic 
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action, ‘the drama actually taking place before our eyes as a visible image of the 
music, where the word and the dialogue belong solely to the action, not to the 
poetic thought’ (ibid). In other words, what Wagner is reinstating is this essay, 
which directly links his Gesamtkunstwerk theory of his earlier writings with his 
after Schopenhauer position, is that the ‘life-giving centre’, as he calls it, is not 
the musical-poetic verse, but the dramatic action which, in the synthesis of the 
arts, functions as ‘the sole determining agent’ (164), to borrow from Stein for the 
music in Wagner’s ideal form of drama. 
Yet, for Adorno, there cannot be any Wagnerian pessimism, and the 
subsequent need for redemption hypostasised from the metaphysical principle of 
meaningless into a meaning endowed upon a meaningless, empirical reality. 
Rather, Wagner’s pessimism is the philosophy of the apostate rebel. As Adorno 
writes: ‘What he retains from his rebellion is his insight into the evil nature of the 
world “as such,” as an extrapolation from an evil present, as well as the further 
insight into the inexorable reproduction of the evil.’ (In search of Wagner 143) 
The idea here is expressed in the Hegelian model of Weltgeist-Regisseur, in which 
the individual is a mere puppet in the hands of the World-Spirit, which 
manipulates him or her by means of technological rationality (Karin ‘Adorno’s 
Wagner’ 74). For Adorno, if Wagnerian art exemplifies totality, which arrives 
devoid of its dialectic relation to the particular and thus eliminates prevalent 
antagonism, it is also because the Gesamtkunstwerk not only expresses 
metaphysics, but produces it. In ‘Schopenhauer,’ argues Adorno, ‘suffering 
appears as a “mere phenomenon”, its very shabbiness and meanness make its 
seriousness evident. In Wagner it is trivialised by the accountments of grandeur’ 
(In Search of Wagner 146).  
When, therefore, Wagner confronts Schopenhauer’s philosophy, for 
Adorno, Wagner’s promotion of the ascetic ideal as part of self-denunciation does 
not take a more infinitely radical turn. It rather conveys the Wagnerian alliance 
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with Schopenhauer’s pessimism as artistic affirmation of Wagner’s renewed 
position expressed in alignment with bourgeois morality. And yet, in actuality, it 
is this very position of death and destruction expressed by Wagner’s application 
of Schopenhauer’s renunciation of the Will-to-Life that conjures, it seems, a more 
anarchist, rebellious worldview of metamorphosis. As Bauer points out, 
Schopenhauer’s renunciation of the Will-to-Life develops from the recognition 
that injustice is unavoidable in the social life of the human order and is aimed at 
breaking with the vicious circle of blind fate. For Wagner, however, it is this will 
that becomes blind fate itself and, therefore, death and the death-drive are 
conceptualised as expressions of sheer joy and the ultimate radical statement of 
escaping into freedom.  
 
The Socialist Case of Wagner 
We’ve seen earlier how anarchist philosophy attracted Wagner and the 
application of anarchist ideas in his operas and writings. In many respects, his 
anarchism prescribed the yearning to uncover the necessary processes that would 
lead to social change that, in Wagner’s writings, take a missionary fervour: how 
could art – and, most specifically, German opera –fulfill its proper function in 
people’s lives, a function which, for Wagner, was always communal following 
the social paradigm of the Greek theatre, which he aesthetically considered as a 
formula for democratisation and emancipation of the people. From this point of 
view, it was only one small step by which he would passionately align himself 
with the current anarchist thinking of his time. Yet, this is the same thinking, we 
should not forget, that was giving way to a rising socialist perspective, rapidly 
turning itself into what was to soon be understood as ‘communism’ following 
Marx’s influential political writings. Wagner’s own programmatic writings, 
poured out of anger and frustration following the failed Dresden revolution of 
1848–49, could be read as similar socialists articulations explicitly drawing on 
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the broader socialist (if not as yet ‘communist’) project of setting off the process 
of democratisation and social justice in Europe.  
Wagner’s critically acute sense towards theatre and opera not only advances 
complex arguments situated within a social context in all of his writings 
throughout the 1830s and 1840s. Rather, his artistic or reformist propositions 
project profoundly revolutionary reflections on what could be some of the most 
fundamental socialist questions: How could possibly impeding social change be 
aided by the arts such as theatre, which is the most communal of all arts? And, if 
this is so, how could the masses be mobilised through theatre for the revolution 
of a socialist – or, indeed, communist – society? Even his interest in the Greek 
tragic theatre was a means by which he could reformulate theatre and, once again, 
regain its commun(ist) power which, for Wagner, carried one particular meaning: 
anti-conformist, anti-hegemonic, anti-subservient. His personal association with 
the famous anarchist Michael Bakunin, whom he joined in anarchist political 
activity, only further reinforces Wagner’s socialism. As Magee accounts: ‘When 
the Dresden uprising of 1848 erupts he is one of the most conspicuous figures 
among the insurgents; when it fails he is a wanted man’ (34). Indeed, the warrant 
that goes out puts Wagner next to Bakunin and other known anarchist leaders of 
the time, which are simultaneously socialist advocates. 
Offering his home for the planning of the revolution, it is around that time, 
too, that Wagner becomes familiar with the revolutionary ideas of Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity (1841) and Principles of the Philosophy 
of the Future (1843) while he engages in lengthy conversations with the political 
views of Bakunin and Proudhon who, among others, were openly socialist 
revolutionaries and well familiar with Marx’s work. Wagner does not make any 
reference to Marx, yet it is almost impossible that Bakunin would have not 
brought his name up in conversation, or at least Marx’s ideas, if not his writings, 
to Wagner. Furthermore, as Magee rightly argues, ‘some of Wagner’s prose of 
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some of his more incendiary articles had an unmistakably Marxian smack: I think 
he must have read some of Marx’s incandescent journalism and been seduced into 
imitating, if only subconsciously’ (35).  
The link of revolutionary activism with aesthetics is not hypothetical in 
Wagner, but a conscious ideological drive that fuels his creativity and his 
commitment to transforming society through the practice of art. He writes in My 
Life: ‘On the basis of the socialist theories of Proudhon and others pertaining to 
the annihilation of the power of capital by direct productive labour, he [Röckel] 
constructed a whole new moral order of things to which, by some of his more 
attractive assertions, he little by little converted me, to the point where I began to 
rebuild upon it my hopes for the realization of my artistic ideals’ (my emphasis, 
373). These are ideals that are not only concerned with aesthetics, but specifically 
derive their artistic aspiration from a socio-political socialist context: ‘[these 
ideas] led me to further reflections of my own, and I took pleasure in developing 
conceptions of a possible form of human society which would correspond wholly, 
and indeed solely, to my highest artistic ideals’ (ibid.).  
Wagner saw a kindred spirit in Bakunin. ‘My relationships,’ Wagner 
confesses, ‘fluctuated between instinctive horror and irresistible attraction.’ For 
Magee, ‘Bakunin’s mad and infantile wish to destroy everything and everybody 
corresponds to something deeper in Wagner’ (41-42). Wagner himself was 
writings articles at the time whose message was equally clear: his call for a 
sweeping away of everything is a powerful image in his aesthetic-political 
writings. And yet, his openly anti-Semitic ideas, which have often been exploited 
by ideological and propagandistic gains, have greatly distorted Wagner’s 
anarchist image. Moreover, the accusation that claims Wagner as a ‘bourgeois 
liberal revolutionary’ (Magee 41) is little supported once placed against his 
anarchist activity and writings. His political views were hardly liberal, yet he 
persistently repudiated reform and advocated revolution, often sounding like 
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Rosa Luxemburg. He also described his opinions as socialist and even, 
sometimes, as communist.  He published pamphlets and newspaper articles about 
these ideas, participated in the editing of a revolutionary socialist journal 
Volksblätter, and he made speeches with clearly socialist doctrines. Wagner 
wrote in Annals during the autumn of 1849: ‘Break now decided. – Solitude: 
communist ideas on fashioning of mankind of the future in a way conducive to 
art’ (quoted in Magee 42). When the upheaval final occurred in 1849, Wagner 
would naturally fight on the barricades. 
In his article ‘The Social Politics of Musical Redemption,’ Frank Trommler 
observes that ‘the broad success of Wagner’s writings on the revolutionary 
aspects of art and culture was helped by the fact that the socialist movement – or, 
more precisely, socialist organisations with Marxist leanings, i.e., the German 
Social Democratic Party – did not produce or encourage programmatic texts on 
socialism in the arts’ (120). However, when Wagner’s articles, most prominently 
his ‘Art and Revolution’, were reprinted in the workers’ papers in the 1870s, they 
were followed, as Trommler observes, with ‘critical reviews and warnings 
regarding his operas’ (120). The main thesis in ‘Art and Revolution’ was on a 
revolution inspired by art in which a communal spectator alongside the artist of 
the future would overcome the alienating effects of commercialism, and under 
the model of classical Greece, would lead people (Volk) to experience the 
communal life of free human beings:  
 
This is art, as it now fills the entire civilised world! Its true essence is 
industry; its moral goal, the acquisition of money, its aesthetic claim, the 
entertainment of the bored. [....] It is for art above all to teach this social 
impulse its noble meaning and guide it towards its true direction. Only on 
the shoulders of this great social movement can true art lift itself from its 
present state of barbarism... (Wagner 42)  
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The prerogative of an artist who envisages an all-encompassing communion with 
the people is a powerful image. It positions Wagner as a socialist as much as a 
maverick artist of a tangible future. In ‘The Art-Work of the Future’, he outlines 
the conceptual basis of his premise arguing for the liberation of humanity from 
the oppressive and alienating forces of existing bourgeois culture. Drawing on 
the socialist call for ‘co-operation’, Wagner translates it into what he perceives to 
be the art of the future; a union of dance, poetry and music, by which it would be 
possible to produce a total-artwork that he calls Gesamtkunstwerk by the means 
of rhythm, harmony and melody. For Wagner, this was a true social revolution 
made possible by art which, in the form of theatre, would also put into action the 
formation of a classless community of spectators and actors. This position is 
further explored in his much longer and ambitious Opera and Drama in which 
Wagner examines the conjunction between aesthetics and politics from the 
crucial function of myth as an inexhaustible source of truth. He proposes myth as 
a possible opening to one’s consciousness when it is combined with music. What 
this again indicates is a consistent interest in dialectically relating arts in ways 
that express theatre as a mode of affectivity by which Wagner highlights the 
possibility of a politics of the common through theatre. 
Seen in this light, it comes as little surprise that Wagner’s notion of 
‘communal feeling’ and his insistence on the democratisation of art were often 
employed by young Social Democrats known as Die Jungen in support of the 
social struggle. Similarly, the Naturalist Socialist writer Bruno Wille frequently 
quoted Wagner’s revolutionary theses when speaking about ‘the great social 
movement’ (in Tommler 122)of the arts. As Trommler observes, ‘evidently 
Wagner, the revolutionary writer, served a peculiar function within the orbit of 
the German socialist party’ (ibid.), inflaming contradictory views as much as 
influence. Even if Marx himself did not seem to be any near accepting Wagner’s 
socialist leaning, popular party leaders such as August Bebel and, later, the 
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prominent female leader in the SDP, Clara Zetkin, would frequently acknowledge 
Wagner’s socialist radicalism, considering his writings as artistic visions which 
the proletariat could use in its struggle: ‘Wagner’ had turned into an insight, 
Zetkin announced in her speech at the Fifth Congress of the Communist 
International, the fact that ‘the strength of the revolution goes before the beauty 
of art and is its pioneer’ (‘Die Intellektuellenfrage’ 3:55). Wagner’s proposition 
of the social and aesthetic liberation of the proletariat through revolution was 
elevating operatic art, which had reconceptualised as Gesamtkunstwerk into a 
critique of capitalist commercialism and a solution to its problem through the 
ability of the total artwork to form a socialist society.  
After all, the aesthetic equivalent of Wagner’s writings for social renewal 
was his Gesamtkunstwerk as an anarchist expression in itself in the form of music-
drama. The idea of a total artwork was essentially aimed at removing the aria, 
frustrating the fulfillment of a fixed melody, and perpetuating process as a 
challenge to established conventions. The dramatic narratives in Wagner’s 
mythical operas were equally experienced, for Trommler, as ‘expressive 
equivalents of socialist projections’ (130). For the socialist leader Victor Adler, 
it was precisely this political quality that appeared to be fostering an ‘emotional 
community’. Not only were Wagnerian stagings proposing a sensitivity based on 
crowd dynamics that most directly addressed the people, but was bringing them 
together as a unified entity, seeking renewal and regeneration. 
Wagner’s propositions of the role of art in accomplishing the revolution 
outlined in his essays were already sensitising radical elites into ways of looking 
at the potential of theatre to inspire and materialise a more heart-felt all-
encompassing sense of socialism in relation to the more mechanical scientific 
materialism that was essentially being advocated and endorsed by Marx. At the 
centre of this difference lay the notion of synthesis that, in Hegelian terms, was a 
relational structure in which one was coaxed to arrive at a renewed sense of 
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socialist existence through reflexivity, mediation and negativity. Let’s not forget, 
too, that socialism’s main premise was the actualisation of the class struggle, 
which could only be made possible by revealing the division within society as a 
constitutive contradiction inherent within it. As an exemplary practitioner of 
synthesis, Wagner was also an exemplary socialist, conceiving the idea of his 
Gesamtkunstwerk as a revolutionary model for the synthesising energies of 
socialism by which its experience could be actualised, not only in theatre, but also 
in real life.  
It is not surprising, consequently, that the aura of the emotional intensity of 
the revolutionary will, in Wagner’s compositions, soon emerged as a principal 
aesthetic paradigm of collective creativity within the theatres of modernism. In 
fact, Wagner’s fusion of arts and politics could be said to later morph into the 
avant-garde performance activity of the early twentieth century. Wagnerian 
emotional-associative structures – or, more precisely, structures of affectivity – 
focus on audience participation as strategies of affect, announcing a new era of 
theatrical developments while placing theatre more firmly in political-ideological 
operations. Wagner, as a prototype of this modernist development, has usually 
been buried under the rigorous claims of the proto-fascist turn of history. It is, 
however, perhaps time to unbury him and unearth his revolutionary potential in 
the context of the socialist tradition of his time and the political ripples felt in 
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Chapter 5 
Unthinking Naturalism & Realism: Antagonism, Hegemony, Census 
 
The Speculative Middle of the Naturalist/Realist Director 
The characteristic relational structure of mediation, what Hegel describes by his 
term Vermittlung, does not so much denote adaptation when applied to theatre, 
but creation. For Hegel, mediation occurs speculatively by challenging two terms 
with a ‘third’; in relation to theatre, this mediating ‘third’, as we saw in the 
introduction chapter of this thesis, is always a matter of relationality. For 
example, the relation between text and performance is no longer a binary 
structure, but what precisely allows this relation – its in-betweenness – formulates 
and presents itself as mediation. It is in this manner that the mediated relation 
between text and the performance can be seen to offer itself in the experience of 
spectating as a kind of ‘sense’, or, we might say, thought, but thought that is 
actualised. In his Phenomenology, Hegel explains the idea of ‘actualisation’ as 
ways of displaying ‘what is one’s own in the element of universality, whereby it 
becomes, and should become, the affair of everyone’ (309). This is the same 
process that reveals the ‘collective’ within the ‘individual’ – that is, again, another 
Hegelian dimension of understanding a work (Jameson, Hegel Variations 67). It 
is also a fundamental mediated relation which, in the work of the director, can be 
seen as always a form of thought through which the work itself is ‘actualised’. 
This mediated relation, that is simultaneously a form of thought, denotes, as 
Boenisch rightly observes, ‘also always some kind of ‘direction’ (Directing 
Senses and Scene 21-8). The workings of thought, then – and a specific mode of 
thought at that – as argued so far, which is that it is embodied and speculative, 
could be read as a concern with portraying the sensuous. In the Naturalist and 
Realist theatre, such a portrayal concerns the object of truth and the appearance 
of truth, which then is what necessitate ‘direction’, not only as a demand for a 
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scientific kind of attention to detail, but as a prerequisite for thinking and acting 
naturally to the point that ‘nature’ begins to even reconfigure the artificiality of 
the medium of theatre. The wholly theatrical paradigm shift, from stylised 
representation (the actor’s manager’s tradition) to Naturalist ‘actualisation’ (the 
director’s theatre) that the medium of theatre undergoes and has often been read 
as a shift in response to the wider spread developments in science during the final 
decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, science’s capacity to reducing more 
and more of existence to a deterministic explanation promises to provide ‘truth’ 
to human existence. However,  it does so in a way that also causes theatre to 
reconfigure human creativity. Creativity as a human act and, particularly the 
aesthetic act of creation, is now considered to be linked to a wider purpose in 
nature, no longer being a matter of representation, but of creative interpretation 
of the highest stakes. It is what turns theatre into a conflictual topos of meaning 
in which reality itself is a matter of aesthetic interpretation. Yet, it is an 
interpretation that stands for mediation, not only because all experience is 
mediated, but because its sensuous dimension, if that is the only one that matters 
in existence and the world, is already an embodied mode of knowledge that the 
mediated subjectivity of the director as a form of knowledge epitomises. 
For Boenisch, the process of mediation has to do with the underlying 
relations established for presenting, performing and spectating. ‘Directing, 
performing and spectating (yet another “magic” theatral triangle),’ he argues, ‘are 
thus structurally complementing activities that mutually presuppose each other 
without a clear hierarchy or privilege awarded to one or the other’ (22). As a 
separate artist of the theatre, this process of mediation, from text to performance 
and from music to score, as we saw in the previous chapter with the case of 
Wagner, releases theatrical experience from the representation of consciousness 
of the subject to what consciousness itself does. It is the same process that invests 
aesthetic material with meaning, allowing theatre to be seen as a mode of thought 
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that does its own thinking. The director, in this sense, acquires, not the status of 
the creator, but what creates in theatre, that is an act equivalent to what thinks in 
theatre, and what allows theatre to think. It is a relation already political that 
evokes Rose’s understanding of mediation as always situated between self-
struggling and the nature of struggling itself. For Armstrong, it is an agonistic 
relation that entails ‘not a representation of the subject but the subject of 
representation, which is not a self, or an object, or a thematics, but the structuring 
movement of thought and feeling’ (The Radical Aesthetic 17). A third term is 
needed to not only express this new relation, but to enact it as a new mode of 
reality itself. We have seen earlier how this relationality is expressed in Wagner 
as a constitutive moment of dialectical thought out of which Wagner himself 
emerges as a speculative type of philosopher. What I want to explore in this 
chapter is the mediation of the Naturalist/Realist director in the aesthetic material 
themselves as a work of mediation (rather than representation) in order to 
understand and interpret the mundane reality of the world by thought and feeling. 
Through this new process, the Naturalist and Realist stage, I argue, define not 
what ‘self’ and ‘other’ is, but what negotiates their new possibilities as actual 
reality or a reality that could be. 
For Rancière, the radical gesture of Naturalism is integrally intertwined 
with the mediating act of shaping that it introduces as the ‘silent speech’ of things 
(The Future of the Image, ch.1). It is why, I think, the banality of objects on the 
Naturalist theatre is not excess or superfluous, but the result of placing, 
positioning and implicitly displacing things. Partly due to the influences from the 
newly emergent visual technologies of photography, which later gives way to the 
moving image in film, and partly due to advents in biology and science, theatrical 
Naturalism inaugurates objective reality as a mode of pure ‘appearing’ in the 
Hegelian phenomenological sense that later is rearticulated by Heidegger as a 
technology of appearing, understood as a transformative medium of what 
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constitutes as reality. That ‘technology’, and not Naturalism as a stylistic trend, 
is what simultaneously inaugurates the birth of the director in the Naturalist 
theatre. Indeed, for Hegel:  
 
The artist does not intend to give us through his work an idea of the object 
he presents us with. We have already the fullest idea of grapes, flowers, 
stags, trees, sandy beaches, of the sea, the sun, the sky, the décor and 
ornaments of the instruments of daily life: of these, there are enough in 
nature itself. Yet, what is meant to attract us is not the content and its reality, 
but the pure appearing which is without interest in regards to the object. 
What is isolated in Beauty is appearance as such, and art is now understood 
as mastery in representing all secrets of this self-absorbed appearing of 
external appearances. (Ästhetik 562). 
But it is Heidegger’s notion of ‘appearing’ or ‘making appearance’ that functions 
as a mode of ‘revealing’. That is, singular subjects could transform their own 
capacities and relations to the world because ‘appearing’ involves the structuring, 
ordering, and ‘requisitioning’ of everything around us and of ourselves that 
essentially renders it a technology. This Heideggerian technology informs the 
mediating subjectivity of the director most visibly in the Naturalist theatre. First, 
in the manner that Rancière’s notion of the ‘obstinate silence’ conceives 
Naturalism as a primarily aesthetic gesture that forces a Heideggerian ‘appearing’ 
on the late-nineteenth century stage. And, second, as simultaneously confirming 
the Naturalist/Realist director as a special form of aesthetic mediation that is itself 
a form of ‘appearing’. The distinctive feature of the Naturalist theatre that, in 
many ways, formally heralds the introduction of the director in the modernist 
theatre, is further evoked in Barthes’ reading of the Naturalist ‘silent moment’ as 
being ‘what touches the spectator’ (Camera Lucida 35). It is why its ‘appearing 
as such’ which, in Naturalism, always conveys realist authenticity, fosters a mode 
of ‘being’ (rather than ‘doing’) that Rancière reads as a ‘form of sensory 
apprehension’ (Aesthetic and its Discontent 29): ‘This is what “aesthetics” mean: 
in the aesthetic regime of art, the property of being art is no longer given by the 
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criteria of technical perfection but is ascribed to a specific form of sensory 
apprehension’ (ibid.). 
In Boenisch’s reading, however, the director’s mediation is not just about 
the (Naturalist) means of presentation – that is the ‘doing’ – but denotes the very 
site of the aesthetic (26). ‘In a paradigmatically dialectic way,’ he argues, 
following Rancière’s thinking, ‘art was at once identified and (re)defined as 
aesthetic – as a specific and different kind of experience, as an essentially 
autonomous partition of the sensible’ (ibid.). I share this proposition, but would 
go a step further, arguing in this chapter that the great achievement of the 
Naturalist director is precisely by offering the aesthetic in Naturalist 
representation as an immensely mediated form of knowledge, which rethinks, not 
only reality, but what defines ‘knowing’ itself. The director, as such a mode 
embedded in the aesthetic material, itself posits an antagonistic relationship to 
philosophy that is most acutely experienced as a form of politics of 
representation. This can be seen by the way this theatre attempts to bring together 
the various, separate, fragmented aspects of an increasingly alienated society 
(when industrialisation was tightening its grip towards the turn of the nineteenth 
century) by which the Naturalist detail in verisimilitude attempts to ‘think over’ 
nature itself. The appearance and identity of the director in this context does not 
mark a theatrical development in the organisational structure of this theatre, but 
a deeply sociopolitical phenomenon that receives a philosophical expression in 
the figure of the director – an expression of speculative philosophy that attempts 
to mediate the various sociopolitical and technologies contingencies and 
upheavals of industrial capitalism while thinking theatre as a form of thought. 
Mediation, as Armstrong insists, has thought for its content (69) ‘…not as a 
thinking about, but a kind of going beyond itself which includes itself and object. 
…It is more like a reworking’ (69).  
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Such a ‘reworking’ as the guiding principle of mediation is already in 
operation as seen in one of the earliest directors in historical Naturalism : Duke 
Georg II of Saxe-Meiningen. While his theatrical exhibits of historical Realism 
were exceptional in staging Shakespearean tragedies, it is the significance of the 
practices he introduced that made such historical accurate portrayals possible in 
the first place. For example, getting rid of the stock characters, which was the 
common acting system, and bringing in actors that impersonated fictional 
characters carefully developed in long rehearsals was a marked shift in the 
practice of the time. It was also effecting a fundamental shift in the scenic 
conception of the stage, which was now furnishing accurately historical scenery 
and costumes. Soon there was a need to even consult the original playscript rather 
than rely on the usual contemporary adaptations, all of which were innovative 
and found passionate followers from all aspiring Naturalist directors, from 
Konstantin Stanislavsky, André Antoine, to Otto Braham, and Max Reinhardt. 
However, the deeper meaning of conjuring atmospheric illusions heightened by 
a real historicist fascination was to present the past in an attempt to come to terms 
with the present. In other words, by performing the tensions to borrow from 
Taxidou, ‘between the desire for verisimilitude and the ontological inevitability 
of illusion and theatricality, (Modernism and Performance 47-48) the Naturalist 
(and Realist) directors articulate the stage antagonistically with a reality that had 
formed the ‘present’. It is, therefore, not so much an obsession with the accurate 
portrayal of the historical past but a profound desire to rethink, unthink, and think 
over the present. It is a tension that, I argue, defines the Naturalist/Realist director 
as the birthmark of this artist articulated on the interstices between the portrayal 
of life as is and a speculative commentary of what could be. 
The celebrated historical Realism of the Meininger and the desire for 
sublime authenticity of the Naturalist/Realist stage speculatively negotiate the 
rupture between the past and present. The obsession with accuracy, with copying 
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reality, and highlighting authentic feeling is also what allows speculative thought 
to form at precisely that rupture. Or, to use Rose’s term, ‘diremption’ between 
what is lost and disconnected in the present. It is how, too, we confront in 
Naturalism, theatre’s attempt to mend and negotiate a ‘broken middle’ which is 
an attempt specifically agonistic in intent, as I argue in the next section. Rather 
than reflecting a nostalgia with a reality from an old past, or a visual fixation with 
replicating the social life in the present, its speculative mediation asserts the very 
possibility of negotiating the actuality of social and political conditions. By direct 
replication of the present or direct access to the past, the specifically aesthetic 
experience that is triggered speculatively negotiates this diremptive middle. What 
this means for the new figure of the director is that the Naturalist/Realist stage 
carved out a new space for speculative negotiation inextricably linked with the 
aporetic journey towards recognition of actuality. In theatrical terms, this takes 
place in the gap that has opened up, between the dramatic text and its performance 
on stage. It is in this respect that the Naturalist/Realist director is proposed in my 
reading as a forum and a locus of speculative thinking. This director creatively 
negotiates and transforms reality at the point of theatre’s broken middle, the gap 
of which reveals antagonisms integral to the mediation that produced it.  
 
Negotiating Reality 
To grasp the radically transformative possibilities of the Naturalist stage, my 
analysis moves beyond the commonly held view of reading the director as an 
extension of the Naturalist project in theatre. Rather, I direct my attention to 
exploring the director as a form of mediation that turns thought into experience. 
Hegel believed that thought entered the world as experience while actuality was 
its content (para. 6. 30). In terms of theatre, as I discussed earlier with regard to 
Wagner, the director’s mediation posits theatricality as a mode of knowing 
through which the director reaches out and reworks both the ‘natural’ in the 
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medium of theatre. The director as a speculative modality embodies what Hegel 
discusses when he refers to subjectivity as ‘what thinks’ rather than an ‘I’ that 
thinks. The idea here is that the experience of an activity of thought already 
implies a form of play in the way perhaps Schiller claims by pointing to the 
concept of play, itself rooted in a Kantian terminology; ‘play’ as an affect which, 
in theatre, is thinking about thought in the act and experience of play – that is, in 
the case the Naturalists directors, to think, to borrow from Williams, by ‘structure 
of feeling’, by which identity (e.g. spectator, actor, etc.) and the ‘other’ (e.g. 
citizen, character, etc.) is delineated and negotiated right at the aesthetic material 
themselves as representation, repetition and negations of reality at once. What 
takes shape in these theatres, then, is not the creation of a particular subject, but 
a process of mediation which, like thought itself, appears to be transitive and 
interactive, giving way to new possibilities. Mediation, by disallowing, as Isobel 
Armstrong observes, the domination of an ‘I’, employs a process of relating that 
is about ‘a constant negotiation of an in-betweenness. Self and other are then co-
ordinates rather than fixed entities in the process of mediation’ (60), even if an 
act of mediation defines a process that ‘does not necessarily require a negotiation 
between self and world at all’ (60). This point of negotiation is the director in my 
reading. It is a form of knowing in the Hegelian sense and yet a ‘broken middle’ 
in the way Rose proposes Hegelian mediation. It is why I conceive the mediation 
of the Naturalist and Realist director as both antagonistic and antinomic. While it 
allows thought to take the shape as expressions of social change in social dramas, 
they are simultaneous antagonistic expressions that reconfigure the spectator’s 
experience, the actor and the role of theatre, into what I see as creating an ever-
new present. In this sense, the director occupies a Rosen space that revisions 
reality in the experience of theatre as thought. The placement of the director in 
the Naturalist theatre as a negotiator of the ‘natural’ appearance of these realities 
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is what transforms the material that this figure thinks with, attempting to grasp 
those points of aporia that can, or could, bring things into a changed relationship.  
It is why Zola’s famous essay ‘Le Naturalism au théâtre’ was seen to 
exercise substantial influence to young theatre enthusiasts, enthusiasts that were 
hoping for reforms, such as Antoine and Strindberg. Their deeper motivation was 
that kind of experimentation that is firmly political. As Jean Chothia observes: ‘A 
claim to moral regeneration and to a moral clear-sighted patriotism than that 
which characterized the vested interests of the established theatre was implicit in 
Zola’s identification of Realist drama with demands for a theatre of scale and 
simplicity, truth and conflict, comparable with that of Molière and Racine’ (3). It 
is with this in mind that Antoine decides to announce his new role as a director 
in missionary terms, intending to bring about nothing less than (the director’s) 
revolution:  
The battle already won in the novel by the naturalists, in painting by the 
impressionists and in music by the Wagnerians was going to be carried into 
the theatre… Here then the field of battle, the occupiers of the place to be 
won, the troups ready for a possible assault; but who would coordinate so 
many scattered elements? Who would give the signal? Quite simply, 
chance. Without being the least aware of it, I was to become the animator 
of forces which I did not even suspect. (quoted in Chothia 3) 
Naturalist directors such as Antoine, and Aurélien Lugné-Poë before he moved 
onto Symbolism, have often been cited as the first directors that introduced an 
entire new concept of spectatorship as well as acting. Through the figure of the 
Naturalist director, the art of the actor and spectator are most distinctively 
redefined. In Antoine’s Théâtre Libre, acting becomes ‘psychological, 
expressive, heavily inflected by the emerging discourses of psychoanalysis and 
theories of the environment’ (Taxidou, Modernism and Performance 51), while 
the audience is trained in attending these performances as a silent, critical 
observant at the other end of the fourth wall. Another apt example is the Russian 
director Konstantin Stanislavsky. On his stage, the internal, psychological 
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approach to acting receives central focus in ways that, as Robert Leach argues, 
such highly psychologically charged dramatic representations tend to rework and 
recreate reality. Drawing on Chekhov, Leach explains that it ‘is experience, not 
an interpretation of experience, which Chekhov provides. This is essentially not 
static, not conservative, but dynamic. It works in both the head and the heart’ 
(Stanislavski and Meyerhold 41-2). To this, I would further add that as an 
extension of life, Naturalism, as we shall see below, enacts a fundamental 
antagonism to that life that it stages, opening up new possibilities – or, to use 
Laclau and Mouffe’s term, ‘discourses’, that are ‘articulated. However, this 
essentially dissensual feature of Naturalism generates a tension so central to this 
movement that it has often effaced its subversive radicalism. It is also why the 
director comes to occupy such a central space in the Naturalist/Realist project. 
Not only does the critical potential of the Naturalist stage demand a mediating 
figure that can enable the staging of a realty as real as actuality itself, but it is 
infinitely illusionist reality – that is to say, ‘unreal’. A better way of putting it 
would be the creation of the ‘appearance of the real’ that is always, by nature, 
antagonistic.   
Naturalism’s and Realism’s re-enactment of ‘real’ life, commonly 
known by the doctrine of the ‘slice of life’, presented reality on stage, not only 
in an effort to repeat or authenticate, but to replace it. This is why, I think, as I 
argue in the next part of this chapter, the Naturalist project is a fundamentally 
antagonistic project – it seeks to not just present or represent reality, but to 
negate it through the very Naturalist fabric of presentation – that is, historical 
accuracy, truthful appearance, verisimilitude, natural acting, etc. As we shall 
see, the function of such an aesthetic is as much coercive as it is dissensual. 
Here lies, I argue, the great antinomy of the Naturalist/Realist aesthetic. This 
antinomy I explore in the aesthetic material itself in which I locate the mediating 
subjectivity of the Naturalist/Realist director, not so much genealogically, but 
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phenomenologically, as an aesthetic mode that thinks speculatively and thinks 
antagonistically. On this premise, I examine the crucial link that helps articulate 
the Naturalist and Realist theatres as discourses. These discourses, I should 
further add, are indistinguishable from the speculative mode of these social 
theatres of ideas: the director.  
The following discussion examines the kind of thought developed in 
theatre by the Naturalist and Realist director through an examination that is 
primarily focused on dramatic texts staged by these directors. The emergence 
of the director has often been associated with the historical emergence of the 
Naturalist/Realist theatre but there is still much to be gained from an analysis 
that approaches the director, not historically, but conceptually; as a mode of 
thought in the aesthetic expressions of these theatres which I conceive as 
expressions of the director’s artistic subjectivity. My emphasis therefore is not 
on the directorial practice in the performance space as such, but on the kind of 
‘thinking’ that permeates the materials themselves in which I explore the 
subjectivity of the director as a modality of thought. Indeed, what I am 
suggesting is to look at the aesthetic works themselves as representations of the 
director’s mediating subjectivity which allows us to discern, in this way, certain 
features of the director as a type of a philosopher. This choice requires an 
investigation, not so much of the practical aspects of directing Naturalist/Realist 
plays on stage, but the kind of thinking that is invested in the relation between 
‘being’ and ‘appearing’ which I propose it describes the Naturalist/Realist 
director as an embodied mode of speculative thought.  
          In this way, what follows develops a non-anthropomorphic reading of 
directing discussed as a form of thought and understood to be implicated with the 
sensory realm of the Naturalism/Realist aesthetic. The director, in this particular 
sense, functions as a modality of thought within the aesthetic works that I 
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examine. I realise that this choice comes with an emphasis on dramatic texts used 
by the Naturalist/Realist directors and has a focus on philosophical perspectives 
and theories, rather than directing as a practice. Although there are numerous 
references to staged performances by directors, the questions I ask are different: 
what constitutes the art of directing as philosophy; what transforms the theatrical 
subjectivity of the spectator; and what kind of aesthetic materials demonstrate the 
director as a speculative figure. As I hope to show, by examining the director 
within the aesthetic configuration of the Naturalist/Realist theatre, we can also 
distinguish the theatrical constitution of the director as a philosophical figure. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE 
In the following published section, I engage with this interface in strictly political 
terms, attempting to decipher the inherent politicality of the Naturalist theatre in 
ways that rehabilitate its aesthetic as antagonistic articulations, while affirming 
its inherent coerciveness in the aesthetics of the Naturalist and Realist theatres. I 
thus explore Naturalism and Realism in relation to the power of theatre as a new 
technology in hegemonic politics that is also always an expression of antagonistic 
discourses in these theatres. In this light, I pursue a critical analysis of the 
Naturalist and Realist theatre as a political expression that conveys, not so much 
the ability of theatre to act politically, which is nothing new in the history of 
theatre, but the very new function of theatrical representation as articulation of 
new antagonistic discourses, while simultaneously operating affirmatively – that 
is coercively – within the broader context of hegemonic politics. Affirmation 
works, I argue, as a form of theatrical illusion that allows us to access the critical 
potential of the Naturalist and Realist aesthetics. It is also a political practice that, 
in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s political thinking, designates the practice 
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of ‘articulation’ – in the sense of ‘putting something together’ so that this 
‘something’ takes a performative function and, as such, acquires an aesthetic 
value. My following examination rehabilitates the commonly held assumption of 
Naturalist and Realist theatre as an expression of liberal bourgeois hegemonic 
politics, to what I perceive to be a site of struggle over articulation. I argue that 
affirmation is intrinsically incorporated in the project of Naturalism/Realism 
which, in turn, I read as part of the modernist project of radical politics receiving 
its climax, as it will be argued in the next chapter, with the advent of the avant-
grade and the manifesto art. However, its ideological underpinnings and socio-
political applications have long been underappreciated and often misinformed as 
to what precisely affirmation signposts in the aesthetic terrain of this theatre, and 
how it can be read as another expression of the director’s mediating subjectivity. 
In the first part of the article, I follow the development in the articulation of 
the Naturalist and Realist aesthetics, which I then subsequently trace and test in 
theories of articulation and antagonism offered by Laclau and Mouffe. While the 
Marxist materialist tradition problematises the aesthetic in its broader sense as an 
expression of (liberal) ideology, I turn to the corrective offered by Laclau and 
Mouffe’s concept of ‘discourse’. Understanding the aesthetic practices of 
Naturalism and Realism as ‘discourse’ already rehabilitates the director’s status 
of the creative tyrant, since discourse is a practice entirely associated with 
rhetorical practices – one of which is affirmation. My hypothesis is that, if it is 
discourse that defines antagonistic perspectives in the theatres of Naturalism and 
Realism, then affirmation is both central to understanding this theatrical project 
and the way by which the director operates as an aesthetic modality within the 
conceptual and sociopolitical frameworks that necessitate this theatre in the first 
place. The second part provides a critical reassessment of the antinomic function 
of affirmation on the Naturalist and Realist stage; that is, as coercion, on the one 
hand, and as a radically antagonistic practice, on the other. I further locate this 
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antinomy in the very aesthetic fabric of the Naturalist and Realist project, which 
is always fraught with difficulty and ambiguity. It is why, in my reading, 
affirmation is rooted in antinomy which, in terms of theatre, is just another key 
expression of the Naturalist or Realist director. I highlight this dimension in the 
final section on ‘Socialist Realism’ in which affirmation and its antinomies 
acquire a further layer; from the predominately representational politics of a 
fictional reality, to the deeply transformative politics of reality itself, through 
theatre. Social Realism most vividly illustrates the political potential of the 
Realist aesthetics. It paints the illusion of reality, not only as a new technology of 
power, but as the radical process of forcing a new reality into being.  
 
 
CONCLUSION TO THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE 
To explore the essential antinomy rooted in the affirmative practice in relation to 
the aesthetic genres of Naturalist and Realist theatre, my aim was to look at how 
the genres’ critical potential interacts with political hegemony. I outlined, in this 
way, some of their aesthetic features of this fundamentally directorial project in 
relation to politics. By drawing on Raymond Williams' definition of Naturalism 
and Realism, which he considers as highly variable and inherently complex 
aesthetic terms of reference, I argued that, whilst the Naturalist and Realist 
aesthetic is stylistically interrelated, the highly significant feature that 
fundamentally binds them both together is the way that these movements operate 
in the space of real hegemonic politics. It is also what helps us understand the 
politically informed mediating subjectivity of the figure of the director, later to 
be more forcefully expressed in the avant-garde experimentation with form, 
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particularly with the political art of the manifesto, before it was finally articulated 
as the political theatre of Brecht theorised as the ‘Epic’ theatre.  
From this conceptual basis, which I premised on the antagonist discourse 
as developed by Laclau and Mouffe, I explore two interrelated ideas. First, the 
conceptual structure of hegemony, understood as a condition in which complex 
and unpredictable sets of power relationships are stabilised temporarily, is found 
at the making of most Naturalist and Realist drama. Second, the representational 
constitution that binds illusionist aesthetics of reality with the course of 
hegemonic politics, is further revealed by closely inspecting Realist and 
Naturalist theatre as material expressions of socio-political and economic 
discourses. This process displays, I argued, an antagonistic articulation in the 
sense of ‘putting something together’, as Laclau and Mouffe maintain. However, 
the struggle to fix meaning and define reality temporarily is also, I think, what 
brings affirmation to effectively occupy so much a coercive space as an 
antagonistic one. This paradoxical process, I concluded, is at the centre of the 
antinomy of the affirmative in the aesthetic genres of Realist and Naturalist 
representation. 
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the most explicit form of the director as 
a mode of thought in theatre that I locate in the form and practice of the avant-
garde manifesto. I am specifically interested in the ways by which the manifesto 
art interacts with real politics and how this activity can allow us to think of the 














The Director’s Meta-Language: Avant-Garde Manifesto  
 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot derive its poetry 
from the past, but only from the future.  
 
– Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 80  
 
 
Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians 
have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.  
WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE! 
 
Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 69 
 
 
Respected citizens of Zurich, students, artisans, workers, vagabonds, 
drifters of all counties, unite! 




Between Theatre and Revolutionary Poiesis 
The demand for finding a language adequate for the revolutionary hour of the 
early twentieth century history could not be more urgent than the political and, 
for that matter, performative efficacy that characterises the genre of the 
manifesto. At first sight, its power to call change into action might seem to draw 
on language’s inherent performativity as speech acts. For J. L. Austin, speech acts 
are singularly invested in doing things with words, of making announcements and 
naming things that are to come into existence. However, as he points out, the 
	  
	   181	  
manifesto’s self-authorising language renders the concept of authority impossible 
once this involves the suspension of disbelief. For, whereas the manifestoing 
language can be seen to project authentic political agency as an openly ‘agonistic’ 
expression, the enacted, performative expression of the word simultaneously 
problematises the type of agency projected by the text. For Puchner, the 
manifesto’s ambiguity has much to do with the combination of ‘performative 
intervention and theatrical posing’ (Poetry of the Revolution18). As he argues, its 
specific performativity stakes everything on an ‘authority it does not yet possess’, 
because ‘speech acts of the Manifesto… are launched in the anterior future’ (24). 
The manifesto’s ability to harvest the future in order to shape the present is 
similarly acknowledged by Badiou. He writes in his book The Century that it is 
the imperative of the act that makes futurity in the manifesto a matter of ‘finality, 
of prospective conditions, of a promise’ (137) – perhaps what could be called, a 
poiesis. It surfaces in its programmatic element (its futurity) and engages in a type 
of thought as an act of making (its promise or finality). 
Marx and Engels were the first to invent the manifesto in its modern form. 
When they composed the Communist Manifesto in 1848, they had in mind the 
revolution of modernity which, for them, was the uprising of the proletariat. The 
manifesto’s power to endow words with a kind of a revolutionary poiesis was 
further an effort immersed in Feuerbach’s calling for philosophers; that is, to not 
simply ‘think’ about the world, but to actively seek to change it. It is why its form 
was seen to be torn between doing away with the past and ushering in the future. 
Indeed, Marx and Engel’s Manifesto ‘seeks to produce,’ as Puchner observes, 
‘the arrival of the “modern revolution” through an act of self-foundation and self-
creation: we, standing here and now, must act! (The Poetry of the Revolution 2). 
It was not too long before such a thought-turned-action format would claim one 
of its most powerful expressions in the engaged art of the avant-garde theatre. 
Once cast at the meeting point of a creative endeavour, the manifesto not only 
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reposed the word theatrically, but seemed to now actively intervene and reshape 
theatre and the world as a whole. In his seminal Theory of the Avant-Garde, Peter 
Bürger discusses the social significance of the avant-garde by highlighting its 
integration with life-praxis. Contrary to Benjamin’s ‘aestheticisation thesis’, by 
which he condemns the avant-garde’s political efficacy for blending art and 
politics, Bürger reads the process of the aestheticisation of real-life praxis as a 
mechanism of reclaiming the social function of theatre, shifting attention to how 
theatre art functions in society (49).  
In performing, then, what could be thought of as revolutionary poiesis, the 
manifesto not only exemplifies the deep tensions that prescribe the avant-garde 
project, replacing its theatricality with the form of the manifesto. Rather, I think, 
it urges mediation between the startling junctures of thought and action, politics 
and philosophy, past and future, historiography and intervention. ‘Presenting an 
enacted form of the word’ (Modernism and Performance 4), argues Taxidou, the 
form of the manifesto acts out ‘the difficult relationship between theatre and 
philosophy’ which, in this chapter, I read as an articulation as a meta-language of 
the director. It is a meta-language because it is capable of articulating philosophy 
not only in the medium of of theatre, but specifically by forming hypotheses that 
have been hitherto unarticulated. It stems from the manifesto’s sense of futurity 
which, in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s political theory, is deemed instrumental for, and 
most indicative of, any class struggle in the process towards emancipation 
(Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 151). In a similar manner, the theatrical form 
of the manifesto not only turns thought into action, but it simultaneously summons 
this action into a form of performative philosophy. The manifesto, more than any 
other form of the avant-garde theatre, allows us to grasp this intricate dimension 
as another expression of the director as a mediator between theatre and 
philosophy that I have been discussing in this thesis.  
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In this chapter, therefore, I explore the avant-garde manifesto as a kind of 
meta-language that negotiates philosophical thought and performativity while it 
simultaneously articulates the hybrid composition of the director as a theatre artist 
of philosophy, or if you like, a performative philosopher. Indeed, as I argue, the 
significance of the avant-garde manifesto is in its capacity to perform a type of 
enacted philosophy by simultaneously theatricalising the word and remodeling 
theatricality as a mode of thought. 
        What I examine here, I should further clarify, is specifically the aesthetic 
form and literary genre of the art manifesto which I perceive to open up the 
possibility of a philosophical practice in theatre as a meta-language of the 
director-philosopher. As such, my examination is focused on the director’s shift 
of theatrical representation into a more direct ‘thinking about’ the world with the 
aim of performing thought capable of integrating with real-life praxis and 
transforming theatre and the world as a whole. This choice limits the scope of my 
examination to analysing directing in relation to written manifestos rather than 
the wide range of avant-garde theatrical practice. This is because, as explained 
elsewhere, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the critical interface between 
directing and philosophy and less what takes place in directing theatrical works. 
 
 
Inhumanity and the Futurist Manifesto 
          It is not surprising that the signal for the kind of manifestoing activity 
that would harness the power of futurity, transforming politics into a theatrical 
preoccupation, was given by a manifesto with ‘Futurism’ in its title. This was 
not surprising but what was perhaps less anticipated was the apocalyptic 
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For far too long Italy has been a marketplace for junk dealers. We want our 
country free from the endless number of museums that everywhere cover 
her like countless graveyards. Museums, graveyards! … They’re the same 
thing, really, because of their grim profusion of corpses that no one 
remembers. (in 100 Artists’ Manifestos xxii) 
 
Written by the Italian avant-gardist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, ‘The Futurist 
Manifesto’ presented itself as a kind of performed philosophy for radical change. 
Its fiercely violent language, drawing its dynamism from the emancipatory power 
of the political manifesto, was boldly announcing ‘the desire to destroy, to 
change, to create something new’ as its programme. At the same time, it was 
presented as the founding gesture for ‘the expression of an abundant force, 
pregnant with Future’ (Marinetti in Critical Writings 428).  
Now, how this aggressive celebration of action process that, for the Futurist, 
would also turn into an aesthetic doctrine of war-inspired action, is an issue that 
runs deeply in the programme of theatricalization and energises all avant-garde 
forms of expression. It is here, for example, that we encounter the idea of a ‘total 
dynamism’ in the spoken voice. And yet, it is always from a speech that must be 
‘metallised, liquefied, vegetalised, petrified, and electrified’ (‘The Futurist 
Manifesto’ 125). Its synoptic concentration of words transforms collective 
theatrical creativity into aggression, while it exposes an altogether different kind 
of theatricality that delights on the premise of a foundational revolutionary 
rupture as war violence. The shift from a warlike revolution to a revolutionary 
war – which is, indeed, remarkable in all Futurists manifestos – is also indicative 
of the subversively dehumanising character of this project. If violence is rupture 
and revolution is an enactment of change, then Marinetti’s programme of 
theatricalisation stands for the aestheticisation, not only of the glorification of 
war, but the desire to be dehumanised by it. Marinetti achieves this by making 
the inhuman (e.g. machines, mechanics, metallic, war itself) rather than the 
human as the manifesto’s main protagonist: 
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We believe that this wonderful world has been further enriched by a new 
beauty, the beauty of speed. A racing car, its bonnet decked with exhaust 
pipes like serpents with galvanic breath… a roaring motor car, which seems 
to race on like machine-gun fire, is more beautiful than the Winged Victory 
of Samothrace.  
 
We intend to glorify aggressive action, a restive wakefulness, life at the 
double, the slap and the punching fist. ... We wish to glorify war – the sole 
cleanser of the world, militarism, patriotism, the destructive act of the 
libertarian, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for women. (5) 
 
Marinetti’s misogyny needs to be understood in the wider context of the gendered 
nature of theatrical democracy within the project of modernism. In his influential 
study After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, and Postmodernism, 
Huyssen exposes the hostility that permeates ‘high’ modernist dramas in their 
relation to femininity, mass culture and everyday life. As he argues, there is 
always a divide to be found at the basic structure of the modernist and avant-
garde theatres and dramatic texts such as high modernism and mass culture, 
individual authority and mass democracy, that reflects the male / female binary. 
Avant-grade modernists such as Marinetti denigrate the feminine, mass culture 
and mass democracy in an attempt to distance themselves from the values of these 
categories. Marinetti’s ‘scorn for women’ in his Futurist’s manifesto is thus such 
a vivid example that shows, as Huyssen observes, that ‘the historical avant-garde 
was by and large as patriarchal, misogynist, and masculinist as the major trends 
of modernism.’ (55) We should also not forget that aesthetic authority was 
deemed predominately male within the project of modernism, even despite 
differing visions (such as those voiced by Virginia Woolf for example) that were 
defending a woman’s democratic right to education and cultural participation. 
(Potter 2)    
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      Nevertheless Marinetti’s call in 1909, that all young revolutionaries needed 
to assemble for a new purpose, which now was the purpose of war, not of 
revolution, was much fitting with the inhuman vision of the world. It is the same 
impulse behind his famous war stance as the ‘hygiene of the world’. At all times, 
the human body and spirit are shown as modified by their relation to war, both 
formed and deformed, by its intensely dehumanised force. While its theatricality 
fuels the depersonalised and dehumanised Futurist events of the Serate, 
Marinetti’s manifestoing activity exquisitely performs it. From throwing back 
words to tomatoes and eggs, he has the participants’ physical involvement tightly 
orchestrated, depending on the tone of the Futurist manifesto. But such a sublated 
individualism into theatricalised displays of collectivity consciously seeks to 
bring into being, in Clare Bishop’s words, ‘an active subject, one that becomes 
empowered by the experience of physical or symbolic participation’ (Artificial 
Hells 12). In effect, the prospect of ‘struggle’ becomes inevitable: ‘There is no 
longer any beauty except the struggle’ Marinetti reaffirms. ‘Any work of art that 
lacks a sense of aggression can never be a masterpiece’ (‘The Futurist Manifesto’ 
5).  
In his introduction for the collection 100 Artists Manifestos, From the 
Futurist to Stuckists, Alex Danchev links Marinetti’s hardly ‘spontaneous but 
carefully rehearsed’ (xxiii) war-inspired speech with Nietzsche’s ‘at once 
unsettling and unsparing’ writing. (ibid.). Danchev argues, Nietzsche’s ‘very 
titles send a shiver down the spine’ – Beyond Good and Evil (1886), subtitled 
‘Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future’ (xxii). Similarly, Futurism’s attachment 
to the anti-utopian, cataclysmic, aggressive theatricality as lending a visual, 
aesthetic dimension to the theoretical organ of the tradition of the revolution, 
could be understood as a ‘prelude to a philosophy of the Future theatre’. It is what 
makes the ‘the current war’ as ‘the most beautiful poem’ (‘War the Only Hygiene 
of the World’ 333 quoted in Puchner, Poetry of the Revolution 80) ), as declaimed 
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Marinetti. This is not simply because the Futurist manifesto was already 
per/forming this poem in a language of action, whose mediated nature insisted on 
thought as experience itself, but because its poetic beauty was so intoxicating as 
a result of the war, to borrow from the French philosopher activist Simone Weil, 
that it could ‘empty human lives of their reality and seems to turn people into 
puppets’ (‘Human Personality’ 72). The Futurist manifesto recognises the 
invitation of war, fascism, death, and destruction as moments of transformation 
in the experiences of reality that it needs to mediate and theatricalise as ways of 
grasping these experiences and the world at large in their inhumanity. 
Even as political values borrowed directly from Fascism’s extremism, the 
Futurist manifesto’s living, live, thoroughly experienced and embodied language 
of action poses itself as a radical mode of speculative thought by which Marinetti 
mediated actual, concrete, live experience in real life. In other words, he employs 
the inner logic of thought as mediation through which he exercises the implicit 
act of shaping experiences that he orchestrates and declaims in his manifesto as 
an already three-dimensional kind of thinking. In this way, he reconfigures 
experiences and temporalities in actuality. This is evidenced from the way 
manifestos featured on the Futurist stage, first as live declamatory performances 
of agitated thought, then as printed texts. Even when printed and published as 
texts, manifestos still acted more as actions, indeed, as sequences of a kind of 
performed thought.  
We can now begin to conceive two different notions of theatricality in the 
performative gesture of the Futurist manifestos. One implies tricks, theatrics, and 
the theatricalisation of the violent politics of fascism. The other, as Nietzsche had 
realised some time ago, presents us with the condition or mode of theatre that has 
to do less with the masking and unmasking of reality, but more fundamentally, 
with one’s capability of doing and undoing the world and our understanding of it. 
It is without a doubt that, in the first half of the twentieth century, Marinetti’s 
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larger programme of declamation and manifestation had theatricalised language 
into action to such an extent that speech had become nearly synonymous with 
action; from the cabaret to street agitation and acted-out poems, from the 
distribution of art manifestos thrown out of racing cars and airplanes to violently 
declaimed speeches, theatricality was shaping and reshaping both theatre and 
politics. Certainly, Mussolini and Hitler’s delivery of public speeches testifies to 
the performative power and real benefits of the action-like qualities of the spoken 
word. In this scheme of things, the ethos of a pervasive theatricalisation, shared 
by arts and politics, could be said to have unleashed much destruction and death. 
And yet, what is most significant in Marinetti’s manifestoing gesture is not so 
much militarism and art, which had come together to form Marinetti’s new 
theatrical rhetoric, but that, perhaps, its violent aesthetic of war also per/formed 
the prospect of un/thinking progress. Or, as it were, of both fiercely breaking with 
the past in order to permanently salute the future as a gesture of contraction – and, 
as such, of reclaiming humanity by making it ‘less human’. It is what can be seen 
to justify, I think, the centrality of the total machinery rhetoric in Futurism, both 
as a speech figure and an actual stage. For, after all, as Marinetti believed, the 
Futurist:   
 
wish to sing the praises of the man behind the steering wheel, whose sleek 
shaft traverses the Earth, which itself is hurtling at breakneck speed along 
the racetrack of its orbit. 
 
It is with this in mind that Marinetti’s manifestos could be read as intensely 
dehumanised expressions that the meta-language of the director performs. As an 
embodied mode of thought, the director’s meta-language seeks to theatricalise 
philosophy and  humanity as a whole. ‘Everything of any value’ claimed 
Marinetti, is ‘theatrical’ (The Futurist Synthetic Theatre 117).    
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Marinetti’s Meta-Language 
Marinetti’s Futurist manifesto – and, more broadly, the early phase of Futurism – 
has often been associated with what Puchner calls the ‘antitheoretical’ celebration 
of the rising fascist discourse. For him, ‘fascism’, lacking coherence or 
programme, ‘used the antitheory and pro-action rhetoric of Sorel and Marinetti to 
turn a deficiency into an asset’ (Poetry of the Revolution 85). Puchner reads its 
theatricality as a pure language of action which not only ‘pertains to a specifically 
fascist oratory’ reduced ‘to its bare bones, biting, sincere, and firm’ (86), but it 
acts as a shaper of the fascist speech itself. And yet, in holding the speech poetics 
of the Futurist manifesto as just another fascist articulation in the Italian culture 
of the early twentieth century, is to properly miss to appreciate the more 
speculative nature of Marinetti’s manifestoing activity. If manifestoing is to 
perform, then it is also an action-oriented approach that engages with aesthetic 
values of speech as performative strategies that evoke thought. It has to do less 
with exposing theatricality as representation, and more with drawing on the 
speculative sense of contact in which something is called into action through 
thought. Its ability to declare thoughts into action, therefore, functions, in this 
sense, as a mode of thinking-over. It is an effort of what Rose calls the struggle 
to comprehend actuality, a comprehension that involves the ‘risk of coming to 
know’, yet without an easy escape. As Rose explains: 
 
Not that comprehension completes or closes, but that it returns diremption 
to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in partial action – 
as long as its political history persists. The complementarity of 
comprehension to diremption involves reflection on what may be ventured 
– without mending diremption in heaven or on earth. (The Broken Middle 
39) 
 
To fully understand this theatrical dynamic, we only need to think of the way, for 
example, Marinetti employs the form of the manifesto to model a new aesthetic 
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programme. Not only does he replace the making of avant-garde artworks with 
the activity of performing manifestos, but he exposes another key side of the 
process of mediation; that, beyond the explicitly revolutionary ethos of the 
Futurist manifesto, its meta-language stages rupture between past and future, 
theory and action. That is, at the very vital point of breakdown, both of what is, 
in Rose’s sense, a diremption and a simultaneously a creation. As such, 
Marinetti’s manifestoing activity creates a speculative space for the double action 
of manifestation: as being an intellectual space of coming to know 
(comprehension), and a performative knowing about that coming to know 
(recognition) – both of which are modalities of speculative thought. This double 
movement can be most clearly felt in the way Marinetti calls attention between 
two terms:  
 
Why should we be looking back over our shoulders, if what we desire is to 
smash down the mysterious doors of the Impossible? Time and Space died 
yesterday. We are already living in the realms of the Absolute, for we have 
already created infinite, omnipotent speed. (5) 
 
Marinetti’s call for the ‘future’ order is only a means for defining itself against 
what is not, yet without necessarily specifying what it is for. ‘Poetry must be 
thought of,’ again he clarifies, ‘as a violent assault upon the forces of the unknown 
with the intention of making them prostrate themselves at the feet of the mankind’ 
(5). This ‘unknown’ is what demands to be opposed and re-cognised at once, so 
that what is familiar or well-known can be, to use Rose’s own words, ‘re-
experienced or known again (anerkannt) in order to be fully known (erkannt)’ 
(Hegel Contra Sociology 47) – and, in this way, changed into a new relation. The 
speculative thinking of the performing manifestos does exactly that. It 
restructures – or, at least, seeks to re-organise – thought as action. Then, 
opposition as cognition. Finally, but not least, futurity as present – and yet, a 
present that is still to form. Its aggressive emphasis on struggle is part of this same 
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process of speculative cognition, which the manifestoing-thinker-director 
performs by engaging with the point of breakdown in theatre’s relation with 
politics. This point entails the risk and anxiety of the middle, which give to the 
manifesto its form and content as always a demand for action.  
It is a demand, for Danchev, ‘like the face of “the other” in Emmanuel 
Levinas’s philosophy’. But, if the ‘the manifesto is a demand’ it is because ‘it 
demands something from us, and it demands it now. That something may,’ he 
argues, ‘be no more than our attention – our full attention – or it may be our 
adherence to a certain world-view, and as like as not a certain programme’ 
(xxvii). And yet, I would add, it is also a ‘demand’ that generates its own 
principles of activity, always from within the subject so that it does change 
something, first in the way one thinks, then in the experience of thought as action, 
turning words into actions. It is why Marinetti claimed Futurism ‘an artistic and 
ideological movement [that] intervenes in the political struggle only at the 
moments when the nation is in great danger’ (Manifesto of the Futurist Party in 
Italy 495). It is an intervention that demanded, too, Marinetti’s mediation in his 
role as an avant-gardist-thinker-director. We should not forget that the form of 
the manifesto was, first and foremost, associated with Marx and widely 
acknowledged as a socialist genre when Marinetti first embarked on creatively 
performing manifestos. As a political form, the manifesto, then, designated a 
socialist revolutionary space, but also a space inevitably of fracture, rather than 
just connection. It thus represented an agonistic space that highlighted the need 
for mediation to work out the differences and engage with radical oppositions. If 
mediation denotes a form of thinking, it is a ‘speculative’ mode that, for Rose, 
engages with contradiction and the anxiety of the middle. This middle, then, 
conveys aesthetic values by appropriating political forms and strategies into a 
language of theatre. It is also what simultaneously renders the avant-garde 
manifesto into a meta-language equivalent with a mode of thought. In this agon 
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of the middle, the manifesto form is, therefore, an explicit form of mediation. It 
draws attention to and works out a middle that is ‘broken’ between past and 
present, art and politics, theatre and philosophy, communism and fascism, form 
and content, speech and action. 
How would its meta-language operate for the avant-gardist director-
thinker? Quite simply, as a grammar of fundamental change, as much for the 
medium of theatre as for theatre’s relation to philosophy. Indeed, its form replaces 
philosophy with a mobile, active, dynamic, structuring and relentlessly poetic and 
theatrical type of spoken thought. Moreover, the manifesto’s aversion for the art 
of the ‘petty realist who sponged on life’, in the words of the Russian 
revolutionary Leon Trotsky, was already an aggressive attack on theatrical 
efficacy. Why would one represent anything truthfully when the ‘truth’ could not 
be seen, sealed behind an oppressive bourgeoisie morality that had one purpose: 
its class supremacy. In this sense, theatricality presents manifestoing avant-
gardists with more than a response of opposition, but a challenge to the form of 
theatre itself: first, as a spoken declamatory word that could be performed, then 
as that form of thought that could directly change the world.  
Marinetti’s manifestoing activity displaces both theatre as imitation and 
theory as philosophy. In interacting with politics, he mediates both fields, rending 
the manifesto language into a meta-language, while theatre is subsumed in what 
could be thought as a very peculiar ‘grammar’ of performing manifestos. I use 
the term ‘grammar’ in Mouffe’s term, which she develops by drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’: it denotes the ways of doing, saying and 
speaking, that account for the ‘rules’ that govern a specific context upon which 
they are also dependent. To the manifestoing theatres of Futurism, Marinetti’s 
mediation is their grammar. His meta-language demarcates the shift from theatre 
to politics, from thought to action, from possibility to inevitability, yet always as 
a move articulated in relation to grasping performance as a form of radical, 
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interventionist thought, embodied and estranged at once in the activity of 
manifestoing. 
The next section turns to what motivates and sustains the manifesto’s call 
for action. It is the same response that compels the avant-garde manifestoing 
activity to interact with real politics, turning the word into the ceaseless 
productivity of the avant-garde manifestoing theatricality. Such a calling, I claim, 
is a deeply felt emotional response. Being inseparable from action, it creates and 
commands an affective attachment – what could be claimed as the manifesto’s 
ability to enchant. 
 
Spectres of Enchantment 
Enchantment describes the mental state that commands powerful agreement, 
often as absolute submission, to ideas, emotions and actions that may carry little 
explicit logical explanation. It may, at first, seem to contradict Marx’s historical 
materialism, but the desire to one day see the proletariat taking the position of 
power is enough to even overcome its own materialist principles. Indeed, in his 
writings, Marx turns to the Epicurean idea of the ‘swerve’ (Klineste), which 
stands for the affirmation of the atom’s ‘formal determination’ or freedom. 
According to Epicurus, the atom does not always follow straight, predetermined 
lines, but occasionally swerves from its straight, downward path through the void. 
In contrast to Democritus, who applies a more deterministic view on nature, 
stating that nothing is accidental and that chance is an illusion created by the 
humans to explain our own perplexity about things, Epicurus believes in the 
freedom of the atom’s will:  
 
necessity... does not exist.... some things are accidental, others depend on 
our arbitrary will... it is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in 
necessity is not a necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to 
freedom are open.’ (‘Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean 
Philosophy of Nature’ 42-43) 
	  
	   194	  
 
The innate prospect of freedom as always being inherent in the atom’s matter is 
a very attractive idea for Marx. To start with, it implies the possibility of freedom. 
Pursuing a Hegelian reading, he translates the Epicurean idea of the atom’s 
freedom into the subject’s ‘pure individuality’ in its struggle within self-
consciousness to realise itself in the larger world. If the atomic swerve denotes, 
on a symbolic level, ‘the active self’ (Livergood ix), then it could also indicate 
that self-consciousness can only attain conscious existence by swerving. That is, 
by resisting the objective, physical world and its social forms, and by fighting 
back and refusing to toe the line. Thus, the swerve of matter that morphs the 
revolutionary subject comes to justify, for Marx, the individual’s capacity to 
overthrow unjust social forms. He sees the atom’s persistent urge for freedom 
(which Marx directly translates to human nature) to what leads the proletariat to 
develop a class consciousness for itself and what summons the revolutionary will 
for overcoming unjust political systems through social praxis.  
In giving form to the idea of the swerve, the Communist Manifesto could 
be said to employ the ‘energy’ of the ‘swerve’, which possesses the power to 
enchant. Not only does it bring up the impetus to act against the very injustices 
one might critically and consciously discern, but it forms something of an 
encounter, something, in Bennett’s words, ‘that hits us, but also a comportment 
that can be fostered through deliberate strategies’ (Bennett 4). The atom’s swerve, 
both self-determined and contingent at once, finds expression in the manifesto’s 
sense of poetic play, honing sensory receptivity to the spectrum of revolutionary 
ideas. It is why enchantment entails a state of wonder that surpasses any 
limitations of space and time, into an infinite projection of open hypotheses that 
relegate their full applicability to the future. ‘To be enchanted,’ as Bennett argues, 
‘is to participate in a momentarily immobilising encounter; it is to be transfixed, 
spellbound’ (5).  
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Such a possibility of a poetics that enchant can be further seen in 
Benjamin’s aesthetic theory. Here, it is the idea of the aura developed in the 
famous artwork essay. Aura enables us to read the manifesto as an object. 
Defining the kind of sensory space, aura becomes a matter of a deeply felt 
personal projection and appropriation for the subject. It simultaneously denotes a 
quality of experience of objects (not necessarily limited to aesthetic products of 
artistic creation), which demonstrates a semi-magic perception investing an 
object ‘with the capability of returning the gaze’ (Benjamin, Illuminations 188)– 
thus, aura for Benjamin withers in modernity. However, to encounter the 
manifesto as an auratic experience is to fundamentally restructure the spatial and 
temporal relations that envelop the subject. In other words, the aura of the 
manifesto contains the capacity for displacement, which is what triggers 
enchantment as a form of psycho-emotional action.  
Indeed, being convinced that aesthetic phenomena provide especially 
sensitive anticipations of broader perceptual and social trends, Benjamin 
perceived aura as the juncture at which connections between a broad network of 
social and historical processes could be identified. To experience something 
auratically, he explained in his essay ‘Small History of Photography’ (1931), is 
to be captivated by the ‘atmosphere’ that appears to envelop an object, a situation, 
or a moment:  
 
What is aura, actually? An extraordinary weave of space and time: the 
unique appearance of distance, however close it may be. While resting on 
a summer afternoon, to trace the crest of a mountain range against the 
horizon or a branch that casts its shadow on the beholder, until the moment 
or the hour becomes part of its appearance – that is what it means to breathe 
the aura of these mountains, this branch. (378) 
 
What emerges is the condition of intense contemplation which the subject 
experiences as a type of absorption in the object: ‘One who concentrates before a 
work of art immerses himself in it. He enters into this work of art like the 
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legendary Chinese painter as he viewed his finished painting’ (504). The aura that 
arises, therefore, from such attentiveness is also a cognitive process: ‘in thinking, 
to the intentional gaze of attentiveness as it does to a gaze in the literal sense’ 
(646). For Benjamin, then, this spell lends the object a cultic status and a 
mystifying authority (McCole 5). In the thrall of this spell, the subject begins to 
sense that the object gazes back at him/her.  
The Communist Manifesto could not be a better example in this sense. It 
immediately reveals a cultic character as a fleeting, elusive waver of space and 
time that is also what gives its form its most powerful quality; a ‘concentrated 
gaze [of identification that] involves a perceptual activity that is neither passive 
nor entirely distracted’, but an emotional intensity (Richter 103). It commands 
change by summoning a state of pure presence, an enchanted state. In The 
Enchantment of Modern Life, Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics, this sensuous 
condition is, for Bennett, dense and intense enough to ‘toss you onto new terrain 
and to move you from the actual world to its virtual possibilities’ (111). Indeed, 
the Communist Manifesto occupies a cultic space throughout the twentieth 
century. Its ability to enchant accounts for the many ferocious ideological battles 
that followed it. Its ability to cast a spell would almost disavowal Marxism’s 
materialism. But its aura seemed to have conjured much of its sorcery in the 
theatre, a sorcery blended, as we shall now see, with the poetics of failure and the 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE 
Avant-garde ‘Failure’  
 
In Bloch’s and Lukács’s aesthetic discussions of Realism and Expressionism, and 
later the aesthetic theories of Adorno and Benjamin, avant-garde performance is 
both exemplified and problematised in what Taxidou calls its ‘world building’ 
(Modernism and Performance 182)_dimension. Its fusion of arts and politics not 
only reconfigures the relationship of the political and the aesthetic, but also 
situates the experience of performance in a position that renegotiates the civic 
dynamic of the individual to the collective. This is an important shift, because it 
simultaneously redefines and reshapes the political space on an aesthetic premise 
that positions theatricality as an engaged creative expression. What that means is 
that theatre begins to claim the power to integrate itself with actual life praxis 
and, as such, to eradicate the separateness of the ‘theatrical’ with the ‘political’. 
It is the same engaged gesture that the avant-gardist-director employs to redefine 
authorship. If the stage was once regarded as a fictional, utopian space, the avant-
garde’s aspiration to theatricalising real life and, particularly, the highly political 
life of the early twentieth century, justifies its foundational gesture, especially in 
the form of the manifesto, as one that organises new life from the basis of theatre. 
Yet, its committed approach has often been read as indicative of its demise – or, 
at worse, of its actual inability to effect any change in real life. Despite its endless 
expression of newness and innovation in invariably appropriating radically 
engaged aesthetic forms, the avant-garde is seen to mainly repeat a failed 
proposition and, in itself, stands as proof of its failure to materialise positive or 
lasting change.  
In Theatre, Performance and the Avant-garde, Günter Berghaus reads the 
failure of the avant-garde on a double premise that a) the avant-garde’s rejection 
of the bourgeois society was paradoxical, since these artists continued to operate 
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within its artistic institutions, and that b) ‘this opposition’ also strengthened ‘a 
structural feature of capitalist society: its constant drive to renew and advance 
itself’ (41). It is a critical position that reiterates to a high degree Benjamin’s 
‘aestheticisation thesis’ (1936) by which Benjamin accused the avant-garde’s 
committed art as paving the path to totalisation. Most recently, Groy’s analysis in 
his revisionist The Total Art of Stalinism attempts to reclaim the immersion of 
avant-garde’s performance art with the ‘praxis of life’ as a radical affirmation of 
totalitarianism, leading to the Russian Socialist Realism. Groys argues that, if 
what is most radical about the avant-garde movement is its attempt to formulate 
alternative life praxes, then its theatres also formulate an aesthetic paradigm that 
not only claims to transform actual socio-political life, but lends its political 
gestus to another movement – Social Realism. For him, Social Realism behaves 
as an aesthetic model of totalisation under Stalin in the sense of affirming, and 
forcefully imposing, a socialist worldview to real life.  
In a similar light, Berghaus claims that ‘the concept of alterity’ that the 
avant-garde ‘promoted came to be incorporated into the machinery of progress 
and was neutralized in just the same manner as the attempts to break up the 
institutionalized distance of art from life’ (42). It was a case, he insists, of a major 
scandal that turned into an added flavour towards dramatic thrill, like the first 
theatrical performances of the Serate evenings in 1910: ‘after a while audiences 
came to these events “to find distraction and excitement… to see and experience 
something new and to feel stimulated and fortified”’ (140). It is the same 
argument that sees the avant-garde as another stimulation in the rapidly growing 
capitalist economy of the twentieth century culture. But was it? What is missing 
here is an equally critical appreciation of what the avant-garde values sought to 
not only implement, but prevent. 
Taxidou and Susan Buck-Morse provide several correctives that 
rehabilitate such a critical approach, reading the category of ‘failure’ as hopeful 
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and emancipatory. ‘Rather than viewing [the avant-garde] experiments’, Taxidou 
argues, ‘as failed/tragic attempts in reconciling politics and aesthetics,’ she then 
agrees with Buck-Morse’s study in which she ‘urges us to revisit these moments, 
particularly in their East/West encounters, as instances of hope’ (210). In her 
Dreamworld and Catastrophe, Buck-Morse defuses the accusation of avant-
garde’s aestheticisation of politics as a prelude to totalitarianism by removing it 
from its instrumentality that most critical assessments focus on. Instead, she 
provides a more speculative reading of what its function might be, arguing for its 
mediating form through which two opposite categories were rethought and 
renegotiated.  
In what follows I also employ this speculative line of thinking about failure 
in order to examine the Dadaist political art of the manifesto and its affinity to a 
failed revolutionary project. By that, I am interested in further rehabilitating the 
critical space of avant-garde ‘failure’ and, in this way, challenge the received 
wisdom that continues to read the avant-garde political efficacy as a failed 
intervention within the overall project of modernism. I read failure as a negative 
modality that, far from its productive counter opposite (success), failure assigns 
engaged performance with an agonistic radicalism that functions as a critical 
mode of transformative appropriation. Therefore, I read failure as an aesthetic 
practice that requires speculative reflection and negotiation of experiencing the 
anxiety and aporia that the political present moment demands.  
As such, the following article explores the ways by which the project of the 
avant-garde manifesto raises the issue of the political in the theatre. By 
highlighting what I call negative poiesis, I read the inherently political process of 
‘failure’ as a mode of speculative performance. Dada Berlin, the most politicised 
expression of the avant-garde manifesto, draws on International Socialism 
represented in Berlin by Rose Luxemburg, by which it charts the political 
character of the movement. Its manifestos openly appropriate the failing 
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revolutionary project of the communist Spartacus as a mode of negative meta-
manifestation; that is, as creative reconfigurations of ‘failure’ that, in the 
playground of theatrical expression, simultaneously assert ‘negativity’ as a 
positive modality. Failure in Dada Berlin is embedded in the political efficacy of 
the revolutionary project of communism. I am interested in rehabilitating the 
received perception of ‘failure’ as a setback or shortcoming usually attached to 
critical evaluation of the avant-garde project, and particularly the political Dada 
expressions. I want to renegotiate the ability of these aesthetic forms to engage 
and stage ‘failure’ as a kind of negative theatre that performs political philosophy. 
Towards this aim, I provide the violating character of failure as a corrective, by 
which I re-read the political engagement of the Dada manifesto in Berlin, not as 
failed articulations of a revolutionary future, but as struggle-filled pursuits that 
renegotiate theatricality in what is political. In embodying, reliving and restaging 
the violence of failure, Dadaists work towards a comprehension of a struggle 
grounded in the theatrical moment of the political present.  
 
 
CONCLUSION TO THE ARTICLE 
 
By untangling the aesthetic dynamics that fuel failure as a negative poesis, Dada 
Berlin rethinks and reshapes what the ‘political’ might be. Dada’s move to 
performing manifestos as a form of the very negation of the manifestoing activity 
– what I discuss as anti-manifestation – posits failure as an already speculative 
experience. 
The failed revolution of the Spartacus Uprising propels Dada’s political 
commitment on the one hand, and embodies anarchist politics as a kind of 
negative thinking on the other. It enables the Dadaist-thinker to not only perform 
manifestos as a mode of resistance, but to use the very activity of manifestoing 
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as a form of negation, speculatively engaging with both the political word and 
theatricality itself. In this way, Dada anti-manifestation marks artistic praxis as a 
form of performing the ‘negative’ of thought, which, in the manifesto form, is 
always about announcing the arrival of a new world order entangled with the 
creative vigour that comes from the shaping of this world – a shaping that, in 






























The Director’s Theatrocratic Middle 
 
The dubious angel constantly changes its self-identity and its relation to 
others. Yet it appears commonplace, pedestrian, bulky and grounded – even 
though, mirabile dictu, there are no grounds and no ground.  
 
– Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity 10 
 
 
The theatre becomes a place for philosophers, and for such philosophers 
as not only wish to explain the world but wish to change it… 
 
–  Bertolt Brecht, ‘The German Drama: Pre-Hitler’ in Willett 78 
 
 
The Director as Philosopher: Bertolt Brecht 
The above excerpt, published in an essay by which Brecht introduces his didactic 
– or, as he called them, ‘learning’ – plays, is seen to capture the famous 
Feuerbachian call for change,  this time coming from the director. It is well known 
that Brecht was well acquainted with the philosophers of his time. Being a close 
friend with Benjamin, he was in direct contact with his philosophical ideas, but 
he also engaged in lengthy discussions with Adorno and Lukács. Most famously, 
his dispute with Lukács was around the workings of Realism within the wider 
context of political struggle in accordance to Marxism, which is well documented. 
For Lukács, ‘the central structural problem of capitalist society’ (‘Reification and 
the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ 83) had to do with what he referred to as the 
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notion of reification. Reification is an aspect of delusion related to ‘commodity 
fetishism’, in which something attains the imaginary characteristic of a thing-like 
status. However, the problem is that it forces a false objectification in the activity 
of individuals who, being led by delusions, become estranged from their real 
potentials.  
In reality, as Elisabeth Weight observes, both Brecht and Lukács wanted to 
‘undo the effects of reification under capitalism’ (Postmodern Brecht 70). For 
Brecht, however, this was a task that could only succeed by ‘de-naturalising the 
rigidified world’ (ibid.); that is, by getting the spectators to critically engage with 
reality. With this in mind, Brecht proposed his Epic theatre that consisted of a 
range of formalist devises aiming to help the spectator decipher the contradictions 
of life under capitalism. Benjamin’s belief in technology, as a means by which 
the work of art could be revolutionised and, in effect, come to transform the 
spectator’s perception, found a natural ally in Brecht’s technical application. Yet, 
it was not so much in Adorno, who critically contested the idea of technology. 
Indeed, Adorno’s objection to Benjamin’s essay, that assigns a ‘counter-
revolutionary function’ to ‘a sublimated remnant of certain Brechtian motifs’, 
situates Brecht, like most of the avant-garde project, on the formal structures of 
mass culture. The culture industry is always received negatively in Adorno. This 
is because he saw its art at the service of a prevailing power structure. He thus 
critiques Brecht’s appeal to populist approaches of theatre, accusing him of 
practising an empty formalism as an aesthetic principle not that dissimilar from 
the totalitarian aestheticisation of politics. And yet, what Adorno fails to see is 
the dialectical nature of these plays. As Weight points out, Brecht’s theatre 
deconstructs ‘the perverse strategies performed by fascism’ by appropriating and 
exaggerating the bourgeois rhetoric for gangsters and fascists ‘in the attempt to 
divert attention from political reality.’ She further explains: 
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The didactic play as artistic principle is not just mere propaganda: what is 
at stake is not mere ‘defamiliarisation’ but ‘distanciation’… the form 
betraying the split consciousness which still inhabits it, thereby 
encouraging the audience (hopelessly unequal to any such task in Adorno’s 
pessimistic assessment) to engage in the production of that particular mode 
of thinking Brecht called ‘interventionist’ (GW 18, p. 237), which questions 
things and events with regards to the possibility of change and 
transformation. (84)   
 
This chapter identifies Brecht with the role of the philosopher/thinker of 
theatre. So far, I have explored this role through an analysis of the aesthetic, 
theatrical, dramatic and political structures that compose the mediating 
subjectivity of the director. My focus, throughout this thesis, has been on the 
interface between theater and philosophy in which I locate the mediating 
subjectivity of the director. This is a ‘thinking’ subjectivity that is anchored in my 
examination in the process of the works themselves, both aesthetic and theoretical 
works, mediated by the director as representations of speculative thought. 
Therefore, I have paid attention to the kind of aesthetic materials and moments in 
theatre history that seem to me to be emblematic of the philosophical paradigm 
of the director in theatre rather than the more practical dimension of the director 
as an artist who interacts with actors and stages plays. 
This concluding chapter seeks to reveal the kind of philosophical framing 
that envelops Brecht’s mediating subjectivity as well as the meaning of the 
relations and tensions that are produced as a result of the director’s mediation to 
both theatre and philosophy. 
Regardless of the critical positions voiced by philosophers in response to 
Brecht’s theatrical innovations, the influence of Brecht on modernist theatre 
cannot be measured only by his impressive approaches to staging and writing of 
plays. Brecht’s real impact comes from thinking about theatre, and thinking 
philosophically. He thus constantly confronts theatrical form and content with 
philosophy in the manner that readily evokes Platonic thought. Benjamin, as 
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Brecht’s closest philosophical associate, was the first to remark on the implicit 
affinity that connected Brecht and his Epic theory with the Platonic tradition of 
drama. For Puchner, Brecht’s Platonic debt originates from the Platonic project 
of Georg Kaiser, which had intrigued Brecht, particularly in how Kaiser 
appropriated Socratic dialogues to write his own Socrates play, Alcibiades 
Delivered (The Drama of Ideas 106). Turning to Plato’s Symposium, Brecht finds 
stylistic features that speak deeply of his own theatrical thinking: ‘Socrates’ 
critical edge, his dialectical reasoning, and his willingness to stand up to the 
powers that be.’ (ibid.) Yet, they are features, too, upon which theatre is 
problemsatised at the same time as a form of bad democracy – a theatrocracy. 
Why, or how, Brecht, a ‘man of the theatre’ (Puchner The Drama of Ideas  107), 
and a Marxist man at that, would become associated with Platonic philosophy is 
a valid question to ask, to which Puchner turns and explores at length in his own 
discussion. However, the most interesting – indeed, the most curious – question 
to further ask is, I think, how Brecht the theatre director would come to enact a 
very specific theatre of Plato, that is not only anti-theatrical, anti-mimetic, 
didactic and critical, but rather a deeply theatrocratic theatre. 
In Chapter 1, I explored the dual meaning of theatrocracy in Plato. First, as 
a democratic mode of ‘vision’ denoting ‘knowledge’ that, for him, is always 
misused as a resource of spectacle in theatre, corrupting the spectators and 
distorting the ‘truth’ of things. In condemning theatre as theatrocracy, Plato is 
thinking of democracry. The blurring of the distinction between imitation and 
representation, and the elimination of the distance between actor and spectator, is 
reminiscent of the democratic demos which Plato considers dangerous because, 
to borrow from Hallward, it authenticates ‘the untutored expression of the people’ 
(‘Staging Equality’ 116). As Rancière has said, Plato’s problem with Athenian 
democracy is its fundamental essence which, in democratic politics, often takes 
the shape of a theatrocratic rule in the sense that it enables the exercise of power 
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by the demos on ‘the absence of any foundation’ (Lacoue-Labarthe L’Imitation 
des modernes 276). Furthermore, theatrocracy is a mode of ruling theatrically. It 
introduces a multiplicity of perspective that, for Plato, acts as a cacophony of 
heterogeneous voices that end up disrupting the ability of the theatron as a mode 
of (philosophical) knowledge and reason. In the end, what emerges is not theatre 
as such, but, as Weber attests, an expression of the subversive force of theatre: 
‘…[theatricality] forsakes the confines of the theatron’, as Weber points out, ‘and 
begins to wander: when, in short, it separates itself from theatre’ (Theatricality 
as a Medium 37). It is how theatrocracy, for Plato, begins to control social, 
political or aesthetic representation, but simultaneously subverts any form of 
control or the rule of the state by escaping the confines of theatre. Theatrocracy, 
in this function could be said to confront the forms of ‘imaginary creation’ that 
shape up society by which this society re-cognises, re-imagines and, finally, re-
configures and transforms both itself and theatre.  
The parallels between Brecht and Plato can be further seen from the kind 
of theatrical thinking they both employ. Brecht was known from his writings on 
theatre, particularly his estrangement effect, distanciation, episodic plots and the 
use of interruption, and the various defamiliarisation techniques of his Epic 
theatre. In common with Plato, his objective was to produce a critical frame of 
mind in the audience and to foreground the stage as a forum of exposure, 
reflection and analysis, rather than concealment, immersion and illusion. His 
series of dialogues, entitled Messingkauf, concern the nature of theatre, especially 
from the point of view of what Brecht understands as ‘didactic’. ‘What is the 
purpose of theatre?’ seems to be the principal question of the dialogic discussion. 
It is why Brecht introduces a character named ‘The Playwright’, whose interest 
gravitates more and more in the political function of theatre through which he 
explores every other aspect: the audience, the actor, the dramatic stage, the text, 
the scenic design, the use of music and the medium of theatre as a whole. The 
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emphasis is placed on what is, and is not, Epic theatre, articulating the Epic 
theatre as the model of the modern theatre. And yet, the main character in Brecht’s 
Messingkauf is not ‘The Playwright’, but another figure who is also the 
protagonist, namely ‘The Philosopher’.    
The story plays out the usual anti-theatrical position portraying ‘The 
Philosopher’ as feeling disturbed, even tyrannised, by the presence of the actor, 
who prevents sober thinking, inciting emotions to the audience, embodied by 
imitation. Yet, what emerges is the affirmation of theatre, even if not as theatre 
of feeling, but a theatre nonetheless, yet for the specific purposes of the 
philosopher. Suddenly, the philosopher seems to have replaced the actor, has 
exchanged embodiment with ideas, imitation with thinking, theatre with 
knowledge, turning the playwright to that ‘other’ of theatre, as that ‘an-other’ of 
Brecht himself. In fact, what we see is ‘the philosopher’ having finally entered 
the theatre, not figuratively or indirectly, but literally, by which he creates this 
new alternative space of thought that is simultaneously shown as a space of 
vision. This new form is made of philosophy and of theatre, in-between of which 
Brecht’s Epic theatre is a curiously hybrid mode of ‘doing’ and ‘thinking’ 
represented by Brecht himself in his roles as a director, that seems, to me, that 
Brecht himself occupies in his role as the director. It is why, I think, that while, 
in The Drama of Ideas, Puchner suggests that Brecht impersonates ‘the 
Playwright’ who argues with the philosopher in defence of theatre (108), it is 
actually ‘The Philosopher’ that Brecht enacts. It is that ‘other’ half of the director. 
Moreover, this is a Platonic ‘other’ half that makes the philosopher-director  
deeply fractured in the middle. One holds this figure suspect of deceiving its 
audience. Inverting philosophy into theatre, the director puts theatre into the 
service of knowledge and analysis, yet without doing away with the perils of the 
spectacle – what Plato called theatrocracy. In this sense, theatrocratic theatre 
denotes a site of natural power but not the far cry of spectacularism that seduces 
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and misleads the emotions of the audience. Instead, theatrocratic theatre could be 
said to be a truly directorial theatre that is simultaneously a philosophic theatre, 
the kind of theatre of ideas as being the medium of the philosopher director. This 
is also why this figure could be viewed as a theatrocratic figure which denotes 
the director as a mode of embodied philosophy, yet a figure that is also embedded 
in the power relations of the economy of the spectacle – the rule of the theatron.  
Brecht’s landmark of the estrangement effect, his emphasis on analysis 
rather than empathy, his aversion to the hypnotic magic of theatre, his insistence 
that the audience must be aware at all times that the action of the play is theatre, 
that the audience must watch critically, can be seen to reiterate the kind of 
philosophical theatre in which Brecht’s character of ‘The Philosopher’ is 
interested. Indeed, it is the kind of theatre already sketched out by the original 
philosopher himself: Plato. Curiously, despite Plato’s protest, it is a theatrocratic 
theatre, a theatre that mediates between the demos and philosophy and which 
receives its full articulation as the power of thought through the figure of the 
director. It is the director, not the philosopher per se, that mediates the ‘rule’ of 
the theatre and the ‘rule’ of knowledge, between actors (embodiment) and the act 
of thought (thinking), bringing together the two ancient rivals and antagonists, – 
theatre and philosophy – in a single space of co-existence.  
Another way that Brecht’s Messingkauf dialogues connect to Plato is 
formalistically. Presenting a dramatised type of thought, Brecht’s Messingkauf 
dialogues offer Plato’s special kind of dramatic philosophy as modernist drama, 
a thesis that Puchner explores in his various book projects. It is the same dramatic 
form that an earlier visionary, the director Edward Gordon Craig, as we saw 
before, used to introduce himself as a director while behaving as a kind of 
philosopher, appropriating Platonic dialogic thought and imitating a 
philosophical persona, by which he would initiate the ignorant students to the 
mysteries of theatre. However, for Brecht, the philosopher is no longer a symbol, 
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an intellectual passage that ascends to the hegemony of the director in theatre. 
Rather, it is something of an identity. When, in the Messingkauf, Brecht stages 
the actual ‘philosopher’ in theatre with the spectators also sitting on stage, the 
setting is a mirror image of Brecht the director surrounded by people that he also 
needs to instruct: the actors in rehearsals, the spectators in performance. The 
director, like the Messingkauf philosopher, carefully discusses the various 
elements of theatre, while the play is slowly taking shape, in contrast to the slow 
process of dismantling that which we see to take place with ‘The Philosopher’ in 
Messingkauf. Here again, the two processes are characteristic of the fundamental 
opposition that binds them together; the potential to ‘see’ and to ‘know-through-
seeing’, that both theatre and philosophy are interested in and want to act out. The 
mediating subjectivity of the director facilitates this relation, both allowing it to 
happen while problematising it. It is in this direct (rather than metaphorical) way 
that the director turns philosophy into theatre, and theatre into philosophy. 
Besides, as ‘The Philosopher’ seems to take pride in the play: ‘We too have made 
art for the past four nights’ (Brecht Messingkauf 644), yet it is an art that is only 
a by-product, made possible through the mediation of Brecht, the director. 
Brecht’s didactic plays (Lehrstücke), to which the Messingkauf dialogues 
belong, are not the only type of philosophical theatre. Rather, what is most special 
about them is in dramatising the relationship between theatre and philosophy and 
in literally showing the philosopher having entered the theatre – the kind of 
philosopher that Brecht uses to address theatre with reason, exemplifying an 
analytical, didactic model of representation that stands for his Epic theatre. At 
this meeting point, Brecht embodies Plato performing the antithesis of a Platonic 
theatre which is also deeply theatrocratic in its anti-theatricality, promoting 
knowledge as another form of thea, inverting it into a site for philosophy. The 
difference is that, in the process, another philosopher is needed that dramatises 
both theatre and philosophy at the very point of opposition of ‘knowing’ the 
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world. The director mediates between those two modes of ‘knowing’ as 
philosophical reason, on the one hand, and as embodied affectivity, on the other. 
It is what makes the director a Platonic figure, and yet unmistakably theatrocratic. 
The director thinks in theatre by mediating world and tropes of knowing, arts and 
artists, people and identities. It is also why the director is intensely anti-
Aristotelian. Brecht is the prime example, but this can be seen in every other 
director of the modernist theatre. I will briefly address Aristotelianism as an anti-
directorial position before I bring this final chapter to an end, by which I conclude 
this thesis. 
The real significant of Aristotle’s Poetics is in proposing ways by which 
theatre can be instrumentalised and, thus, act in a controlled and specified way 
which is a form of ‘direction’ – of how one thinks and behaves in society. It is, 
thus, a proposition that aims to reconfigure theatre from being an instrument that 
empowers people to controlling this power through the instrument of theatre. The 
latter offers theatre a poetics (which is about a ‘how to’) that aims to defuse 
theatre’s unsettling ability to merge identities and moderate its place of in-
betweenness. Theatre’s mediating capacity that, for Weber, can forsake ‘the 
confines of the theatron and begin to wander’ (37) has always been speculated as 
a claim to real political power, which is precisely what horrified Plato in the first 
place, leading him to perceive all theatre as essentially forms of theatrocracy. It 
is in response to this prospect that Aristotle’s solution is to subordinate theatre to 
a conception of its medium as a poetic genre of dramatic representation structured 
as a complete, coherent and unified narrative. From this premise, then, Aristotle 
advances a sophisticated reading of mimesis as tekhne developed on the idea of 
artistic purity in relation to the literary properties of dramatic plot and narrative. 
The dramatic paradigm of tragedy, proposed as a single, complete and meaningful 
praxis, can be seen to create an equally structured and meaningful muthos (plot) 
to which he subordinates theatricality and, in this way, devalorises the material 
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environment of theatre. If theatre, in Aristotle’s thought, is not theatrocratic, it is 
not because it is conceived as lacking in power. But precisely because he relegates 
theatre to an instrumental status. ‘The specifically scenic medium of theatre’ in 
Aristotle, argues Weber, in the sense of ‘everything having to do with spectacle, 
with opsis’ is rendered susceptible to mere synoptic viewing – the act of taking in 
the spectacle ‘with a single view’ (99). 
And yet, it is by offering theatre as a stable and detachable point or fixed 
position that Aristotle not only reduces everything that has to do with opsis (stage, 
locality, bodies, auditorium, masks, etc.) to having a solely material, technical 
meaning. Rather, he effectively prevents the possibility of speculative meaning 
that can potentially take on a political significance. If theatre is to be ‘taken in at 
a single view’ (ibid.), it is to eliminate that troubling confounding of reality and 
fiction, role and character, theatre and politics, so that text and action can be 
merely performed on stage in a way that ‘nothing happens’ (Rancière, Staging 
the People) . It is a case of what Rancière claims as ‘actors or singers simply 
execut[ing] their roles and their audiences simply consum[ing] them’; a properly 
anti-spectacle approach that necessitates the impossibility of a mediating stage or 
any praxis other than a unified, self-contained plot. It renders theatre to a medium 
– not of mediation and improvisation, but what equals, as Weber observes, to 
‘means, instrument, element, a necessary but not sufficient ingredient of poetry’ 
(100). Aristotle’s insistence that ‘a tragedy cannot exist without a plot, but it can 
without characters’ (Poetics 50 a 23-24) offers theatre as synoptic by which he 
describes the sense of a whole as unity established, namely its representation of 
‘praxis’ (action) through ‘muthos’ (plot). And yet, synopsis does not merely relate 
to a unified understanding of life (bios) unfolding in the ‘plot’, but to a sense of 
a unified action qua plot as a process of discovery described by Aristotle as 
peripeteia, which is, then, what prepares us for the moment of recognition – 
anagnōrisis. The key question, however, is recognition of what? Or, more to the 
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point, what kind of recognition? The answer is the kind of recognition, or perhaps 
affirmation, that is capable of diverting political ‘excess’, which is the kind 
associated with the speculative middle of theatre, of that political space, we might 
also add, of those who have no part in power. Its instrumentalisation not only 
devaluates the medium of theatricality to the controlled supervision of its scenic 
medium (synopsis), to be exercised from appropriately managing its institution. 
Rather, it disallows the very function of the director as a mediating form of 
embodied thought that claims to not only understand the world, but also to be able 
to shape, reshape and transform it. 
Indeed, for Aristotle, the task of representing the unity of an ‘action’ and, 
through it, of ‘life’, theatre must be subordinated to the right kind of recognition. 
It must not be one that could potentially bring something anew to light, drawing 
attention to the spontaneous and contingent function of the mediating function of 
theatre, but something that enables recognition from what is already known, 
mostly in its pedagogical sense and, thus, reaffirms ‘the identity of the learner, 
who is able to re-identify what he or she has already seen’ (Weber 256). 
Recognition as a pedagogical mode in Aristotle is often coercive and hegemonic, 
reiterating the affirmation, repetition, and confirmation of the same, stable or 
fixed position of authority. It is also why it precludes mediation in which 
recognition acquires a difficult, agonistic meaning, not as a mode of knowing and 
understanding, but one that rehabilitates what ‘recognition’ might stand for in the 
first place, including that part that has to do with reason and criticism as forms of 
pedagogy. This is why Aristotelianism is not a director’s stage. For the 
fundamental question of a mediating stage is not what one might come to 
recognise, but what Rosean re-cognition itself might be able to reveal, subvert 
and, ultimately, transform, always offered as an unsettling form of ‘knowing-
through-seeing’ – the kind of embodied philosophy the director exercises in 
theatre. 
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It is for this reason, perhaps, that Puchner argues that modern drama results 
‘from the coincidence of a demise of Aristotelianism and a rise of Platonism’. 
And yet, for me, such coincidence is placed elsewhere and has to do with the 
entrance of Platonism in theatre through the tragic poet. Its return in the modern 
theatre heralds the figure of the modern director as a deeply Platonic 
configuration  in its antithesis – that is a resourcefully theatrocratic figure. It is an 
opposition that marks the mediating experience of the director, as an aesthetic 
subjectivity and a speculative mode of thought. Brecht has always been compared 
to Marxist Materialism, but it seems that Brecht might be closer to Rose. 
In his article ‘The Achievement of Brecht’, Raymond Williams insightfully 
observes that Brecht exercises a form of ‘complex seeing’, not only through 
argument (explored mainly in his didactic plays), ‘but through a dramatic 
demonstration’ (157). Referring to The Good Woman of Setzuan, Williams points 
out that dramatic characters are offered in an oppositional logic as both what are 
and what are not – such as the case with Shen Te’s transformation of herself into 
her tough male cousin, Shui Ta, who himself has an enigmatic existence. Yet, 
what Williams means here is that Brecht discovers, as he puts it, ways of ‘enacting 
genuine alternatives: not so much, as in traditional drama, through the 
embodiment of alternative in opposing characters, but by their embodiment in 
one person, who lives through this way and then that and invites us to draw our 
conclusions’ (157). ‘Complex seeing’ is simultaneously embedded in the 
dramatic form and enacted through it without an ‘imposed resolution’, but an 
invitation for us to think, consider and rethink. As Williams puts it, drama occurs 
and is seen at once, not assumed as an action and then argued, a difference that 
offers Brecht’s ‘seeing’ as a complex mode of speculative mode in the Rosean 
sense – as a mode of re-cognition. Its thinking ‘struggles’ towards a 
comprehension of oppositions in one’s selves and in the roles one plays in 
sustaining and promoting injustice. In Brecht, we often see ‘the moral’ as being 
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‘the dramatic’, but as an active process. It functions as a way of speculative 
looking that, as Rose argues, struggles towards comprehension, and yet 
acknowledges that any form of understanding might ultimately be partial, 
incomplete, fraught and covered with gaps and fissures. Here, the process towards 
understanding, denotes, for Brecht, as for Rose, an essential part of working 
through contradictions, not only at the level of personal qualities, but also, as 
Williams observes, at the level of the play as a whole – what would be, for Rose, 
the anxiety-ridden level of engaging with actuality that sits with ambiguity and 
embraces equivocation. It is worth quoting Williams’ passage from Brecht taken 
from Mother Courage, which is an excellent example of speculative, equivocal 
thought employed by Brecht the director/author-philosopher: 
 
Chaplain: …Mother Courage, I see how you got your name. 
Mother Courage: Poorer people need courage. They’re lost, that’s why. 
That they even get up in the morning is something – in their plight. Or that 
they plough a field, in wartime. Or that they have an Emperor and a Pope, 
what courage that takes, when you can lose your life by it. The Poor! They 
hang each other one by one, they slaughter each other in the lump, so if they 
want to look each other in the face once in a while – well, it takes courage, 
that’s all. (159) 
 
I discussed earlier Rosean aporia as the kind of aporetic perspectivity that informs 
the director’s mediation, and already being traced as a mode or trope of thought 
in the aesthetic paradigm of Athenian tragedy. Brecht’s attention on re-cognition 
of the what is and the how is as an ongoing process of struggling towards 
recognition, or an action that ‘is continually being replayed, and could be 
otherwise’ for Williams, of that kind of fuller re-cognition of others, of ourselves, 
and where one constantly finds oneself in social and political institutions for 
Rose, is such an aporetic expression. It conveys the speculative act with engaging, 
not with the past, not the future, but the present. This active engagement with the 
present, it seems to me, is a final point of contact between Brecht and Rose, but 
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also, between the role of the director and speculative philosophy. The process of 
working towards knowing, what Williams call a ‘complex seeing’, is already 
political, because it involves the political risk of coming up against that violence 
that speculative reason requires – the kind of violence that is our own and 
embedded in the structures of our institutions. For Rose, as Schick observes, ‘an 
agonistic pursuit of justice does not assume that we can take linear steps towards 
a better future, but it does not retreat from action’ (129). It is what makes Rosean 
thought fundamentally theatrical. It urges for action that involves risk because 
any action will need to be inevitably revisited and revised in the process of 
knowing and re-cognising it and this is already what we find that theatre does. 
Theatre does not merely seek displacement or impossible stages of seeing, but, 
rather, it seems to me, what is here and now in the experience of what Rose calls 
a ‘good enough justice’, an experience that already performs and acknowledges 
the brokenness it is embedded in. 
Here, we might once more recall Angelus Dubiosus. It is the angel that 
embodies speculative reason, and is unlike Benjamin’s melancholic and 
traumatised angel of Angelus Novus with which I opened this thesis. As Rose 
maintains, Angelus Dubious is more precious than his fellow angelic ‘Novus’ 
because this is a dubious and, indeed, theatrical angel capable of employing that 
kind of ‘humorous witness that must endure’ (Judaism and Modernity 8). For 
Schick, this is a ‘humorous witness that embraces a facetious reason that learns 
and grows, struggling towards recognition and taking political risks’ in the pursuit 
of this ‘good enough justice’ (130). As Rose insightfully describes: 
 
the dubious angel, bathetic angel, suits reason: for the angel continues to 
try to do good, to run the risk of idealization, of abstract intentions, to stake 
itself for ideas and for others. Experience will only accrue if the angel 
discovers the violence in its initial idea, when that idea comes up against 
the actuality of others and the unanticipated meanings between them. Now 
angels, of course, are not meant to gain experience – in the angelic 
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hierarchies, idea and act at once define the angel, who is the unique instance 
of its species, without generation or gender. (8) 
 
A speculative director begins here, with such an angel that is apotetic, 
gender-less and generational-less. It is a figure that occupies the critical space of 
in-between ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’, always as a creative act of thought-embodied 
scenically in the form of theatre. Each of the chapters discussed in this thesis 
explores the speculative aspect of the director, which I traced in the Event of 
tragedy. It is the same Event that gives shape to the director and turns this figure 
into the Event of the director at the last quarter of the nineteenth century. I focused 
on moments of that history in Evental terms by looking at those figures and works 
that most clearly portray the mediating subjectivity of the director as a speculative 
way of a-poria. Aporetic poetics work through the uneasy negotiation of the 
middle, positing political agency as a matter of theatre, which is why an aporetic 
perspective is always, in my reading, theatrocratic. It models a radically 
democratic subjectivity in which political engagement is an agonistic relation, 
even if negatively for Plato. In aporia as a mode of theatre, there is an urgent 
sense of readiness to act, by engaging in political risk, yet knowing that any action 
will be imperfect, incomplete and, for that matter, negative.  
 
The study brought together two distinct but intimately related projects: the 
relatively absent field of speculative thought in theatre studies and the mode of 
analysis that we refer to as Performance Philosophy. My reading drew closely on 
the ideas of Rose as well as other philosophers, such as Castoriadis, Laclau and 
Mouffe as well as Plato and Hegel. Rose’s revisionist Hegelianism as a ‘broken 
middle’, with which this thesis began, illustrates that reading to a speculative 
compass is not only philosophical, but also profoundly theatrical. Rose herself 
explored this connection with her evocation of the dubious angel in this thesis 
stands for the speculative dimension of the figure of the director. On Rose’s 
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terms, this is also a figure of a new type of ethics, grounded on mourning and 
failure, always battling with the brokenness of the middle. I showed how this 
connection is also part of the meaning of the director and what allows this figure 
to be read as a mediating, philosophical figure in theatre, equal to a Rosean new 
aesthetic, ethics and new politics of the broken middle. The predominantly 
historiographical research in theatre studies, with little attention paid to the 
conceptual bearing of the director, has often obscured both the philosophical 
dimension of this figure and its infinite connection to philosophy. My contention 
more broadly has been that theatre scholarship on the director remains 
underdeveloped and lacking analytical thinking appropriate to the complexity of 
this figure. Perceived as an evolutionary moment in theatrical history, the director 
is often offered on the reductive notion of stylistic reform, despite a great deal of 
important scholarship available on theatre. A speculative reading, on the other 
hand, is, as I hope to have shown here, anti-reductive and anti-evolutionary. 
Rather, it draws its analytical potency from the very form of speculative thought, 
allowing the director to be conceptualised as an equivalent form of thought. My 
main hypothesis lies on the recognition of mediation as a primarily broken middle 
that situates the director in the hybrid, in-between space of mediation, always 
mending two opposites that were never united to start with, yet always mediating 
and negotiating this space between theatre and philosophy, stage and the city, 
actor and character, politics and representation, autonomous and committed art, 
and so forth. As such, a mediating subjectivity as a properly speculative figure, 
which recognises theatre as always broken in the middle, does not ask ‘What are 
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